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Abstract
The widely accepted Grundaxiom of Karl Rahner's doctrine of the Trinity, "The
economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity and vice versa," functions in contemporary
theology as a means of reconciling the seemingly contradictory claims: (a) that God
has revealed the doctrine of the Trinity to the church; and (b) that he has not
disclosed this doctrine verbally in Scripture. Rahner's Grundaxiom, that is to say,
serves to legitimate theological reflection on the Trinity that does not presuppose a
pre-Enlightenment understanding of Scriptural revelation.
In our dissertation, however, we argue: (a) that Rahner's Grundaxiom does not
cohere with certain elements of Rahner's own theology; (b) that the Grundaxiom
entails conclusions inconsistent with what Rahner regards as Trinitarian orthodoxy;
and (c) that a pre-Enlightenment understanding of Scripture, by contrast, constitutes
a reasonable foundation for Rahner's ideal of Trinitarian orthodoxy. We conclude,
therefore (d) that, barring the possibility of some third foundation for the theology of
the Trinity, Rahner's doctrine of the Trinity itself presupposes a pre-Enlightenment
conception of Scriptural revelation.
Preface
In "The Revelation of the Trinity: Karl Rahner's Position and an Evangelical
Alternative," we hope to achieve two fundamental objectives: first, to discredit Karl
Rahner's account of how God reveals the doctrine of the Trinity; and, second, to
valorize an alternative account of this process. We hope, that is to say, in Part 1 of
this work, to criticize Rahner's belief that because God communicates his very self
(semetipsum) to human beings in the economy of salvation, human beings can
reasonably assume that the triune form in which God appears in this economy
belongs to him necessarily and eternally. In Part 2 of this work, we hope to construct
an alternative account of how God endows human beings with knowledge of the
immanent Trinity by way of establishing that Scripture implicitly contains the
doctrine of the Trinity.
In Part 1, specifically, we intend to level four, principal criticisms of Rahner's
views on these subjects. First, we shall argue, if God is simple, as Rahner admits,
and incapable of communicating himself without undergoing some metamorphosis,
as Rahner insists, then the economic Trinity cannot correspond precisely to the
immanent Trinity in any respect. Since every aspect of a simple God is absolutely,
albeit not necessarily relatively, identical with every other, that is to say, a simple
being cannot change in any respect without also changing in every respect. If, then,
the immanent Trinity, i.e. God in himself prescinding from any self-communication,
must mutate in some way in order to become the economic Trinity, i.e. God
communicating himself to his creation, then the tripersonal structure of the economic
Trinity can coincide with that of the immanent Trinity in no respect whatsoever. In
such a case, it seems, one could not justifiably attribute the triune form God exhibits
in the economy of salvation to God as he would have existed irrespective of any self-
communication.
We shall argue, second, that even if a simple God could somehow exempt his
inner, relational structure from the comprehensive metamorphosis requisite to self-
communication as Rahner understands it, human beings could never know which
aspects of God communicated actually do correspond to the hypothetical
uncommunicated God and which do not unless God either endowed them with the
beatific vision or simply told them through a verbal, or at least a conceptual,
revelation. Even if the first criticism were invalid, then, a communication of the
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doctrine of the immanent Trinity to human beings would still require a
verbal/conceptual revelation, the possibility of which Rahner refuses to countenance.
To the extent, then, that he constructs his account of the Trinity's self-revelation
precisely in order to prove that human beings can attain to warranted, true belief in
the doctrine of the Trinity without a verbal/conceptual revelation, Rahner's account
fails to achieve its purpose.
We shall argue, third, that if, as Rahner admits: a) the Trinitarian persons possess
as peculiar to themselves only their relations of opposition to each other; and b) "in
God the relation is real only through its identity with the real divine essence;"1 then
God can influence creation only through the one, undifferentiated divine
omnipotence and not through any powers peculiar to the persons. In this case, it
seems, one could not infer God's intrinsic triunity from the triune character of the
causality he exercises in divine self-communication, because every divine influence
would proceed from a strictly unitary principle. Rahner's own presuppositions,
therefore, imply that a non-verbal, non-conceptual revelation other than the beatific
vision cannot convey to human beings the doctrine of the immanent Trinity.
Fourth and finally, we shall argue, the Biblical accounts of Christ's anointing with
the Holy Spirit (Matt 3:16, 17; Mark 1:10, 11; Luke 3:22; and John 1:32), when
interpreted in accordance with the Grundaxiom of Rahner's theology of the Trinity,
"The economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity and vice versa," entail conclusions
incompatible with Rahner's orthodox, Latin Trinitarianism. One can, we shall argue,
so expand one's concept of what qualifies as correspondence between economy and
theology as to allow for a projection of the pattern of relations displayed in the
anointing into the immanent Trinity that would not undermine Latin Trinitarianism.
Yet one can do so, we hope to prove, only at the expense of depriving the
Grundaxiom of its power to warrant inferences from the triune structure(s)
manifested in the economy of salvation to the doctrine of the immanent Trinity.
In Part 1, therefore, we hope to counter Rahner's understanding of how God
reveals the doctrine of the Trinity with four, principal objections that, in our view at
least, suffice to compromise its credibility significantly. In Part 2, we intend to
construct an alternative and, hopefully, more satisfactory account of the means
whereby God reveals the doctrine of the Trinity. We intend, specifically, to show
1 The Trinity (Joseph Donceel, tr.; New York: Herder, 1970), 71; "Der dreifaltige Gott als
transzendenter Urgrund der Heilsgeschichte" in MS ii, 317-401 at 363.
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that Scripture taken as a whole implicitly contains the full, orthodox, Latin doctrine
of the Trinity so that, given a conservative evangelical understanding of Scripture
and its authority, one is warranted in accepting this doctrine as divinely revealed.
We hope to derive the Latin doctrine of the Trinity from Scripture by the
following procedure. Assuming that Christ's distinctness from the Father and the
Spirit and the Spirit's deity are sufficiently manifest in Scripture as to require no
special proof, we intend: a) to vindicate the deity of Christ principally by
demonstrating the equivalence of pop<|)f], as Paul employs the term in Phil 2:6-7,
with ouota; and b) to demonstrate from Scripture that the Holy Spirit constitutes a
divine person distinct from the Father and the Son. We hope, then, to derive from
Scripture the doctrines of c) divine simplicity; and d) the transitivity of identity.
After e) establishing the existence of certain realities that pertain formally to the
divine persons rather than the divine essence, without, of course, giving rise to a real
distinction between the persons and the essence, we hope f) by a process of
elimination to show that the persons' relations of opposition alone account for their
distinctness from each other. We intend, next, g) to draw the consequence that, if the
divine persons possess as peculiar to themselves only their relations to each other,
then they possess no capacity for action insofar as they are distinct and, therefore, h)
cannot reveal their mutual distinctness to human beings by exerting distinct
influences on creation from which this distinctness might be inferred. In this case,
we shall observe in conclusion, the divine persons can reveal their distinctness to
human beings who do not yet enjoy the beatific vision only through a verbal, or at
least a conceptual, revelation.
In the present work, then, we intend to mount a thoroughgoing critique of Karl
Rahner's understanding of the means whereby God reveals the intra-Trinitarian
distinctions to human beings and especially of his view that verbal/conceptual
revelation need not play a role in any actual, divine disclosure of the divine persons'
multiplicity to human beings who do not yet enjoy the beatific vision. After
discrediting, to the best of our ability, Rahner's views on these subjects, then, we
hope to show how, by an alternative method, one can reach, without unduly straining
one's credulity, an orthodox, Latin doctrine of the Trinity on the basis of a Protestant,
inerrantist, and so, to a certain extent at least, "evangelical" view of Scripture. We
hope to prove by these means, specifically, that human beings who do not yet enjoy
the beatific vision cannot attain to warranted, true belief in the orthodox, Latin
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doctrine of the Trinity by means of a revelation through acts and/or athematic
experience, as Rahner proposes; but that they can attain to warranted, true belief in
this same doctrine by means of a revelation in concepts and/or words. We hope to
prove, that is to say, that the orthodox, Latin doctrine of the Trinity presupposes the
belief that God reveals certain truths to human beings in concepts and/or words.
Part One
Karl Rahner's Position
Chapter 1: Rahner on the Revelation of the Trinity: Introduction
and Preliminary Critique
I. Introduction
In the present chapter, we intend, first, to outline Rahner's philosophical
presuppositions; second, to discuss the relation of Rahner's philosophy to his
theology; third, to outline certain discontinuities between Rahner's early,
philosophical thought and his later theology; fourth, briefly to introduce his mature
views on revelation in general; fifth, to explain and in some measure evaluate the
Grundaxiom of Rahner's theology of the Trinity, viz. "the economic Trinity is the
immanent Trinity and vice versa;" and, sixth, critically to explore Rahner's
understanding of the process whereby God supplies human beings with reasonable
grounds for believing the doctrine of the Trinity. While executing the first four of
these tasks, which we undertake solely for propaedeutic purposes, we shall limit
ourselves, on the whole, to presenting and clarifying Rahner's perspective. In the
last two sections, which pertain more immediately to the subject of this work, by
contrast, we intend to interact more critically with Rahner's proposals without,
however, presenting the pith of our critique of Rahner's understanding of God's
revelation of the doctrine of the Trinity. This task, rather, must await the second and
third chapters of this work to which the present chapter constitutes an extended
introduction.
II. Rahner's Philosophical Presuppositions
1. Introduction. "In the deepest and truest sense," writes Karl Rahner:
[a] philosophy is not Christian, because it allows theology to serve as a negative norm for protection
against ideas that might come into conflict with the convictions of Christian faith; nor because it
allows itself to be stimulated by theology to new questions, which otherwise would have remained
outside its area of vision; but because, in accordance with its own law and from questions immanent
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to itself..., it understands the human being in such a way that it places him in the position of one
poised for the appearance of a possibly occurring revelation; because it "sublates" itself (in the
Hegelian sense) into theology.2
These words express the young Rahner's profound dissatisfaction with what many
in the 1930's and 40's regarded as "Christian" philosophy as well as his aspirations
for creating a Christian philosophy according to his own understanding of the term.
Rahner considers a philosophy authentically Christian only if it "precisely as an
authentic, as a 'pure' philosophy.. .refers beyond itself and invites us to assume the
attitude of listening to an eventual revelation":3 only if, that is to say, it constitutes "a
praeparatio Evangelii...[that] by itself alone...refers us beyond ourselves into
history and places us before the question of an historical encounter with God."4
Rahner's efforts to realize this ideal of Christian philosophy concretize
themselves, principally, in two works: Geist in Welt (1939) and Horer des Wortes
(1941), which constitute, respectively, a) an extraordinarily sophisticated,
Heideggerian "retrieval" of what Rahner considers the central insights of Aquinas'
STh la. 84, 7; and b) a series of lectures in which Rahner, in the process of
elucidating the relationship between philosophy and theology, presents a more or less
fully developed philosophy of religion. In the following, drawing principally upon
these two works, we shall attempt to convey some sense of Rahner's designedly
Christian philosophy and, particularly, his efforts 1) to clarify the nature and
foundations of human knowledge; 2) to demonstrate the existence of God; and 3) to
show that human beings possess an intrinsic orientation to a supernatural revelation
without, however, compromising this revelation's gratuity.
2. The foundations and nature ofknowledge. "The starting point ofmetaphysics,"
writes Rahner, "is the question: what is the being of beings?"5 This question alone
suffices to justify the claim that the human person possesses knowledge of "the being
of all beings,"6 Rahner believes, because the very ability to ask the question implies
some knowledge of being as such on the part of the inquirer. In Rahner's words:
2 "Religionsphilosophie und Theologie," Salzburger Hochschulwochen 1937 in SmtWk iv, 285-93 at
286.
3 HW, 16; Horer, SmtWk iv, 38.
4 Ibid., 17; ebd.,40.
5 Ibid., 25; ebd., 54.
6 Ibid., 28; ebd., 60.
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When we inquire about the being of all beings, we admit that we have a provisional knowing about
being in general. It is impossible to inquire about something that is in every respect and absolutely
unknown. Thus some kind of knowing is asserted and expressed when we inquire about the meaning
of being."7
The human person's very possession of such knowledge regardless of its content,
moreover, implies, in Rahner's view, the knowability of every being. Insofar as the
inquiry about the being of all beings implies some knowledge in the inquirer of being
as such, Rahner contends, "the first metaphysical question, the most universal
question about being, is already the affirmation of the fundamental intelligibility of
all beings."8
This, in turn, implies, according to Rahner, perhaps the most fundamental
conclusion of his metaphysics of knowledge: "being as such, to the extent that it is
being, is knowing."9 This follows from the universal intelligibility of beings, Rahner
claims, because:
Otherwise this relation of every being by itself to some knowledge might at most be a factual one, and
not a feature of every being, belonging to the very nature of its being. An essential relation of
correlativity between two states of affairs must, in final analysis, be founded in an original unity of
both of them.10
If the intelligibility of being really implies the identity of being and knowledge,
Rahner recognizes, knowledge cannot consist in any correspondence involving a gap
between the subjects and objects of thought. Instead, according to Rahner,
knowledge can occur only where "the knower in the true sense and the known in the
true sense are one and identical in being."11
This union between knower and known, the human capacity for which Rahner
ascribes to the faculty of sensibility, dictates a somewhat unconventional approach to
grounding the validity of human knowledge. In Rahner's words:
7 Ibid.; ebd..
8 Ibid., 29; ebd., 60, 62. The intervening page is taken from the second edition ofHorer des Wortes,
edited by Johannes Baptist Metz, which appears alongside the first edition in SmtWk iv.
9 Ibid.; ebd., 62.
10 Ibid.; ebd..
11 "Thomas Aquinas on Truth," 77 xiii, 13-31 at 29; "Die Wahrheit bei Thomas von Aquin," SmtWk ii,
303-16 at 315.
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The problem does not lie in bridging the gap between knowing and object by a "bridge" of some kind:
such a "gap" is merely a pseudo-problem. Rather the problem is how the known, which is identical
with the knower, can stand over against the knower as other....It is not a question of "bridging" a gap,
but of understanding how the gap is possible at all.12
Rahner's metaphysics of knowledge, therefore, revolves not, as in much earlier
philosophy, around some device to unify the knower and the known; it revolves
rather around the Vorgriff, a non-objective "pre-grasp" of esse commune that, in
Rahner's view, makes possible a distinction in human consciousness between the
knower and its object.
Rahner takes it as a self-evident datum of consciousness that human beings do, in
fact, distinguish themselves from the objects of their knowledge. In order to
determine "the a priori transcendental condition of the possibility" 13 of this
distinction, Rahner examines the structure of actual knowing.
From this phenomenological analysis, he concludes that "it is precisely because,
through our concepts, we as knowing subjects know something of something,
because we can refer a universal concept to a this to which it applies, that we oppose
this this to ourselves" 14 thus attaining consciousness of "our knowing self-
subsistence,"15 i.e., consciousness of subsisting separately from known objects. It
follows from this, according to Rahner, that "inquiring about the ultimate ground
of...this self-subsistence is identically asking the following question: what makes
it...possible to subsume the single sense object under a concept, to grasp the universal
in the singular?"16
Rahner proceeds to inspect precisely what it means to "subsume the single sense
object under a concept" and "to grasp the universal in the singular," in order further
to refine his question. In order to view an individual thing, Rahner concludes, as an
example of a particular kind of thing not necessarily limited to one instance, one
must discern "the whatness (the forma or quidditas in Scholastic terminology)...as a
determination which, in principle, applies to more than this individual object...."17
On this basis, Rahner formulates again a more specific question. "What is the
12 SfV, 75; GW, SmtWk ii, 66-7.
13 HW, 44; Horer, SmtWk iv, 86.
14 Ibid., 45-6; ebd., 88.
15 Ibid., 46; ebd..
16 Ibid.; ebd..
17 Ibid.; ebd., 90.
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transcendental condition that enables the knowing subject to discover that the
quiddity is unlimited, although it is experienced as the quiddity of one single
individual?"18
One can account for this human ability to recognize the universality hidden, as it
were, under the guise of an individual thing, Rahner concludes, only by positing the
existence of "an a priori power given with human nature"19 suited to this purpose.
This power Rahner designates "the Vorgrifff20 i.e., "the dynamic movement of the
spirit toward the absolute range of all possible objects."21 In this conscious "pre-
grasp" or "pre-apprehension," every human knower, according to Rahner,
apprehends individual sense objects against the background of all things knowable so
that the particular thing "is also always known as not fdling this domain completely,
hence as limited. And insofar as it is thus known as limited, the quidditative
determination [i.e., the whatness of the thing] is grasped as wider in itself, as
relatively unlimited."22 To both of these, the quiddity and its instance, Rahner thinks,
a human intellect opposes itself, thus bringing its distinctness from its objects to
consciousness.
3. The existence of God. Having established that human beings can know of
things distinct from themselves, Rahner proceeds to the second of his objectives for a
Christian philosophy: proving the existence of God. Because "we can know that the
totality of the objects of human knowledge is finite only if we reach beyond this
finiteness,"23 Rahner concludes that one cannot reasonably exclude any possible
objects of knowledge from the horizon disclosed by the Vorgriff. This horizon must
include, therefore, at least the idea of a possibly existent God. Yet, Rahner notes, the
idea ofGod "cannot be grasped as objectively merely possible...."24 Inasmuch as one
implicitly affirms the at least potential reality of the range of objects disclosed by the
Vorgriff in every act of knowledge, therefore, one also implicitly affirms the
18 Ibid.; ebd..
19 Ibid., 47; ebd., 92.
20 Ibid.; ebd..
21 Ibid.; ebd..
22 Ibid., 48; ebd..
23 Ibid., 50; ebd., 96.
24 Ibid., 51; ebd., 98.
Rahner's Philosophical Presuppositions 11
existence of God. "The same necessity," Rahner writes, "that drives us to anticipate
being as such [in the Vorgriff] makes us co-affirm the infinite being of God."25
Rahner argues, moreover, from an analysis of the act of human judgment that
human beings not only co-affirm God necessarily, but also love him necessarily with
a love that implies his absolute freedom. For, Rahner reasons, in every act of
judgment, a material knower necessarily posits its own existence as distinct from the
object of its knowledge; i.e., it affirms something merely contingent, its own
existence, absolutely. Yet, Rahner notes, "to posit something contingent absolutely
is to will."26 "Such a positing...must be will,"27 according to Rahner, inasmuch as
"something contingent...does not have in its quidditative essence [i.e. the basis of
conceptual reasoning, the province of the intellect] any ground to be absolutely
affirmed."28
"It follows," Rahner contends, "that this necessary volitional affirmation can only
be conceived as the ratification [Nachvollzug: re-enacting] of a free absolute positing
of something that is not necessary."29 In other words, humanity's positing of itself
constitutes an acceptance of its creation by a free God. For without this freedom of
God, Rahner explains, humanity's necessary positing of its contingent existence and
the intelligibility of being, both of which he regards as indubitably proved, could not
co-exist. "Let us suppose," Rahner writes:
that we as human, the contingent reality that is being posited, should derive from a ground that cannot
not posit us. Then we have the choice between these two hypotheses: human being, the reality posited,
is as necessary as the act by which it is posited. Or the positing cause is of such a nature that any
attempt to clarify it, by means of a "logical connection" between it...and what is posited, would be
frustrated by the peculiar nature of the cause.30
Neither of these hypotheses, according to Rahner, can hold true. The first must
fail, because it denies the manifest contingency of human existence. The second,
likewise, must fail "because being, the positing cause, must in final analysis be
luminous, and because the connection between a necessary act of positing and a
25 Ibid.; ebd..
26 Ibid., 68; ebd., 130.
27 Ibid.; ebd..
28 Ibid.; ebd..
29 Ibid., 69; ebd.. We italicize "free," because Rahner himself italicizes "'freien."
30 Ibid.; ebd., 132.
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contingent, not necessary object of this act, can never be made luminous."31 Rahner
concludes, therefore, that, in order to sustain basic insights about being and human
nature, one must affirm the freedom of God's creation. "The finite may be grasped,"
he writes, "only when it is understood as produced by divine freedom."32
By "the necessary welcoming of our own existence,"33 then, human beings "ratify
and endorse the act whereby this contingent [human] being has been freely and
voluntarily posited as absolute"34 by God. Rahner regards this "ratification" as an
implicit, but real, act of love. Insofar as this "voluntary self-affirmation"35 renders
possible even the most elementary act of knowing, it follows, according to Rahner,
that "love is...the light of knowledge,"36 and knowledge "in final analysis...is but the
luminous radiance of love."37 As a prerequisite for any and all knowledge, Rahner
believes, a primordial and "necessary love for God...is [thus] always already given
with human existence."38
4. An orientation to a possible revelation. The discovery of this necessary love
for God, moreover, significantly advances Rahner's philosophical project of
demonstrating that human beings "have to hear, or better have to listen to, an
eventual revelation of the transcendent, supremely free God."39 Insofar as one
necessarily co-affirms the existence of God in every judgment, one can, if one
explicitates this knowledge, listen to God for a possible revelation. Insofar as one
loves God, it seems, one must.
31 Ibid.; ebd..
32 Ibid., 81; ebd., 150.
33 Ibid., 82; ebd..
34 Ibid., 69; ebd., 132.
35 Ibid., 83; ebd., 154.
36 Ibid., 81; ebd., 150.
37 Ibid.; ebd..
38 Ibid., 86; ebd., 158.
39 Ibid., 11; ebd., 30.
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Rahner presumably regards such an understanding of human beings' natural40
potentia oboedientialis for divine revelation as apologetically advantageous, because
it eliminates the possibility that divine revelation might be irrelevant to the merely
natural needs and wants of human beings. Rahner insists, nonetheless, that his views
on the receptivity of human beings for supernatural revelation do not imply that such
revelation forms part of the natural fulfillment theoretically "due" to human beings
unstained by original or actual sin.
One could argue, Rahner realizes: a) that the doctrine of the Vorgriff implies that
human beings naturally desire the beatific vision;41 b) that the beatific vision is,
therefore, "due" to sinless human beings; and c) that any divine revelation short of
the beatific vision, at least if granted to sinless human beings, would constitute a
mere down payment on the fulfillment owed them rather than a gratuitous gift in the
strictest sense of the term. To this line of reasoning, Rahner responds with a twofold
argument for the invalidity of inferences from his understanding of the Vorgriff to the
non-gratuitous character of the beatific vision.
First, he maintains, one can account for the existence of the Vorgriff without
postulating an exigency in human nature for the beatific vision. In Rahner's words:
We have admitted the absolute range and limitlessness of the human spirit's transcendence as a
condition of the possibility of an objective knowledge of finite beings and of human self-subsistence.
The purpose of this transcendence is to make possible the peculiar mode of being which turns a finite
being into a spiritual being....We have posited and were able to establish this transcendence only as the
condition of this possibility. We have not presented it as a function that had its own telos for itself
alone. Hence we have no right to demand that this transcendence should...receive a fulfillment other
than the one on account ofwhich we have affirmed its existence.42
40 That the "ontology of our obediential potency for the free revelation ofGod" (ibid., 16; ebd., 38),
which Rahner constructs in Horer des Wortes concerns a merely natural, as opposed to a supernatural,
potency appears from the following remarks:
We may speak of that part of fundamental theology that concerns us here as the ontology of our
obediential potency for the free revelation ofGod. In connection with this formula, we must note at
once that we are not speaking of the obediential potency for supernatural life, as our ontic elevation to
a share in God's own life, but only of the obediential potency for a listening to an eventual word of
God. Should such a word be spoken, we may expect it to occur, at least originally, also within the
domain of our natural knowledge, i.e., through concepts and words (ibid.; ebd.).
41 The beatific vision would constitute a fulfillment of the human being's orientation to all possible
objects of knowledge in their original unity insofar as all perfections exhibited by creatures pre-exist
in God in an infinitely higher, uncreated mode.
42 Ibid., 62-3; ebd., 120.
Chapter 1: Rahner on the Revelation of the Trinity 14
Second, Rahner argues, the impossibility of establishing, on the basis of
philosophy alone, that human beings possess the capacity for strictly immaterial
intuition implies the impossibility of establishing, on the basis of philosophy alone,
the necessity of such intuition to human beings' fulfillment. Whatever is not
demonstrably possible, Rahner seems to reason, is not demonstrably necessary either.
Again, in Rahner's words:
In a philosophical anthropology we know only of a human knowledge that demands, as a condition of
its possibility, besides the Vorgriff toward being as such, the representation of a finite object, to render
the Vorgriff conscious. It follows that philosophically, we cannot say whether the spirit's
transcendental capacity may ever be filled without the help of a finite sense object. We cannot say
whether the beatific vision is intrinsically possible, much less whether it is humanity's due.43
Rahner regards these arguments as abundantly sufficient for the purpose of
invalidating inferences from his metaphysical anthropology to the "exactedness" of
the beatific vision or of any supernatural, divine revelation short of this vision.
Nevertheless, he regards these arguments as inadequate to the purpose of proving
positively that the beatific vision and, a fortiori, partial and preliminary revelations
of the mysteries beheld therein are strictly gratuitous. In his words, "Our conclusion
that the beatific vision cannot clearly be assigned as humanity's natural end does not
yet prove that it is essentially supernatural and utterly undue to humanity; it does not
prove that, despite our absolute transcendence, God continues to stand before us as
the one who is still unknown, and that in this way there remains an object for an
eventual revelation."44
The solution to this problem, however, lies ready to hand, in Rahner's view, in the
idea of divine freedom. "A free activity," writes Rahner, "is always unpredictable,
hence final and unique. Therefore such a revelation [i.e. a divine revelation through
history] is not simply the continuation of the manifestation of being that would
already, although only inchoatively, have started for us in its definitive and final
direction with our natural knowledge of God."45 In other words, Rahner reasons, if:
43 Ibid., 63; ebd..
44 Ibid., 63; ebd., 122.
45 Ibid., 71; ebd., 136.
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1. God's action is contingent rather than necessary so that one could know what God
necessarily is qua presupposition of esse commune without thereby being able to
anticipate the course of his future actions; then
2. achievement of a perfect knowledge of esse commune, which, according to
Rahner's doctrine of the Vorgriff, constitutes the goal of the human intellect's natural
striving, would not entail knowledge of God's free interventions in history; and in
this case
3. knowledge of God's acts in history would be gratuitous in the strictest sense of the
term; for such knowledge would be supplementary to the body of knowledge
"deserved" by hypothetical, sinless human beings who, having obeyed God's
commandments perfectly, might be said to have "merited" the fulfillment of the
natural desire that God implanted in them.
In the early Rahner's view, then, humanity's "necessary, volitional affirmation"46
of God's free act of creation supplies the philosopher with sufficient evidence to
prove that God is free; and this natural knowledge of divine freedom suffices,
furthermore, to prove the absolute gratuity of God's free revelation.
Mere philosophy, moreover, suffices equally, in the young Rahner's view, to
prove the intrinsic possibility of "revelation in the theological [i.e., historical/verbal]
sense."47 To accomplish this task, Rahner appeals to the device of negation. "By
denying the limits of...a specified, immediately accessible intensity of being [and] by
displacing these limits upwards in the direction of pure being," Rahner claims, "it is
possible to determine..., albeit only negatively, extra-mundane beings"48 such as God
and the angels. Since every object possesses a certain, negatable intensity of being,
every object, according to Rahner, can serve as a possible vehicle of divine
revelation.
This universal ability of material objects to signify the extra-mundane, however,
does not lead Rahner to conclude that "revelation in the theological sense" may occur
46 Ibid., 69; ebd., 130.
47 Ibid., 73; ebd., 138.
48 Ibid., 130; ebd., 228.
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in absolutely any manner. Rahner insists rather that "insofar as we are spirit and
must therefore reckon with a possible revelation of the free God, and insofar as we
can be spirit only as historical beings, we must turn toward the history of humanity,
so as to meet in it God's possible revelation."49 He argues, first, that, as a free act of
God after creation, revelation must constitute a "free, hence unforeseeable"50 event
within human history. Second, the young Rahner believes that if special revelation
occurred outside of history or at every place and every moment of human history,
this "revelation" would become in some sense equivalent to "an essential element of
humanity itself, since we would no longer come to know it as unexpected."51 It
follows, according to the early Rahner, that humanity must seek divine revelation "as
an event that has occurred at a certain point of space and time within the total history
of humanity."52 The young Rahner concludes, therefore, that "the human person has
to be the being who has to look out in history for possible revelation of the God
whom metaphysics makes known to us as the one who is essentially unknown."53
5. Conclusion. In his early philosophical works, then, Rahner achieves, to a
certain extent at least, each of the three, central desiderata outlined in the
introduction to this section. He succeeds, that is to say, in: a) constructing a coherent
and critical account of how human beings come to know both beings and being; b)
formulating sensible theistic arguments; and c) establishing that, given the soundness
of his more general, anthropological ontology, humans beings are naturally oriented
towards a gratuitous, divine revelation, which, if it occurs at all, occurs in the arena
of human history.
Rahner's mature theology, as we shall see, supplements considerably, and in some
respects even contradicts, the portrait of God, humanity, and revelation supplied by
Rahner's philosophy alone. The development in Rahner's thought, however, by no
means constitutes a repudiation of the Christian philosophy he cultivated before
becoming a theologian in the strictest sense of that term. For the young Rahner
considers it a mark of an authentically Christian philosophy that it is "sublated" into
49 Ibid., 141-2; ebd., 254,
50 Ibid., 134; ebd., 240.
51 Ibid., 135; ebd..
52 Ibid., 136; ebd., 242.
53 Ibid., 9; ebd., 26.
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the richer, fuller explanation of existence supplied by revelation. "We mean
'sublated,'" Rahner explains:
in the threefold meaning which this word has for Hegel. First, philosophy sublates itself, i.e., it does
away with itself, because it has finished its job, it has exhausted itself in its claim of constituting the
best existential foundation for human existence. It is precisely because it assumes and must assume
this task that it impels us to listen for a message from God and does away with itself as a total
explanation of existence. Next, it sublates itself, that is, it lifts itself to a higher level. It reaches this
higher level when, as the condition of the possibility for our receiving revelation, it finds its
fulfillment on the higher level of a revelation that has really occurred. Finally it is sublated, i.e., it is
preserved, because, in the actual hearing of revelation as it takes place in theology, the possibility of
hearing a revelation is preserved and has ever again to be actualized.54
Rahner's philosophy sublates itself into his theology, as we shall see, in just such
a manner.
54 Ibid., 17-18; ebd., 40, 42.
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1. Introduction. Before examining Rahner's theological synthesis in any detail,
however, it behooves us to clarify somewhat further the relation between his
philosophy and his theology. In particular, we should like to inquire into the extent
and the manner in which Rahner employs, or perhaps abstains from employing,
distinctively philosophical arguments in warranting theological claims.
2. The range of interpretations. For convenience's sake, we shall follow Karen
Kilby in distinguishing interpretations of the philosophy/theology relationship in
Rahner's thought into two broad classes: the semi-foundationalist and the non-
foundationalist.
a. The semi-foundationalist interpretation. Advocates of a "semi-foundationalist"
construal of Rahner's thought, Kilby explains, believe that "what Rahner first does as
relatively pure philosophy in Spirit in the World and Hearer of the Word he
subsequently takes up to become an element in his theology...[so that] the
theology...contains, and requires, as one of its elements, specifically philosophical
arguments."55 Although those who support a semi-foundationalist interpretation
"need not go along with some critics in taking Rahner's theology to be entirely
derived from and driven by a prior philosophical starting point,"56 they do regard
some "appeal to an independently demonstrated philosophy as one component in
Rahner's theology."57
b. The non-foundationalist interpretation. Those who adopt the "non-
foundationalist" perspective, by contrast, view the seemingly philosophical aspects
of Rahner's theology as defensible on exclusively theological grounds. "The same
claims," writes Kilby, probably the foremost exponent of the non-foundationalist
interpretation, "may function differently in different parts of Rahner's corpus: what
55 Karen Kilby, Karl Rahner: Theology and Philosophy (London and New York: Routledge, 2004),
75.
56 Ibid., 76.
57 Ibid..
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is at one point presented as the conclusion of a philosophical argument may
elsewhere function as a theological hypothesis."58
"What must be denied, for the non-foundationalist," Kilby continues:
is that Rahner's theology is dependent on a philosophy formally distinct from it, [i.e.] on an
independently argued philosophy that makes no appeal to revelation. But in a material sense, insofar
as philosophy is defined not by its method but by its subject matter, it is clearly the case that
philosophy is an inner moment of theology: theology, to speak of grace and revelation, must include
philosophy in the sense of a reflection on human nature. On the non-foundationalist reading,
significant elements of Rahner's own philosophical works do indeed become an inner moment of his
theology, but in so doing they remain philosophy only in...a material sense.59
3. Evaluation. At least three considerations, admittedly, do seem to favor a non-
foundationalist construal of the relation between philosophy and theology in
Rahner's thought. First, Kilby's formal/material distinction certainly renders the
employment of at least materially philosophical terminology and concepts in
Rahner's theology much less problematic for the non-foundationalist perspective.
Second, significant discontinuities do exist between Rahner's mature theology and
his early, philosophical thought. Third and finally, the later Rahner does hold that
the immense "gnoseological concupiscence" characteristic of contemporary society
renders present-day Christians incapable: a) of adequately synthesizing the
knowledge they derive from secular sources with the truths of Christian faith; and b)
of evaluating objectively the range of, at least seemingly, radically conflicting
philosophies and theologies.
These considerations notwithstanding, the semi-foundationalist understanding of
the philosophy/theology relation in Rahner's thought, sc. that of the vast majority of
Rahner's interpreters, seems decisively superior to the non-foundationalist
interpretation. For, among other considerations, the items adduced above as
evidence for the non-foundationalist position seem inconclusive at best.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
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i. Introduction. Kilby's contention, for instance, that the philosophical premises
employed in the later Rahner's arguments differ from their strictly theological
counterparts materially rather than formally, in that they concern nature instead of
grace, seems to run contrary to the later Rahner's understanding of the relation
between the supernatural and the natural.
ii. The modally supernatural. For, first, the later Rahner considers nature itself at
least "modally supernatural." As he explains:
Since from the start 'nature' is always and irrevocably conceived by God as the presupposed
condition of possibility of grace strictly speaking, nature itself cannot be entitatively supernatural
grace. But it is always and necessarily endowed with a supernatural finality....It is modally
supernatural. The unity and difference of nature and (entitatively supernatural) grace, precisely from
the point of view of gratuitousness, result from the same principle. Hence nature is not simply and
non-dialectically non-grace. It is not something which—in the actual order of things!—rests on its
own foundations and is sufficient 'for itself, even without grace. It is not the substructure which
could exist even without the superstructure, but the lower, which though the presupposition of the
higher, still depends on the higher, because in the last resort all depends on the highest—who freely
willed to be the love that imparts itself.60
Since, then, everything is in some sense supernatural according to the later Rahner,
one cannot, without contravening the mature Rahner's explicit statements, demarcate
the subject matter of philosophy from that of theology by identifying the latter as
grace and the former as nature. For, as we have seen, in the later Rahner's view,
"nature is not simply and non-dialectically non-grace."
Hi. Absence of material distinctions. As Kilby observes,61 second, the later
Rahner believes that human beings, in the present economy, cannot distinguish
between: a) those aspects of their constitution that exist purely because of human
beings' ordination to grace; and b) those other aspects of their constitution that would
belong to them even if God had chosen to create them in a purely natural state.
60 "Questions ofControversial Theology on Justification," 77 iv, 189-218 at 217-18; "Fragen der
Kontroverstheologie iiber die Rechfertigung," SzTh iv, 237-71 at 270-1.
61 Kilby, Karl Rahner, 64-7, 73-4.
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Prescinding from the first consideration, then, which we consider objectively the
weightier of the two, Kilby concludes that, at least within the categories of Rahner's
thought, "the distinctive nature of philosophy...is undermined....One can still
conceive of a philosophy in the formal sense—a philosophy which makes no appeal
to revelation—but this is no longer materially distinct from theology, because the
philosopher too lives in and reflects upon a world transformed by grace."62
Kilby grants, in other words, that the later Rahner's emphasis on nature as borne
and suffused by grace renders a concrete, material distinction between philosophy
and theology impossible. Now, if this is the case, her claim that Rahner, in his
theological arguments, appeals to no arguments of a philosophy that is formally
distinct from theology implies that Rahner the theologian appeals to no philosophical
arguments at all.
iv. Formally philosophical premises. This conclusion, as Kilby would readily
admit, is manifestly false. For Rahner the theologian frequently makes remarks like
the following: "the same conclusion which we have been able to demonstrate on the
basis of a direct dogmatic datum can also be arrived at by approaching the question
rather from the standpoint of the philosophy of transcendentality,"63 In defending a
modified version of the psychological analogy of the Trinity, likewise, Rahner
appeals to the datum that "an authentic metaphysics of the spirit tells us that there are
two (and only two!) basic activities of the spirit: knowledge and love."64 Similarly,
the late Rahner once employs as a premise the following statement: "contemporary
philosophy only recognises man's spiritual life in so far as it is also and at the same
time material in any given case."65
v. Conclusion. To recapitulate, then, our argument for the inconclusiveness of
Kilby's first reason: Rahner most definitely does employ philosophical arguments in
62 Ibid., Ibid., 74.
63 "Reflections on Methodology in Theology" ["Methodology"], 77 xi, 68-114 at 104; "Uberlegungen
zur Methode der Theologie" ["Methode"], SzTh ix, 79-126 at 116.
64 Trinity, 116; "Der dreifaltige Gott," MS ii, 394.
65 "The Intermediate State," TI xvii, 114-24 at 120; "Uber den 'Zwischenzustand,'" SzTh xii, 455-66
at 462.
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constructing his theology.66 As we have seen, moreover, the all-encompassing
character of the supernatural in Rahner's later theology implies that one cannot
clearly distinguish, at least in the concrete, the subject matter of philosophy from that
of theology. If this is the case, however, then no material distinction between
philosophy and theology, as Rahner conceives of them, exists; and to say that the
later Rahner's philosophical reasoning is only materially distinct from its theological
counterpart is tantamount to saying that the two are not distinct at all. Kilby's
opposition of a merely material distinction between philosophy and theology to a
more robust, formal distinction, therefore, does not suffice to render the
philosophical aspects of the later Rahner's theology innocuous for the non-
foundationalist interpretation.
Admittedly, the employment of some other, neither simply formal nor simply
material, type of philosophy/theology distinction might conceivably suffice for this
task. Admittedly, moreover, the positing of some non-formal distinction between
Rahner's philosophy and theology constitutes a brilliant, dialectical maneuver on
Kilby's part; it allows her simultaneously to affirm both the non-foundationalist
interpretation and the profound significance of philosophy for the later Rahner's
thought. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the later Rahner's understanding of the
nature/supernature relation renders a concrete, material distinction between
philosophy and theology inconceivable. Kilby's insistence that the two differ only
materially in the later Rahner's thought thus constitutes not a solution of a difficulty
of interpretation, but an implicit and unintentional denial of the obvious: viz. that the
later Rahner treats philosophy, in some sense of the term, as an "inner moment of
theology."67
66 Rahner describes one of his later essays, for instance, as "a study which unashamedly refuses to
observe with too much exactitude the difference between philosophy and theology, but which, on the
contrary, freely employs the methods and basic principles of both disciplines" ("Immanent and
Transcendent Consummation of the World" ["Immanent and Transcendent"], 77 x, 273-89 at 273;
"Immanente und transzendente Vollendung der Welt" ["Immanente und transzendente"], SmtWkxv,
544-56 at 544).
67 "Philosophy and Theology," TI vi, 71-81 at 72; "Philosophic und Theologie," SzTh vi, 91-103 at 93.
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i. Introduction. The second item adduced above as evidence for the non-
foundationalist construal of the late Rahner's thought, i.e. the existence of significant
discontinuities between Rahner's early philosophical presuppositions and his mature
theology, seems to buttress the non-foundationalist perspective rather more than the
previous consideration. The existence of such discontinuities, however, seems
insufficient to falsify the central, "semi-foundationalist" contention that Rahner's
"theology...contains, and requires, as one of its elements, specifically philosophical
arguments."68
Prescinding from the subject of "gnoseological concupiscence," to be addressed
in the next section, the relevant discontinuities include: a) that between the early
Rahner's understanding of concrete, human nature as roughly equivalent to "pure
nature" and the later Rahner's theory of the "supernatural existential"; and b) that
between the early Rahner's conception of revelation as categorical and spatio-
temporally localized and the later Rahner's doctrine of "transcendental revelation."
ii. The supernatural existential.
a. Introduction. First, the late Rahner, in contrast to the early Rahner, believes
that "pure nature," i.e. human nature as it would have existed if God had not called
human beings to the beatific vision, does not exist. In Rahner's view, rather, human
nature, strictly speaking, always exists in combination with the "supernatural
existential": sc. a universal, 69 unconditional,70 unexacted,71 and inescapable72
"burning longing for God himself in the immediacy of his own threefold life."73.
68 Kilby, Karl Rahner, 75.
69 "Such an existential does not become merited and in this sense 'natural' by the fact that it is present
in all men as an existential of their concrete existence" (Foundations, 127; Grundkurs, SmtWkxxvi,
127)
70 "This 'ordination' is apprehended not merely as the natural possibility of the potentia oboedientialis,
but as 'unconditional'" ("Concerning the Relationship between Nature and Grace" ["Relationship"],
77 i, 297-317 at 312, n. 1; "Uber das Verhaltnis von Natur und Gnade" ["Verhaltnis"], SzTh i, 323-45
at 338, Anm. 1). The relevant note in the English translation extends from the preceding page.
71 "This central, abiding existential...is itself to be characterized as unexacted, as 'supernatural'"
(ibid., 312-13; ebd., 339). A reality is "unexacted" with respect to a given nature if it is: 1) unneeded
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(i. Rahner's motive. The late Rahner posits the existence of this existential, at
least in part, in order to counteract typically neo-scholastic understandings of human
nature.
In neo-scholastic theology, writes Rahner:
it has been usual to presuppose a sharply circumscribed human 'nature' with the help of a concept of
nature one-sidedly orientated to the nature of less than human things. It has been felt that one knows
quite clearly what precisely this human nature is and how far precisely it extends....It is tacitly or
explicitly presupposed [moreover] that whatever man comes to know by himself...about himself or in
himself belongs to his nature..., and that so a sharply circumscribed concept of man's nature can be
produced out of the anthropology of everyday experience and of metaphysics. Thus it is presupposed
that the concretely experienced (contingently factual) quiddity of man squarely coincides with man's
'nature' as the concept opposed by theology to the supernatural.74
This neo-scholastic equation of humanity's concrete, contingently factual nature
with "pure nature," i.e. human nature minus the supernatural, engenders, in Rahner's
view, a false dichotomy. Either one must deny that concrete, human nature
possesses more than a conditional orientation to the beatific vision and so vindicate
the vision's gratuity at the expense of rendering it dispensable to human happiness;
or one must ascribe to human nature an unconditional longing for the beatific vision
and so affirm the vision's indispensability to human happiness precisely by forfeiting
its unexactedness.
y. Rahner's proposal. Rahner proposes to overcome this, in his view false and
destructive, dichotomy by distinguishing between: a) pure nature, i.e. that which
must characterize human beings in order for them to be human and would
characterize them even if God had not called humanity to a supernatural end; and b)
concrete nature, which includes human nature as a moment within itself, but which,
in the present order of salvation, includes additional elements that derive solely from
the human being's ordination to grace.
by the subjects of this nature for the fulfillment of their natural desires and, therefore 2) unowed by
God to the subjects of this nature even if they obey him perfectly.
72 "He [i.e. the human being] must have it always" (ibid., 311; ebd., 338).
73 Ibid., 312; ebd..
74 "Relationship," 77 i, 298-9; "Verhaltnis," SzTh i, 324-5.
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That human beings actually possess such supernatural elements in their concrete
constitution follows ineluctably, in Rahner's view, from God's universal, salvific
will. "IfGod gives creation and man above all a supernatural end and this end is first
'in intentione',"75 writes Rahner, "then man (and the world) is by that very fact
always and everywhere inwardly other in structure than he would be if he did not
have this end, and hence other as well before he has reached this end partially (the
grace which justifies) or wholly (the beatific vision)."76 In other words, Rahner
reasons, one can plausibly infer from God's antecedent will to bestow the beatific
vision on all human beings that he created human beings in such a way that they
would constitute apt receptacles for supernatural grace: something he would not have
done, or at least would not have done to the same extent, if he had called humanity to
a merely natural end.
In Rahner's view, accordingly, human beings universally and inexorably
exemplify certain properties that nonetheless do not belong to their nature, in the
theological sense of the term. This conclusion, Rahner reasons, implies that human
nature, in the world as it actually is, never occurs in isolation; if one can know of it at
all, therefore, one can know of it only by abstracting from the supernatural elements
that characterize humanity as it exists and then examining what remains. In Rahner's
words:
'Nature' in the theological sense (as opposed to nature as the substantial content of an entity always to
be encountered in contingent fact), i.e. as the concept contraposed to the supernatural, is consequently
a remainder concept (Restbegriff). By that is meant that starting as we have done, a reality must be
postulated in man which remains over when the supernatural existential as unexacted is subtracted.77
The theologoumenon of the supernatural existential, then, warrants a sharp
distinction between pure nature and contingently factual nature. The idea that the
natural and the supernatural exist in an integrated fashion in the concrete, human
being, moreover, implies that one cannot determine the contents of human nature as
such simply by inspecting actual, human persons. One must, rather, have recourse to
revelation to distinguish the natural from the supernatural constituents of concretely
75 Rahner invokes in this sentence, explains David Coffey, "the Scholastic principle that the end is
first in intentione, meaning that the end determines everything else about the being under
consideration" ("The Whole Rahner on the Supernatural Existential," TS 65 [2004], 95-118 at 100).
76 "Relationship," 77 i, 302-3; "Verhaltnis," SzTh i, 328-9.
77 Ibid., 313-14; ebd., 340.
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existing humanity; and even then, Rahner cautions, one cannot reasonably expect
one's data to yield a precise description of pure nature. Again, in Rahner's words:
This 'pure' nature is not...an unambiguous delimitable, de-finable quantity; no neat horizontal (to use
Philipp Dessauer's way of putting it) allows of being drawn between this nature and the supernatural
(both existential and grace). We never have this postulated pure nature for itself alone, so as in all
cases to be able to say exactly what in our existential experience is to be reckoned to its account, what
to the account of the supernatural.78
Rahner asserts, then, that although human beings inevitably possess the
supernatural existential, it does not pertain to their nature in the strictest sense of the
term. The supernatural existential and human nature, rather, constitute imprecisely
distinguishable components of the internally differentiated, human being; and "pure
nature" constitutes an only ambiguously definable entity the possibility of whose
existence in isolation one must, however, posit in order to vindicate the
unexactedness of supernatural grace.
5. Conclusion. Rahner seems, therefore, to reject his own attempt in Horer des
Wortes to construct an ontology of the human being's natural potency79 for hearing a
possible revelation as: a) overambitious; and b) perhaps even extrinsicist80 insofar as,
in Horer des Wortes, he does not ascribe to concrete, human beings an unconditional
ordination to the beatific vision. At least "the overarching framework of Hearer of
the Word, and presumably also Spirit in the World," then, is, as Kilby correctly
observes, "inconsistent with a central theme of Rahner's theology."81
78 Ibid., 314; ebd., 340-1.
79 Cf. n. 40.
80 Extrinsicism, the characteristic vice of the neo-scholastics, writes Rahner, is not:
wholly overcome...by emphasizing... that the potentia oboedientialis of nature includes nevertheless a
kind of velleity, indeed a yearning (only a conditional one of course) for the immediate possession of
God in the depths of the essence, and that a spiritual nature cannot really be thought of without this
appetitus, so that the potentia oboedientialis is not simply an absence of contradiction in a purely
negative way. For so long as this yearning is really conceived of as conditional and.. .a half
unhappiness is not made out of the finite happiness which would be man's lot without the visio and a
proper capacity not made out of the potentia oboedientialis..., this desiderium remains so hypothetical
that nature can always become enclosed within its own plane ["Relationship," 77 i, 303; "Verhaltnis,"
SzTh i, 329],
81 Kilby, Karl Rahner, 69.
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iii. Transcendental revelation. Second, the late Rahner, unlike the early Rahner,
believes that God's supernatural self-revelation consists primarily not in historical
events, but in his gracious bestowal on all human beings of a "supernatural formal
object":82 i.e. a transcendental horizon of knowing and willing that is objectively
identical with himself. This supernatural elevation of humanity's transcendence
constitutes a revelation, Rahner asserts:
in the sense of a change of consciousness..., which originates from a free personal self-
communication of God in grace. It is therefore absolutely legitimate to call it already a revelation,
especially since it already communicates or offers in an ontologically real sense as 'grace' something
which also ultimately constitutes the whole content of divine revelation contained in.. .propositions
and human concepts, viz. God and his eternal life itself.83
Rahner, in fact, identifies this transcendental mode of revelation as "the mode on
which all other revelation is based."84 "One can without hesitation," Rahner writes,
"view the material contents of historical revelation as verbalized objectifications of
the 'revelation' which is already present in the gratuitous radicalizing of human
transcendentality in God's self-communication."85
Now, these remarks and the whole idea of "transcendental revelation" seem
thoroughly incompatible with the sentiments of the young Rahner as expressed in
Horer des Wortes. "It is inadmissible," writes the young Rahner:
that we should be permanently and miraculously raised above our natural way of thinking and of
acting by God's revelation. This would ultimately reduce God's free revelation...to be but an
essential element of humanity itself, since we would no longer come to know it as the unexpected, as
the act of God's freedom with regard to us as already constituted in our essence. Therefore, at least
within the existence of the individual human being, the free revelation can occur only at a definite
point. 86
82 "A formal object," writes Rahner, "is the a priori horizon given in consciousness, under which, in
grasping the individual a posteriori object, everything is known which is grasped as an object strictly
speaking" ("Nature and Grace," TI iv, 165-88 at 178; "Natur und Gnade," SzTh iv, 209-36 at 225). As
to the identity of the human intellect's supernatural, formal object with God, Rahner writes: "The
formal a priori of faith, in contrast to the natural transcendence of the spirit and its a priori
relationship,... is none other than the triune God himself in his real self-communication"
("Considerations on the Development of Dogma," TI iv, 3-35 at 25-6; Uberlegungen zur
Dogmenentwicklung," SzTh iv, 11-50 at 38-9).
83 "History of the World and Salvation-History," TI v, 97-114 at 104; "Weltgeschichte und
Heilsgeschichte," SmtWk x, 590-604 at 596.
84 Foundations, 150; Grundkurs, SmtWk xxwi, 148.
85 "The Act of Faith and the Content of Faith," TI xxi, 151-61 at 158; "Glaubensakt und
Glaubensinhalt," SzTh xv, 152-62 at 158.
86 HW, 135; Horer, SmtWk iv, 240, 242.
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Once more, accordingly, a central aspect of Rahner's theology stands in stark
contradiction to an equally central aspect of his philosophy: a circumstance Kilby
correctly regards as evidence against the view that Rahner's early philosophy
constitutes a "foundation" for his later, theological synthesis.
iv. Formally philosophical presuppositions. Kilby recognizes, nonetheless, that
the elements of dissonance between Rahner's philosophy and his theology do "not
rule out the possibility that Rahner might...continue to use particular arguments
from these works to underpin this same theology."87 Nor, we should like to add, do
these elements of dissonance preclude the possibility of Rahner's drawing arguments
and presuppositions from philosophies not uniquely his own.
It requires little diligence, in fact, to locate instances, in addition to those cited in
the previous section, in which Rahner appeals, directly or indirectly, to formally
philosophical conclusions in his theological arguments. In defense of the idea that
the intellect could possess multiple, formal objects without explicitly distinguishing
between them,88 for instance, Rahner appeals to "considerations...taken from a
metaphysics of the spirit."89 Likewise, in discussing the relation between the body
and the soul, Rahner writes, "in Thomist metaphysics, which are perfectly justifiable,
one is bound to say...."90 Even the later Rahner, furthermore, appeals continually to
"the axiom of the thomistic metaphysics of knowledge according to
which...something which exists is present to itself, to the extent in which it has or is
being."91
v. Conclusion. In spite of the discontinuities between Rahner's early philosophy
and his late theology, then, the evidence of Rahner's writings disallows the
87 Kilby, Karl Rahner, 69.
88 In the same context, incidentally, Rahner describes this view as a truth, which "for a metaphysics of
knowledge, there is no great difficulty in recognizing" ("Nature and Grace," TI iv, 178; "Natur und
Gnade," SzTh iv, 225).
89 Ibid., 179; ebd..
90 "The Hermeneutics of Eschatological Assertions," TI iv, 323-46 at 340, n. 16; "Theologische
Prinzipien der Hermeneutik eschatologischer Aussagen," SzTh iv, 401-28 at 422, Anm. 16.
91 "Dogmatic Reflections on the Knowledge and Self-Consciousness of Christ," TI v, 193-215 at 205;
"Dogmatische Erwagungen tiber das Wissen und SelbstbewuBtsein Christi," SzTh v, 222-45 at 233-4.
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conclusion that philosophy, in the formal sense of the term, plays no role in the later
Rahner's theological arguments.
c. Gnoseological concupiscence. The third item adduced above as evidence for
the non-foundationalist interpretation of the later Rahner's theology, viz. the later
Rahner's ascription of far-reaching effects to "gnoseological concupiscence" in
contemporary culture, seems somewhat weightier than the two previous
considerations. Nonetheless, as we shall attempt to show, it does not suffice to
establish that the later Rahner refuses to employ distinctively philosophical reasoning
in constructing his later theology.
i. What is gnoseological concupiscence? "By 'gnoseological concupiscence,"'
Rahner writes, "I mean the fact that in human awareness there is a pluralism between
the various branches of knowledge such that we can never achieve a full or
comprehensive view of them all together, and that they can never be integrated into a
unified system by man in a way which makes them fully controllable or
comprehensible to him."92 In Rahner's view, this "gnoseological concupiscence"
constitutes a permanent existential of human beings no less than moral
concupiscence. "Man is a pluralistic being," he writes, "who can never adequately
synthesize the protean manifestations of his reality, his history and his
experience—and today less than ever."93 Again, in Rahner's words, gnoseological
concupiscence "has been the lot of human beings from time immemorial, since
92 "On the Relationship between Theology and the Contemporary Sciences" ["Contemporary
Sciences"], 77 xiii, 94-102 at 95; "Zum Verhaltnis zwischen Theologie und heutigen Wissenschaften"
["Heutigen Wissenschaften"], SmtWk xv, 704-10 at 705. Rahner conceives ofmoral concupiscence,
incidentally, not as a tendency to sin, but as an irresolvable pluralism between oneself as one is (one's
"nature") and oneself as one wishes to be (one's "person"): a pluralism that inhibits sinful decisions as
much as it inhibits righteous ones (cf. "The Theological Concept of Concupiscentia"
["Concupiscentia"], Tl i, 347-82 at 360-66; "Zum theologischen Begriff der Konkupiszenz"
["Konkupiszenz"], SmtWk viii, 3-32 at 14-19). By thus portraying concupiscence, Rahner seeks to
prove that concupiscence is not intrinsically evil and so to vindicate the unexactedness of the gift of
integrity from it (ibid., 357, 369-70; ebd., 11, 21-2). Likewise, Rahner conceives of gnoseological
concupiscence as essentially morally neutral (cf., e.g., "Theological Reflections on the Problem of
Secularisation," TI x, 318-48 at 341-7; "Theologische Reflexionen zum Problem der Sakularisation,"
SzTh viii, 637-666 at 661-6).
93 "Transformations in the Church and Secular Society," TI xvii, 167-80 at 170; "Kirchliche
Wandlungen und Profangesellschaft," SzTh xii, 513-28 at 516.
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people have always been burdened with errors which were incompatible with other
true insights that they had."94
Rahner insists, however, that the explosion of human knowledge in the twentieth
century has exacerbated the situation of gnoseological concupiscence enormously.
"However limited an individual's knowledge is when compared with the amount of
knowledge available today," explains Rahner:
it is, nonetheless, still enormous taken in itself and thus it is no longer possible for an individual to
gain a full grasp of the mutual consistency of its individual elements. If an individual today should
subject his or her knowledge to an honest and objective appraisal, he or she would have to say, "So
much knowledge, so many opinions and views from every side have found their way into the
storehouse ofmy consciousness that, try as I may, I really couldn't tell you anymore if and how it all
fits together, and I couldn't even tell you how even in principle it could be synthesized into a
consistent 'system.'"95
In Rahner's view, accordingly, the vast expansion of human knowledge in the
twentieth century has engendered a level of gnoseological concupiscence so acute
that reasonable and intelligent human beings cannot honestly claim to have
integrated all of the data of their knowledge into a consistent system of ideas.96
ii. Contradictions between secular knowledge andfaith. As we have already seen,
Rahner holds at least three beliefs about the consequences of these unprecedented
degrees of gnoseological concupiscence that might seem to exclude the possibility of
his consistently employing philosophically derived premises in theological
arguments. First, Rahner maintains, existentially significant data exist within the
consciousness of contemporary Christians that admit of no reconciliation, in the
practical order at least, with the truths of Christianity. "Today's faith," in Rahner's
view:
co-exists with positively contradictory elements in some kind of mostly unconscious schizoid state.
Even if we suppose that no objective contradictions exist among the particulars in an individual's
consciousness (statements of faith included), these contents are incredibly complex and almost
94 "Intellectual Patience with Ourselves," TI xxiii, 38-49 at 44; "Uber die intellektuelle Geduld mit
sich selbst," SzTh xv, 303-14 at 309.
95 Ibid.; ebd., 308-9.
96 "We cannot refrain," writes Rahner, "from considering others to be obtuse, naive, and primitive if
they are not aware of this fragmentation and fail in their utterances to realize the lack of clarity in their
concepts and the inconsistency in their knowledge" (ibid.; ebd., 309).
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impossible to harmonize. It is practically impossible for individuals to harmonize all the data of
consciousness with the contents of the faith, although it is a tenet of faith that such a harmonization is
theoretically possible.97
Rahner maintains, then, that gnoseological concupiscence affects the individual
Christian's consciousness in such a way as implicitly to place Christianity itself, and
not merely some or all theological or philosophical systems, in question. Yet Rahner
does not take this to mean that one cannot reasonably believe, with an absolute assent
of faith, both in Christianity's general truthfulness and in the truthfulness of many,
specific, doctrinal claims.
If what he takes to be the practical impossibility of reconciling Christianity with
all of the secular data that impinge on one's consciousness does not lead Rahner to
renounce Christianity, neither, a fortiori, should Rahner's skepticism about the
possibility, practically speaking, of refuting all conceivable objections to particular,
philosophical theses lead him to renounce their employment in theology. It would be
inconsistent, therefore, for the later Rahner to abandon formally philosophical
reasoning simply because every philosophical system is inescapably disputable.
Hi. Inability to survey the range of philosophies and theologies. Rahner's
judgment that no individual can possibly survey the range of existing philosophies
and theologies, the second of his theses about gnoseological concupiscence that
might seem to favor a non-foundationalist construal of his thought, seems much less
consequential in the light of the preceding considerations. Admittedly, Rahner does
affirm in no uncertain terms the impotence of individual theologians to comprehend
the range of alternative theological and philosophical systems. Of theology, for
instance, Rahner writes, "the substance of the theology and the theologies which are
possible and actual today can no longer be contained even approximately by the
mind of any one individual theologian, or assimilated in the time available to him."98
Of philosophy, likewise, he remarks, "Every man and every theologian, although he
97 "What the Church Officially Teaches and What the People Actually Believe," 77 xxii, 165-75 at
167; "Offizielle Glaubenslehre der Kirche und faktische Glaubigkeit des Volkes," SzTh xvi, 217-30 at
219.
98 "Pluralism in Theology and the Unity of the Creed in the Church," TI xi, 3-23 at 6; "Der
Pluralismus in der Theologie und die Einheit des Bekenntnisses in der Kirche," SzTh ix, 11-33 at 14.
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must philosophise in theology, knows less and less of 'Philosophy', since there are
continually more and more philosophies, which no single person can assimilate."99
Such remarks, however, do not necessarily suggest skepticism on Rahner's part
about the possibility of fruitfully employing philosophy, in the formal sense of the
term, as a presupposition and internal component of theology. Obviously, Rahner
rejects the view that one can reasonably expect all interested parties to understand
and accept conclusions based on the presuppositions of one, particular philosophy.
To that extent, moreover, the following remarks ofKilby seem abundantly justified.
To maintain...that a religiously neutral, universally persuasive argument can be developed to
demonstrate that everyone is aware of God whether they know it or not is anything but modest and is
not very much in line with the affirmation of an inescapable pluralism of philosophies....To think that
one could in this way philosophically demonstrate the existence of the Vorgriffwould be to think that
one had found an escape route from pluralism and from the historically conditioned nature of our
understanding, that one was somehow able to wriggle one's way underneath it all and build something
sturdy and unquestionable on an ahistorical and indubitable basis.100
Kilby is correct, we repeat, in holding that to affirm the possibility of establishing
the existence of the Vorgriff\ or any other meta-empirical reality, "in this way," i.e. in
a way that would be intelligible and persuasive to all persons concerned, would be
implicitly to deny the existence of an insurmountable pluralism of philosophies. It is
by no means obvious, however, that one could not affirm the possibility of
constructing a merely probable, and yet genuinely philosophical, argument for, say,
the existence of the Vorgriff without implicitly denying the inescapability of
pluralism.
Without rejecting Kilby's insight as to the incompatibility of a robust affirmation
of pluralism with pretensions to developing universally acceptable philosophical
arguments, then, one can allow the possibility that Rahner: a) employs a modest,
disputable philosophy in constructing his theological arguments; and yet b) in no
way attempts to transcend the irreducible pluralism of philosophies. That Rahner
understands himself to employ a philosophy of this unassuming sort in his own
theology seems to follow from comments Rahner made in 1965 about the necessity
of "metaphysics" in theology.
99 "Philosophy and Philosophising in Theology" ["Philosophising"], TI ix, 46-63 at 54; "Philosophic
und Philosophieren in der Theologie" ["Philosophieren"], SzTh viii, 66-87 at 75.
100 Karl Rahner, 96-7.
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I am sometimes amazed that theologians are quick to declare that a metaphysics must be false or
unsuitable for theology simply because it is a matter of dispute. How can they not see that their own
theology too is itself a matter of dispute, and yet they do not straightway regard this as a criterion for
saying that their own theology is false? The man who has not the courage to pursue a metaphysics
(which is not the same thing as a closed system) cannot be a good theologian. Even when one is
conscious of possessing a constantly inadequate metaphysics, it is still possible to rely on it, to use it
in addressing the true God and in directing man towards the experience which he always has already
from God. For it is man's inalienable blessing that his words say more and purer things than he
himself knows and can enclose in his impure words, provided...that his pride does not make him keep
silent...because, as soon as he begins to speak about God, his words immediately sound foolish.101
Rahner does not seem to believe, accordingly, that if he cannot survey all of the
possible alternatives and objections to his philosophy and cannot hope to make his
philosophy universally persuasive, he ought, therefore, to abstain from
philosophizing altogether. If the inexorable pluralism of philosophies does not imply
that the enterprise of philosophy itself ought to be abandoned, however, Rahner's
affirmation of this inexorable pluralism seems quite compatible with his own
continued employment of formally philosophical arguments within his theology. In
any event, Rahner considers contemporary theology just as pluralistic as philosophy;
yet the uncontrollable pluralism of theologies does not lead him to cease formulating
distinctively theological arguments. Why, then, should he renounce the employment
of formally philosophical reasoning on account of the insurmountable pluralism of
philosophies?
These considerations, again, do not detract from the soundness of Kilby's
demonstration that the late Rahner's views on pluralism imply the impossibility of a
universally intelligible and persuasive philosophy. They do, however, show that if
one is willing to include merely probable arguments, whose conclusions do not
derive from specifically Christian premises, within the compass of "philosophy in the
formal sense of the term"; then Rahner's views on contemporary pluralism do not
constitute evidence for the absence of formally philosophical reasoning in his late,
theological works.
To this line of reasoning, Kilby would presumably respond that an argument's
lack of distinctively Christian premises does not establish that it is formally
philosophical rather than formally theological. Kilby would claim, that is to say, that
the datum that an argument:
101 "Observations on the Doctrine ofGod in Catholic Dogmatics," 77 ix, 127-44 at 138;
"Bemerkungen zur Gotteslehre in der katholischen Dogmatik," SzTh viii, 165-86 at 178-9.
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is not yet specifically Christian...means neither that it is not Christian nor that it is justified
independently of Christian considerations. It does not follow that it is not Christian, first of all, from
the fact that some claim falls into the intersection of Christianity and some other way of interpreting
experience (tea is no less an English form of sustenance than crumpets even though the one is
consumed elsewhere and the other is not). And second, because it is not a uniquely Christian claim it
does not follow that Rahner is trying to justify it on purely general, a-Christian grounds.102
Now, Kilby seems correct in insisting that arguments that draw on premises that
Christianity holds in common with various philosophies (to speak in un-Rahnerian
terms, data contained in both general and special revelation) can, in fact, be formally
theological. If, however: 1) an argument or a conclusion within Rahner's theological
corpus seems to be formally philosophical; and especially if, as is frequently the case,
2) the seemingly philosophical argument or conclusion appears in much the same
guise in Rahner's early, philosophical works; then 3) unless the context or some,
specific remark of Rahner suggests otherwise, it appears reasonable to consider the
argument in question formally philosophical.
For example, when Rahner writes, "Anyone who has grasped the metaphysical
meaning of the scholastic axiom [two sentences later Rahner refers to it as an 'axiom
of scholastic metaphysics'] 'ens et verum convertuntur', 'ens est intelligibile et
intelligens, in quantum est ens actu', will know that in principle at least, every ontic
statement...is capable of being translated into an ontological one";103 he at least
appears to appeal to a formally philosophical principle for which he argues
vigorously in his early philosophical works. Since: a) Rahner tends to reject
"theological hypotheses" such as Ladislaus Boros' Endentscheidungshypothese as
arbitrary, because their sole justification lies in their usefulness for resolving some
theological dilemma;104 and b) Rahner's acknowledgment of an insurmountable
pluralism of philosophies does not lead him to disavow the usefulness of formally
philosophical reasoning for theology; it seems that in this and similar cases one
cannot plausibly claim that Rahner employs principles like "ens et verum
102 Karl Rahner, 82.
103 "Current Problems in Christology" ["Current Problems"], TI i, 149-200 at 169; "Probleme der
Christologie von heute" ["Probleme"], SzTh i, 169-222 at 189.
104 Rahner specifically disassociates himself from the views of Boros, his former student, in
"Experience of the Spirit and Existential Commitment," 77 xvi, 24-34 at 25, n. 2 ("Erfahrung des
Geistes und existentielle Entscheidung," SzTh xii, 41-53 at 41, Anm.2); "The Liberty of the Sick,
Theologically Considered," TI xvii, 100-113 at 105, n. 6 ("Die Freiheit des Kranken in theologischer
Sicht," SzTh xii, 439-54 at 444, Anm. 6); "Christian Dying," TI xviii, 226-56 at 230 ("Das Christliche
Sterben," SzTh xiii, 269-304 at 273); and his "Vorwort" to Silvio Zucal's La teologia della morte in
Karl Rahner (Bologna: EDB, 1983), 4-6 at 6.
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convertuntur" as free-standing theological hypotheses without regard to the probative
force of philosophical arguments alleged on their behalf. It seems much more likely,
rather, that, notwithstanding his acknowledgement of uncontrollable philosophical
pluralism, Rahner employs here and elsewhere principles which he himself credits on
formally philosophical grounds and which, therefore, qualify as formally
philosophical.
This consideration might seem sufficient of itself to establish that Rahner's
"theology...contains, and requires, as one of its elements, specifically philosophical
arguments;"105 it might seem sufficient, that is to say, to establish the accuracy of the
semi-foundationalist construal of the later Rahner's thought. Kilby, nonetheless,
offers two arguments to the contrary, which, in our view, merit some response before
we pass to the next section.
First, Kilby maintains, the brevity with which Rahner frequently refers to
philosophical conclusions in his theological writings could conceivably indicate that
he regards them as a matter of indifference. "The semi-foundationalist," Kilby
writes:
will assume that when Rahner writes something like "[b]ut this philosophical argument for...will not
be pursued any further in the present context," he is not wanting to interrupt his theology with long
philosophical discussions, and that he does not need to precisely because he has done it before. But
the non-foundationalist can put a different construal on the situation: if Rahner neither offers a full
demonstration [of a given philosophical conclusion inserted in a theological argument], nor explicitly
pointfs] to where he has already set one out, this only underlines the fact that prior philosophical
demonstration is not needed for theology—if Rahner assumes that a philosophical demonstration can
be given, he also assumes that it is not important to do it because his theological position does not
depend on it.106
Two characteristics of this argument seem particularly striking. First, it is of a
purely defensive character. Kilby does not pretend positively to refute what she
describes as "the strongest point in favor of a semi-foundationalist reading,"107 but
only to prove that "it is not absolutely decisive."108 Second, and more importantly,
Kilby seems to posit something of a false dichotomy. Either, she suggests: a) Rahner
regards the philosophical arguments to which he alludes as unimportant; or b) he
105 Kilby, Karl Rahner, 75.
106 Ibid.. 84.
107 Ibid.. Kilby's sentence continues, "and it is a genuinely strong point."
108 Ibid..
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expects his readers to understand, without being told, that he appeals to arguments
advanced in his early, philosophical works. In the latter case, presumably, Rahner
would expect his readers either to consult these works or to resign themselves to
ignorance of the arguments in question.
Few persons, it seems, if confronted with these two alternatives, would find the
second scenario, the only scenario Kilby presents that is compatible with a semi-
foundationalist construal of Rahner's thought, even remotely plausible. The
prominence of the semi-foundationalist perspective in the secondary literature on
Rahner, therefore, strongly suggests that some third explanation of the brevity with
which Rahner frequently alludes to points of philosophical interest may be
conceivable. We should like, in particular, tentatively to propose the following
rationale for this peculiarity in Rahner's style.
The intended audience for the majority of Rahner's theological essays consists in
progressive, central European, Roman Catholic theologians. Such persons, whether
directly acquainted with Geist in Welt and Horer des Wortes or not, would
presumably be broadly familiar with philosophical ideas like the basic identity of
being and knowing and the Horizonthaftigkeit of human knowledge. Such persons,
moreover, would also presumably be familiar with the appropriation and translation
into Thomistic terminology of these and similar ideas by Joseph Marechal and other
Marechalian Thomists: a circle including, but not limited to Gustav Siewerth,
Johannes B. Lotz, Max Miiller, Emerich Coreth, Bernhard Welte, and Rahner
himself. When Rahner, therefore, alludes to typically "transcendental Thomistic"
conceptions such as the basic identity of being and knowing, the limitless
transcendence of the human spirit, the human being's necessary, but athematic
awareness of God, etc., he can reasonably assume his readers' familiarity with these
themes. Pace Kilby, then, the brevity with which Rahner refers to philosophical
arguments in his theological writings may reflect neither the unimportance of
philosophical premises in Rahner's later work, nor a desire on his part for readers to
consult Geist in Welt and Horer des Wortes. Rahner's brevity may simply reflect his
expectations of a readership educated in scholastic philosophy and theology and
well-informed about Continental philosophy in the mid-twentieth century.
For the original audiences of some of Rahner's most philosophically dense essays,
moreover, these expectations seem eminently reasonable. The essay, "Uber den
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Begriff des Geheimnisses in der katholischen Theologie,"109 for instance, certainly
presupposes extensive familiarity with a particular blend of neoscholastic and post-
Kantian, Continental philosophy. This seems entirely appropriate, however, for the
readership of a Festschrift for Erich Przywara: the format in which this essay
appeared immediately before its inclusion in Rahner's Schriften. Rahner's
"Dogmatische Erwagungen iiber das Wissen und SelbstbewuBtsein Christi," likewise,
presupposes its readers' prior acquaintance with several theses typical of
transcendental Thomism: a plausible assumption, it seems, about those to whom
Rahner originally delivered the paper as a lecture: viz. the 1961 Catholic theological
faculty at Trier.110
In any event, Rahner seems clearly to indicate that he presupposes the reader's
acquaintance with the philosophical theses to which he refers in the essay, "Zur
Theologie des Symbols:" perhaps the most philosophical of Rahner's late,
theological essays. "We choose here a method," he writes, "which will bring us to
our goal as quickly and easily as possible, even though it simplifies matters by
presupposing ontological and theological principles which would have to be
demonstrated, not supposed, in a properly worked out ontology of the symbol.
However, in view of the reader who is primarily envisaged here, these
presuppositions may be made without misgiving."111 One need not choose, therefore,
between hypothesizing: a) that philosophy is unimportant to the late Rahner, and that
he, therefore, sees little point in clarifying the philosophical arguments he mentions;
or b) that Rahner continually refers his readers to Geist in Welt and Horer des Wortes.
It seems, rather that Rahner not unreasonably assumes that the progressive, German-
speaking, Roman Catholic theologians who constitute his primary audience are
already aware of the basic theses of Marechalian Thomism and the arguments for
them.
The brevity with which Rahner frequently refers to formally philosophical
arguments within his theological works, we repeat, does not appear to betray an
attitude of indifference on the later Rahner's part to such arguments in theological
109 "The Concept of Mystery in Catholic Theology" ["Mystery"], TI iv, 36-73; ["Geheimnis"] SzTh iv,
51-99.
110 Cf. also Rahner's philosophically sophisticated "Theologische Prinzipien der Hermeneutik
eschalogischer Aussagen" (bibliographical data in n. 78), which originated as a lecture to the Catholic
theological faculty at Bonn in 1960.
111 "The Theology of the Symbol" ["Symbol"], TI iv, 221-52 at 225-6, n. 4; "Zur Theologie des
Symbols" ["Symbols"], SmtWk xviii, 423-57 at 427, Anm. 4.
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contexts. As a counterargument to inferences from Rahner's explicit references to
philosophical proofs within his theological arguments to the integrality of philosophy
to Rahner's theology, therefore, Kilby's argument from brevity does not succeed.
Kilby proposes, however, a second counterargument as well. Assuming, again,
that the later Rahner's brief references to philosophical arguments constitute either
signs of indifference or implicit instructions to consult Geist in Welt and Horer des
Wortes, Kilby claims that:
even if one did take these passages to involve an implicit reference back to Rahner's own early
philosophical arguments, though this would count against a nonfoundationalist reading, it would not
count decisively against it. This is because the real case for a nonfoundationalist reading does not rest
on the construal of individual passages....The real case for the nonfoundationalist reading is that it
makes possible the most plausible and most coherent reading of Rahner's theology taken as a whole.
Even if, then, it turns out that at particular points Rahner makes appeal to his earlier philosophy, the
nonfoundationalist would argue that this represents merely a remnant of an earlier kind of thinking,
one which is extraneous to the basic drift and at odds with the overall thrust of Rahner's theology.112
This, it seems, would constitute a weighty argument if Kilby could point to
genuine elements of incoherence and implausibility in the alternatives to a non¬
foundationalist perspective on Rahner's later thought. We have seen, however, that
the neither the discontinuities between Rahner's early philosophy and his late
philosophy, nor the practical impossibility of reconciling one's faith with all of the
data of one's consciousness, nor the insuperable pluralism of philosophies (the point
on which Kilby lays the greatest stress) poses significant difficulties for the semi-
foundationalist position.
4. Conclusion. Neither Kilby's distinction between formal and material
conceptions of philosophy, nor the sometimes radical discontinuities between the
views of the early and the late Rahner, nor even the consequences the late Rahner
attributes to rampant gnoseological concupiscence, then, seems to falsify the
consensus interpretation of the role of philosophy in Rahner's theology. Philosophy,
in the formal sense of the term, actually does function in the mature Rahner's thought
as an "inner moment of theology."113 It seems unreasonable to presuppose a priori,
112 Kilby, Karl Rahner, 84-5.
113 "Philosophy and Theology," 77 vi, 72; "Philosophic und Theologie," SzTh vi, 93.
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therefore, that Rahner's theological conclusions do not, at any time, depend on
formally philosophical premises.
IV. Modification of Rahner's views
1. Introduction. Over the course of his long career, as we have already noted,
Rahner significantly modifies certain of the views set forth in his early philosophical
writings. In order to avoid confusion, therefore, it seems advisable to identify certain
of these modifications before proceeding to the substance of our discussion of
Rahner's concept of revelation. We have already discussed two of the most
significant modifications: viz. Rahner's decisions to maintain 1) that revelation, at
least in its most primordial sense, consists not in a spatio-temporally localized
Heilsgeschichte, but in the universal, transcendental experience of divine self-
communication; and 2) that, by virtue of God's self-communication to all human
beings without exception, all persons possess a "supernatural existential" by virtue of
which they possess an exigency for the beatific vision; in the preceding treatment of
the relation between Rahner's philosophy and his theology. In the following two
sub-sections, we hope to document and account for, in some measure at least, two
other shifts of opinion on Rahner's part: viz. his decisions to hold: a) that God, and
not solely esse commune as he had previously argued, constitutes the transcendental
horizon within which human beings apprehend categorical beings; and b) that,
Rahner's early enthusiasm for revelation as history notwithstanding, God never
intervenes in the categorical order.
2. God as the transcendental horizon of human experience. In his 1939 work,
Geist in Welt, Rahner denies that God constitutes the horizon of human
consciousness in the following terms:
the esse apprehended in the pre-apprehension [= the Vorgriff]...[is] known implicitly and
simultaneously...as able to be limited by quidditative determinations and as already limited....Insofar
as this esse simultaneously apprehended in the pre-apprehension is able to be limited, it shows itself to
be non-absolute, since an absolute necessarily excludes the possibility of limitation. This esse
apprehended in the pre-apprehension is therefore in itself esse "commune" ("common" esie)."4
114 SW, 180-1; GW, SmtWk ii, 142.
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In other words, since the esse apprehended in the Vorgriff is subject to limitation,
and the divine esse absolutum is not, the esse apprehended in the Vorgriffmust be
distinct from and inferior to that of God. The Rahner of Grundkurs, however,
describes God as "this absolute, incomprehensible reality, which is always the
ontologically silent horizon of every intellectual and spiritual encounter with
realities"115 and "the creative ground of everything which can encounter us within
the ultimate horizon which he himself is."116 The principal reason for this radical
alteration of perspective seems clearly to lie in Rahner's adoption of his later,
relatively outre theory of divine self-communication.
For one can rephrase the early Rahner's claim quoted above in the following
terms: since the esse apprehended in the Vorgriff is subject to limitation, and the
divine esse absolutum is not, the esse apprehended in the Vorgriffmust be inferior to
that of God. The later Rahner, presumably, concludes: a) that any change in a
perfect being must constitute, in some sense at least, a limitation; and b) that God
must change if, in communicating himself, he becomes "the very core of the world's
reality."117 His understanding of divine self-communication thus impels him, his
former convictions notwithstanding, to affirm that God can suffer limitation. The
later Rahner, therefore, claims not only that "God...in and in spite of his
immutability can become something,"118 but that "this possibility is not a sign of
deficiency, but the height of his perfection, which would be less if in addition to
being infinite, he could not become less than he (always) is."119
Now, if God can suffer limitation, no theoretical obstacle inhibits Rahner from
identifying him with the horizon of human consciousness. Rahner's beliefs: a) that
divine self-communication renders God "the innermost constitutive element of
man;"120 and b) that "being..., to the extent that it is being, is knowing,"121 moreover,
seem to imply that all human beings possess a conscious, albeit athematic, awareness
of God of the sort that his communication to them as the horizon of their
115 Foundations, 77; Grundkurs, SmtWk xxvi, 79.
116 Ibid., 81; ebd., 82.
117 "The Specific Character of the Christian Concept of God" ["Specific Character"], TI xxi, 185-95
at 191; "Die Eigenart des christlichen Gottesbegriffs" ["Eigenart"], SzTh xv, 185-94 at 190.
118 "On the Theology of the Incarnation" ["Incarnation"], TI iv, 105-20 at 114, n. 3; "Zur Theologie
der Menschwerdung" ["Menschwerdung"], SzTh iv, 137-56 at 147, Anm. 3.
119 Ibid.; ebd..
120 Foundations, 116; Grundkurs, SmtWk xxvi, 116.
121 HW, 29; Horer, SmtWk iv, 62.
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transcendence would supply. Rahner's decision to reverse himself on this subject
and identify God with the human intellect's horizon, therefore, seems largely
attributable to his later ideas about divine self-communication.
3. Divine intervention in the categorical order. Although the early Rahner
already displays hesitancy about the idea of miracles as exceptions to the laws of
nature,122 he affirms, nonetheless, that God, on certain occasions at least, produces
particular effects in the created order without the mediation of second causes. In his
"Theologisches zum Monogenismus," for instance, Rahner, while insisting that "the
transcendent divine causality influences the terrestrial course of things in the most
discrete and economic way,"123 identifies divine intervention as integral to "saving
history" in the following remarks:
That divine activity, of a miraculous kind, is terrestrial which takes place at a fixed point in space and
time within the whole of material reality; and there on the one hand is as such observable, and on the
other can be recognized as the divine institution of novelty....Such action on the part of God is
precisely his action in saving history, in which he wishes to reveal himself as someone who conducts
a personal dialogue with the spiritual person..., and does not only maintain his sway as transcendent
cause of the world itself....In saving history and there alone the transcendent cause steps forth from
behind the veil of space and time and conducts a dialogue with man. Otherwise it institutes the world
and its otherwise individual, irreducibly separate origins without putting itself as an agent in the world.
Every occasion on which it does this immediately and necessarily has the character of personal
dialogue addressed to man...[i.e.] Revelation, not Creation.124
In "Theos im Neuen Testament," likewise, the early Rahner writes, "It is on the
basis of a concrete experience of free irruptions into the historical course of the
world, novel and unexpected and extrinsic to the world's immanent dynamism, that
the men of the New Testament recognize God as a free, transcendent Person."125 It
seems difficult to dispute, then, that the pre-Vatican II Rahner at least occasionally
affirms that God sometimes miraculously intervenes in his creation.
The Rahner of Grundkurs, however, emphatically asserts the opposite. "A special
'intervention' ofGod," he writes:
122 Ibid., 142; ebd., 254.
123 "Theological Reflexions on Monogenism," 77 i, 229-296 at 296; SzTh i, 253-322 at 322.
124 Ibid., 292-3; ebd., 318-19.
125 77 i, 79-148 at 108; "Theos im Neuen Testament," SmtWk iv, 346-403 at 370.
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can only be understood as the historical concreteness of the transcendental self-communication of God
which is always already intrinsic to the concrete world. Such an "intervention" of God always takes
place, first of all, from out of the fundamental openness of finite matter and of a biological system
towards spirit and its history, and, secondly, from out of the openness of the spirit towards the history
of the transcendental relationship between God and the created person in their mutual freedom.
Consequently, every real intervention of God in his world, although it is free and cannot be deduced,
is always only the becoming historical and becoming concrete of that "intervention" in which God as
the transcendental ground of the world has from the outset embedded himself in this world as its self-
communicating ground.'26
4. Conclusion. Rahner's views, therefore, evolve quite radically in some
instances over the course of his career and do so in ways not irrelevant to his
theology of the Trinity. In the following section, we shall focus on Rahner's concept
of revelation and especially on his understanding of the relations that pertain between
the categorical aspects of revelation, especially as officially recognized in Scripture,
and the transcendental aspect of revelation consisting in God himself as horizon of
the human intellect.
126 Foundations, 87; Grundkurs, SmtWk xxvi, 87-8.
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V. Revelation as such.127
"Scripture," Rahner writes, "[is] the inspired word of God...and not just debatable
theology."128 Yet specifying why and in what sense this thesis holds true, according
to Rahner, "is not as easy as it might seem at first sight."129 For the statements of
Scripture, as proclaimed and heard, always contain, in his view, a moment of
theology. In Rahner's words:
there is no proclaimed revelation except in the form of a believed revelation. A believed, i.e. heard,
revelation always already includes also — insofar as it is a revelation understood, accepted and
assimilated—a synthesis of the Word of God and the word of a particular man....Every Word of God
which is spoken by men is already, therefore, to a certain extent a reflected word, and to that extent
also already a beginning of theology.120
This theology, this reflecting on a more primitive revelation, Rahner avers, occurs
even in Scripture itself. "It would be absurd," Rahner writes, "to try to reduce the
whole difference between for example the theology of the Synoptics or of the Acts of
the Apostles and that of St. Paul to the intervention of a new, direct revelation of
God."131 One must instead suppose, according to Rahner, that the human authors of
Scripture "ponder and reflect on the data of their faith already known to them"132 and
respond to new questions, experiences, etc. "to the best of their ability in a
theological reflection."133
Indeed, in Rahner's view, the actual statements of Scripture constitute nothing
more than a "conceptual objectification...[which] is secondary in comparison"134
127 An earlier version of this section appeared in our M.Th. thesis, "Karl Rahner's Theological
Method as a Response to Gnoseological Concupiscence and Cryptogamic Heresy" (Edinburgh, 2001),
41-8.
128 "Considerations on the Development of Dogma," TI iv, 6; Uberlegungen zur
Dogmenentwicklung," SzTh iv, 14-15.
129 "What is a Dogmatic Statement?" ["Dogmatic Statement"] TI v, 42-66 at 61; "Was ist eine
dogmatische Aussage?" ["Dogmatische Aussage"], SzTh v, 54-81 at 75.
130 Ibid.; ebd., 75-6.
131 "Theology in the New Testament" ["New Testament"], TI v, 23-41 at 28; "Theologie im Neuen
Testament" ["Neues Testament"], SzTh v, 33-53 at 38-9.
132 Ibid.; ebd., 39.
133 Ibid.; ebd..
134 Ibid., 39; ebd., 51.
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with a more "fundamental revelation."135 This revelation, in turn, he considers
ultimately identical with a "pre-thematic and transcendental experience" 136
universally bestowed on human beings. "The express revelation of the word in
Christ," he writes, "is not something that comes to us from without as entirely
strange, but only the explicitation of what we already are by grace and what we
experience at least incoherently in the limitlessness of our transcendence."137 Rahner
affirms, in fact, that "the totality of the message of the Christian faith is in a real
sense already given in...transcendental experience." 138 The specific difference
between Scripture and other forms of theological discourse, therefore, most
definitely does not, in Rahner's view at least, "lie in the fact that in the former there
is as it were the pure Word ofGod alone and in the latter only human reflection."139
The real distinction between the two, Rahner claims, derives from "the peculiar
and unique position of Holy Scripture,"140 which Rahner attempts to articulate in his
"Catholic principle of sola-scriptura."U] Such a principle need not conflict with the
defined doctrines of his Church, according to Rahner:
provided that we understand...it to involve also [1] an authoritative attestation and interpretation of
holy scripture by the living word of the Church and her magisterium, and [2] an attestation of
scripture itself and its authoritative interpretation which cannot be replaced by scripture
itself...presupposing, of course [3]...that one does not interpret this principle of the sola-scriptura as
meaning a prohibition of a living development of the faith of the Church.142
The self-understanding of the Roman Catholic Church, in fact, requires such a
principle, Rahner contends, for at least three reasons. First, Rahner explains, "by
herself testifying absolutely...that the Scriptures are absolutely authoritative:"143 that
they are just as authoritative, in fact, as the Church's infallible teaching office, "the
135 Ibid., 40; ebd., 52.
136 "Contemporary Sciences," 77 xiii, 97; "Heutigen Wissenschaften," SmtWk xv, 707.
137 "Anonymous Christians," TI vi, 390-98 at 394; "Die Anonymen Christen," SzTh vi, 545-54 at 549.
138 "Reflections on Methodology in Theology," TI xi, 109. Likewise, writes Rahner, "Christianity is
none else but the deepest reality of the transcendental experience" ("Ideology and Christianity," 77 vi
43-58 at 51; "Ideologic und Christentum," SmtWk xv, 395-408 at 402).
139 "Dogmatic Statement," 77 v, 61; "Dogmatische Aussage," SzTh v, 76.
140 Ibid., 62; ebd., 77.
141 "Scripture and Tradition," TI vi, 98-112 at 108; "Heilige Schrift und Tradition," SzTh vi, 121-38 at
132.
142 Ibid., 107-8; ebd..
143 "Inspiration in the Bible," in Studies in Modern Theology [SMT] (W. J. O'Hara et al, trans.;
London: Burns & Oates, 1965), 31; Uber die Schriftinspiration (QD 1; Freiburg-im-Breisgau: Herder,
1958), 38.
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Church seems to involve herself in a contradiction."144 For, it seems, one of the
authorities cannot but render the other superfluous. If the Church recognizes an
infallible and intelligible Bible, "she evacuates the force of her own authoritative
'infallible' magistery in favour of the Bible, as the infallible Word of God."145 If the
Church retains the plenitude of her authority, however, "she subjects the Scripture to
her own magisterial interpretation; it is she who decides what the Scriptures can do
and say."146
One cannot dispose of the latter difficulty, moreover, by claiming "that the Bible
cannot interpret itself, that it needs an infallible interpreter."147 The person who
reasons thus, Rahner avers, "is in effect saying that the Bible can claim no priority
over other [ecclesiastical] traditions when it comes to finding out just what is of
divine revelation; both are equally in need of a teaching authority if the divine
revelation in them is to be unerringly discerned."148 In such an event, an infallible
book would be superfluous. The "Two-Source Theory,"149 therefore, according to
which Scripture and tradition constitute two, independent sources of doctrine, seems
to involve the Roman Catholic theologian in an insoluble dilemma: "why an
infallible teaching authority if there is an infallible Scripture? Why an infallible
Scripture if there is an infallible teaching authority?"150
Rahner thinks he can resolve this dilemma by developing a new theory of
inspiration which implies, in turn, a less problematic understanding of the relation
between Scripture and tradition. According to Rahner, "inspiration does not of itself
require an immediate divine intervention into the interior of the human will; it is
possible for the will to be moved mediately, by means of created impulses arising
within...the author's concrete empirical experience."151 Instead, Rahner contends,
one can do justice to the traditional doctrine of inspiration simply by asserting that
"God wills and produces the Scripture as a constitutive element in the foundation of
the Apostolic Church, because and to the extent that it is precisely in this way that he
144 Ibid.; ebd., 39.
145 Ibid.; ebd..
146 Ibid.; ebd..
147 Ibid., 32; ebd..
148 Ibid.; ebd..
149 Ibid., 36; ebd., 43.
150 Ibid., 31; ebd., 39.
151 Ibid., 22-3; ebd., 31.
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wills and effects the Apostolic Church's existence."152 God constitutes the divine
author of Scripture, in other words, insofar as he wills the existence of the Church.
His willing of the Church's existence makes God the "author" of Scripture,
according to Rahner, because "the concrete, fully realized essence of the Church
includes the Scriptures: they are a constitutive element of her."153 "A fundamental
character of the Scriptures," Rahner explains, "is the fulfillment of the role...[of] the
Apostolic Church as distinct from the later Church: to be not only the earliest phase
in time, but also the permanent source, the Canon and norm for the Church of later
eras."154 Before the Church possessed the entire canon of Scripture, therefore, it
constituted "an eglise naissante, the Church in the process of birth."155 By her
"production of the Scriptures," however, "she constituted herself the normative law
for the Church's future course"156 and thus brought about the "self-constitution,"157
the "self-realization"158 and, indeed, "the completion of the Apostolic Church."159
This understanding of Scripture as the Church's self-produced and self-imposed
doctrinal standard implies, according to Rahner, that "the inspiration of Holy
Scripture is nothing else than God's founding of the Church."160 This thesis, in turn,
suggests a means of conceiving of the relation between Scripture and the Church's
teaching authority in such a way that neither renders the other superfluous: the
"Catholic sola-scriptura principle." Such a principle, according to Rahner, if
conceived in the terms of his understanding of inspiration, actually confers on the
magisterium and Scripture a status ofmutual priority.
Insofar as Scripture constitutes "the enduring and unsurpassable norma normans,
non normata for all later dogmatic statements,"161 the magisterium must remain
utterly subservient to it. Yet Scripture, according to Rahner, proceeds, to a degree at
least, from that very magisterium. "The New Testament authors were," Rahner
writes, "on this showing, organs of the Church's self-expression."162 In yielding to
152 Ibid., 58-9; ebd., 63-4.
153 Ibid., 50; ebd., 55.
154 Ibid., 51; ebd., 56.
155 Ibid., 47; ebd., 53.
156 Ibid., 51-2; ebd., 57.
157 Ibid., 51; ebd., 56.
158 Ibid., 69; ebd., 74.
159 Ibid., 79; ebd., 82.
160 Ibid., 53; ebd., 58.
161 "Dogmatic Statement," 77 v, 62; "Dogmatische Aussage," SzTh v, 77.
162 "Inspiration," SMT, 76; Schriftinspiration, 79.
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the authority of Scripture, therefore, the magisterium merely conforms to its own
previous edicts. "The infallible teaching authority of the Apostolic Church, in her
function for the future, consists in the capacity for creating the Scriptures, while the
infallible teaching authority of the later Church consists in the authentic
interpretation of the Scriptures."163
Rahner's "Catholic principle of sola scriptura" with its concomitant view of
inspiration, therefore, vindicates his church's self-understanding, first, in the sense
that it maintains the authority of both Scripture and tradition while giving no
impression of conflict between the two. It thus endows, in Rahner's view, the
Roman Catholic understanding of Scripture and tradition with "that measure of
intelligibility which...is needed for a solid and enduring faith on the part of the
majority ofmen."164
Rahner's principle sustains his church's self-understanding, second, to the extent
that it engenders "a less embarrassed attitude toward the datum of comparative
religion, that non-Christian religions of a high cultural level also have their holy
books."165 Embarrassment at this datum, Rahner thinks, arises from a mythological
understanding of inspiration which he intends his theory of inspiration, including the
"Catholic sola scriptura principle," to replace. According to Rahner's theory, the
Bible does not consist in miraculously dictated messages from heaven: the kind of
literature which one would expect to find only in Christ's mystical body. Instead,
Rahner holds, the Bible consists in a document written by the Church to define the
Church's beliefs: the kind of writing one would expect to find in any literate
religious group. In Rahner's words:
a community will almost necessarily establish itself as historically founded and enduring into the
future through the medium of books. It could even be suggested that the origin of books lies here,
rather than in the need for private communication. Possession of sacred books is [therefore]
something to be expected a priori in any religion which possesses a certain level of culture and claims
to be a bearer of historical revelation.166
163 Ibid., 77; ebd., 80.
164 Ibid., 34; ebd., 41.
165 Ibid., 81-2; ebd., 84-5.
166 Ibid., 82; ebd., 85.
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For one who accepts Rahner's understanding of inspiration, therefore, "the non-
Christian analogies to the Christian Scriptures are no longer a cause of unease,"167
and, to that extent, Rahner's theology of Scripture sustains the credibility of
Christianity.
Third, and, for Rahner, probably quite significantly, his understanding of
Scripture's inspiration retains key elements of a traditional, Christian doctrine
without invoking divine intervention: a concept Rahner rejects as mythological. If
one presupposes his theology of inspiration, Rahner writes, "it seems to me that all
that is being said [by the Church] about the Sacred Scripture of the Old and New
Testaments — about God as the main author of Scripture, about inspiration, about
Scripture as norm, about the inerrancy of Scripture — can be understood without
recourse to the miraculous, which does not find credence today."168
Rahner's theology of Scripture and tradition also concedes to historic
Protestantism the material sufficiency of Scripture as a source of Christian doctrine.
He does not, however, in so doing adopt a Protestant understanding of the relation
between ecclesiastical authority and Scripture. For: a) he maintains that only the
Church can identify precisely which books belong to the canon of Scripture; b) he
maintains that the Church herself not only receives, but actually produces the
Scriptures; and c) he maintains that "the very fact that the Church proclaims a
teaching according to the norms of her office...guarantees that the Scriptures are
being rightly interpreted."169 Such a principle, according to Rahner, if conceived in
the terms of his theory of inspiration, confers on the magisterium and Scripture a
status ofmutual priority. "The infallible teaching authority of the Apostolic Church,
in her function for the future, consists in the capacity for creating the Scriptures,
while the infallible teaching authority of the later Church consists in the authentic
interpretation of the Scriptures."170
In Rahner's view, then, the "infallible" teachings of the post-apostolic Church
(excluding the question of the canon) derive, in some sense, from Scripture.
Scripture, in turn, derives from the experience of the Biblical authors, which
experience derives from certain historical events which, while they provide the
167 Ibid.; ebd..
168 "Book of God— Book of Human Beings" ["Book of God"], 77 xxii, 219; "Buch Gottes—Buch
der Menschen" ["Buch Gottes"], SzTh xvi, 278-91 at 284.
169 "Inspiration," SMT, 77; Schriftinspiration, 80-1.
170 Ibid., 77; ebd., 80.
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material content of categorical revelation, do not, in and of themselves, contain its
ultimate and authoritative meaning. This deeper meaning, in Rahner's view, subsists
entirely in the divine self-revelation bestowed at all places, in all times, and on all
persons in humanity's transcendental experience.
This brief etiology seems to sum up at least the essential elements of Rahner's
view of divine revelation. On this understanding, particular truths, like the doctrine
of the Trinity, demand the assent of Christians only to the extent that their meaning is
contained implicitly in the former levels of revelation.171 In particular, their meaning
must be implicitly contained in transcendental experience: the sole origin of the
indispensable and formal, as opposed to the dispensable and material, content of
revelation.
A "recourse to this originating reality of faith," i.e. transcendental experience, "is
[therefore] wholly suitable," in Rahner's view, "to provide a critical criterion for
determining the exact meaning and the limitations of a theological statement."172
Whatever in a dogma reflects this "originating reality" must, in Rahner's view,
remain absolutely normative. All else he considers dispensable: "time-conditioned
amalgams"173 with "no claim to permanent validity."174
One might object, of course, that this kind of "interpretation" of dogma "might
lead eventually to the elimination of what is 'really' meant, a process of elimination
leading ultimately to the destruction of any real meaning of a religious statement."175
Rahner, however, seems to consider such fears unfounded. Of this difficulty, he
writes:
it need only be said that a religious statement points not to what is drained of meaning, but to the
ineffable mystery that we call God....In other words, these processes of elimination are basically
continually recurring events pointing to that mystery and must occur over and over again in the
history of abiding religious truth, since this liberating and hopeful approach to the mystery of God
must take place in the light of continually new historical situations of truth.176
171 Cf. Rahner, "The Congregation of the Faith and the Commission of Theologians," 77 xiv, 98-115
at 107; "Glaubenskongregation und Theologenkommission," SzTh x, 338-57 at 348-9.
172 "Yesterday's History of Dogma and Theology for Tomorrow" ["History of Dogma"], TI xviii, 3-
34 at 20-21; "Dogmen- und Theologiegeschicte von gestern fur morgen" ["Theologiegeschicte"],
SzTh xiii, 11-47 at 31.
173 "Magisterium and Theology," TI xviii, 68; "Lehramt und Theologie," SzTh xiii, 85.
174 Ibid.; ebd..
175 "History of Dogma," TI xviii, 16; "Theologiegeschicte," SzTh xiii, 26.
176 Ibid.; ebd..
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As long as the dogma continues effectively to mediate the transcendental
experience of God, Rahner holds, it ipso facto retains its true meaning. Rahner
identifies, then, the certain, irreducible content of Christian revelation with universal
and athematic transcendental experience.
VI. The Revelation of the Trinity
1. Introduction. Rahner's view of the content of Christian revelation renders the
doctrine of the Trinity, as traditionally understood, quite problematic. For, in the
traditional view, the acts of the Trinitarian persons ad extra are absolutely
indistinguishable so that neither creation nor grace engenders elements in human
experience from which one can legitimately infer the existence of the immanent
Trinity. In order for human beings to possess any certain knowledge at all about the
tripersonality of God, the traditional view holds, God must reveal this tripersonality
to them through a conceptual, and even verbal, revelation. In Rahner's non-
miraculous understanding of Christianity, however, the kind of divine intervention
necessary for the conveyance of such a revelation simply does not occur. "Every real
intervention of God in his world," Rahner writes, "is always only the becoming
historical and...concrete of that 'intervention' in which God as the transcendental
ground of the world has from the outset embedded himself in the world as its self-
communicating ground."177
The very idea of a revelation of something unrelated to humanity and utterly and
completely transcendent of human beings and their world, moreover, strikes Rahner,
on philosophical grounds, as absurd. For his theory of the unity of being and
knowing entails the abandonment of any theory of knowledge according to which the
known remains simply external to the knower. As Rahner explains: "Every
knowledge of another by man is a mode of his self-knowledge, of his 'subjectivity';
the two are not merely extrinsically synchronized, but intrinsic moments of the one
human knowing....This holds also for man's knowledge of God."178
Even if a verbal revelation could occur, therefore, it would suffice, in Rahner's
view, only to convey an unintelligible and insignificant doctrine about the Trinity to
177 Foundations, 87; Grundkurs, SmtWkxxvi, 88.
178 SW, 183; GW, SmtWk ii, 144.
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human beings. In order for human beings to know the Trinity itself, Rahner holds,
they must experience God's triune nature in some way in the depths of their own
being; indeed, the Trinity must become, in some sense, an aspect of their being. If
this "economic Trinity," the Trinity that communicates itself to human beings, does
not relate in a very intimate way to the "immanent Trinity," i.e. God as he exists in
himself from all eternity, then, in Rahner's view, human beings cannot know of the
immanent Trinity. Now, the dogmas which Rahner, the theologian, must uphold
dictate, among other things, that certain human beings at least do know explicitly of
the immanent Trinity. Such a relationship must, therefore, in his view, exist. In
order to assert, explain, and defend the existence of this relationship, then, Rahner
develops: 1) a complex and original account of the process whereby God discloses
the Trinitarian structure of his inner relations to human beings; and 2) an a priori
rule179 that warrants inferences from God's Trinitarian self-revelation to the doctrine
of the immanent Trinity.
2. Rahner's Grundaxiom. The rule in question, of course, is Rahner's famous
Grundaxiom: "the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity and vice versa,"180
Since, in Rahner's view, this a priori dictum constitutes the principle of intelligibility
of God's Trinitarian self-revelation, it seems reasonable to us to examine its meaning
and grounds before discussing the revelation of the Trinity itself.
a. Four misconstruals. In order the more precisely to determine what Rahner's
Grundaxiom means, we shall first eliminate four, possible misconstruals.
i. Trivially obvious identity. First and above all else, Rahner does not posit his
Grundaxiom in order to affirm a trivially obvious identity of the Trinity with itself.
In the words ofPhilip Cary:
179 We refer, of course, to Rahner's Grundaxiom. Commenting on its apriorism, J. A. Colombo
writes, "It is precisely at this point that a danger arises, for it appears that the speaker has taken up a
position ab aeterno and abandoned the historicity of his own starting point" ("Rahner and His Critics:
Lindbeck and Metz," Thomist 56 [1992], 71-96 at 79, n. 19).
180 "Oneness and Threefoldness," 77 xviii, 114; 'Einzigkeit und Dreifaltigkeit," SzTh xiii, 139. In the
following sentence, Rahner writes: "I do not know exactly when and by whom this theological axiom
was formulated for the first time."
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Rahner must be claiming more than just the identity of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit of salvation-
history with the three persons of the immanent Trinity; for that is an identity already written into the
Creed, which no Trinitarian theology could possibly want to contest....The distinction between the
economic Trinity and the immanent Trinity has never implied that there were two separate Trinities,
but only that there is a difference between describing God in se and describing the work ofGod in the
economy of salvation.181
ii. Absolute identity. Second, however, Rahner also does not intend for his
Grundaxiom to affirm an identity so absolute that it renders the distinction between
the immanent and the economic Trinity superfluous. "The 'immanent' Trinity,"
Rahner's writes, "is the necessary condition of the possibility of God's free self-
communication":182 not that self-communication simpliciter.
Hi. Copy theory. Nor does Rahner, third, regard the economic Trinity as a mere
manifestation of the immanent Trinity through the divine acts of salvation history.
God's "threefold, gratuitous, and free relation to us," in Rahner's view, "is not
merely a copy or an analogy of the inner Trinity."183 Rahner characterizes the
economic Trinity much more as the self-gift of the immanent Trinity to humanity.
"God has given himself so fully in his absolute self-communication to the creature,"
he writes, "that the 'immanent' Trinity becomes the Trinity of the 'economy of
salvation.'"184 Again, "because God himself and not some created representation of
God is involved in the free self-gift of God as mystery, the three-fold form belongs
directly to God in his relation to man. Thus the economic Trinity of salvation is ipso
facto the immanent Trinity."185
The economic Trinity, then, does not, in Rahner's view, correspond to the
immanent Trinity as, for instance, a picture corresponds to the reality it portrays. It
181 "On Behalf of Classical Trinitarianism: A Critique of Rahner on the Trinity," Thomist 56 (1992),
365-405 at 367.
182 Ibid., 102, n. 21; ebd., 384, Anm. 21. As Joseph Wong explains, "If the economic Trinity simply
is the immanent Trinity, then Rahner's repeated assertion that the immanent self-expression of God
[the Trinitarian processions] is the presupposed condition for the free self-utterance ad extra [the
economy of salvation] would lose its meaning" (Logos-Symbol in the Christology of Karl Rahner
[BSRel 61; Rome: LAS, 1984], 211). Cf. the similar remarks of Ludger Oeing-Hanhoff in his "Die
Krise des Gottesbegriffs," TQ 159 (1979), 285-303 at 301.
183 Trinity, 35; "Der dreifaltige Gott," MS ii, 337.
184 "Mystery," 77 iv, 69; "Geheimnis," SzTh iv, 95.
185 "The Hiddenness ofGod," 77 xvi, 227-43 at 240; "Uber die Verborgenheit Gottes," SzTh xii, 285-
305 at 301.
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corresponds to the immanent Trinity, rather, as a person who spends himself for the
good of another corresponds to himself as he would exist whether or not he
undertook this labor. The economic Trinity, as Rahner understands it, is the
immanent Trinity pouring itself out in grace.
iv. Merely de facto identity. Rahner, fourth and finally, does not consider this
correspondence between the eternal Trinity and the Trinity which communicates
itself to humanity as merely de facto and unnecessary in itself. Although Rahner
allows for and, indeed, insists upon some change in God's being when he
communicates himself to others, he nonetheless regards God's triune, internal
relatedness as a principle of divine identity which necessarily perdures even through
the process of divine self-communication. Rahner denies the possibility, therefore,
of a self-communication of God whose internal distinctions differ in any way from
those of the immanent Trinity. In his words, "if...there is a real ^//-communication
with a real distinction in that which is communicated as such, hence with a real
distinction 'for us,' then God must 'in himself carry this distinction."186
b. Rahner's actual meaning. By the statement, "the economic Trinity is the
immanent Trinity, and vice versa," then, Rahner does mean that divine self-
communication "can, //'occurring in freedom, occur only in the intra-divine manner
of the two communications of the one divine essence by the Father to the Son and the
Spirit."187 In other words, the immanent constitution of the Trinity forms a kind of a
priori law for the divine self-communication ad extra such that the structure of the
latter cannot but correspond to the structure of the former.188
c. Rahner's arguments for the Grundaxiom. That such a correspondence must
obtain, however, is by no means self-evident. Rahner, after all, famously admits that
"he who is not subject to change himself can himself be subject to change in
something else."m If God could alter other facets of his being in something else, it
186 Trinity, 36, n. 34; "Der dreifaltige Gott," MS ii, 338, Anm. 34.
187 Trinity, 36; "Der dreifaltige Gott," MS ii, 338.
188 "The Trinity as present in the economy of salvation," Rahner writes, "necessarily embodies also
the Trinity as immanent" ("Methodology," 77 xi, 108; "Methode," SzTh ix, 120).
189 Foundations, 220; Grundkurs, SmtWk xxvi, 212.
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seems, prima facie, that he could also alter the relations between his modes of
subsistence. God's simplicity,190 as classically understood, moreover, would seem to
dictate that changes in other facets of God's being could not leave the Trinitarian
relations untouched. For, if God is simple, i.e. absolutely uncomposed, then every
aspect of his being is essentially, though not necessarily relatively, identical with
every other; hence the slightest change in any aspect of a simple God would
transform every aspect of that God. It seems, then, that the relations between Father,
Son, and Holy Spirit could hardly escape the comprehensive metamorphosis entailed
by divine becoming. Such becoming, however, forms an indispensable prerequisite
to divine self-communication as Rahner conceives of it: i.e. "the act whereby God
goes out of himself into 'the other' in such a way that he bestows himself upon the
other by becoming the other."191
i. The argument from divine self-communication. Rahner contends, nevertheless,
in his only explicit argument for the Grundaxiom, that precisely because God
communicates himself, the relations intrinsic to that communication necessarily
correspond to the eternal relations within the immanent Trinity. "The differentiation
of the self-communication of God...must," he writes, "belong to God 'in himself,' or
otherwise this difference...would do away with God's se/^communication." 192
Rahner, indeed, seems to regard asymmetry between God's eternal relations and his
communicated relations as self-evidently incompatible with a genuine, divine self-
communication and, accordingly, never responds explicitly to the difficulty raised
above about the implications of change in a simple being. To his credit, however,
Rahner does display awareness of a related objection to his position: viz. that even if
he could identify an authentically Trinitarian superstructure of religious experience;
and even if he could plausibly argue that this superstructure characterizes the God
himself who communicates himself to human beings; Rahner could not, it seems,
establish that the structure in question 1) characterized this God even before he
communicated himself, and 2) would have characterized him even if he had never
communicated himself.
190 Rahner endorses the doctrine of divine simplicity (cf. Trinity, 69, 102, n. 21; "Der dreifaltige
Gott," MS ii, 362, 384, Anm. 21), but interprets it in an unconventional sense (cf. ibid., 103; ebd., 384).
191 "Mystery," TI iv, 68; "Geheimnis," SzTh iv, 93.
192 Trinity, 99-100; "Der dreifaltige Gott," MS ii, 382. Cf. Foundations, 137; Grundkurs, SmtWk xxvi,
135-6; and "The Mystery of the Trinity," TI xvi, 255-9 at 258; "Um das Geheimnis der
Dreifaltigkeit," SzTh xii, 320-25 at 323.
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In the following passage, for instance, one can discern a preliminary response to
the criticism that, if God is not immutable, his inner structure after he communicates
himself need not mirror his structure before, or prescinding from, this
communication. "The Aoyoc ev5ia0£Toc," he writes:
is the condition of the possibility of the Aoyoc TTpotfopixoc. This does not make of the Logos a
mere principle of creation. For if the verbum prolativum.. .is uttered freely, thus having its condition
in the Father's immanent Word, it must have an "immanent" sense and a meaning for the Father
himself. Otherwise the Father's self-expression ad extra would either no longer be a free grace, or no
"immanent" word could pre-exist in relation to it as the condition of its possibility.193
Rahner recognizes, in other words, that one could reasonably conceive of the
Logos as "a mere principle of creation" under one, or possibly both, of two
conditions. The Logos could constitute a mere principle of creation if: a) the self-
communication involved in creation was not a free grace; or b) the Logos did not
exist prior to creation. It is the second possibility that interests us here.
By raising the possibility that God first differentiates himself into Father and
Logos when he wishes to communicate himself ad extra, Rahner displays his
awareness that a differentiation within a mutable God's communication of himself
need not imply a differentiation within this God prior to, or irrespective of, the
communication. He acknowledges, in fact, that "here lies the critical point of the
whole question. Why is the Son as the word of the free self-expression of the Father
to the world necessarily also the Aoyoc sv5ia0ETOG of the Father? Why does the
possibility of the Father's self-expression to the world, even as a mere possibility,
already imply an inner 'differentiation' in God himself?"194
Rahner seems, then, clearly to understand the problem: if God can change in
communicating himself, why should one assume that the communicated God
corresponds to God as he existed before, or as he would have existed without, the
self-communication? He attempts, moreover, to supply a rudimentary answer, which,
due to the importance of the matter at hand, we quote at length:
First, we may simply point out that the experience of the absolute proximity of the God who
communicates himself in Christ is already interpreted in this way by the theology of the New
193 Trinity, 64; "Der dreifaltige Gott," MS ii, 358-9.
194 Ibid., 64-5; ebd., 359.
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Testament. This theology knows already of a descent Christology [Deszendenzchristologie] as an
interpretation of an ascent Christology [Aszendenzchristologie] in the Synoptics and in the discourses
of the Acts of the Apostles. But how and why did such an interpretation arise—a "theology" developed
within the very framework of the history of revelation? Taking a leaf from this biblical interpretation
itself we may say: Jesus knew of himself in a peculiar way as the "Son" as well with respect to the
Father as also with respect to men. But this would be impossible if he were simply the Father making
himself present and giving himself in a human reality. Let us suppose that...we should, in some kind
of Sabellian way, allow the human reality to subsist hypostatically in the Father. In that case we could
still in this humanity conceive of a spiritual, free, created subjectivity which might also refer to the
Father in adoration, obedience, and so on....It might call this origin in which it subsists "Father." But
as the concrete presence of the Father it could not with respect to man experience and express itself as
the Son of the Father.195
These remarks, which Rahner himself characterizes as "brief and stammering
words,"196 do, of course, contain significant moments of truth. The central claim of
the first half of Rahner's statement, nonetheless, seems partially gratuitous; and the
central claim of the second half seems largely, albeit not entirely, immaterial.
The gratuitous aspect of the first half, naturally, does not consist in Rahner's
acknowledgment of a robust descent Christology in the New Testament, especially in
the Johannine literature and the epistles of Paul. The gratuitous aspect of Rahner's
statement lies rather in the undefended assumption that this descent Christology
constitutes "an interpretation of an ascent Christology.. .in the Synoptics and in the
discourses of the Acts of the Apostles." For, first, the New Testament writers
themselves do not claim that they reached their descent Christology by drawing
conclusions from earlier, more modest claims. On the whole, they either: a) ascribe
their Christology to Jesus' words delivered on earth (Matt 28:19; John 3:13; 8:23, 42,
58; 10:30; 12:45; 14:9; 16:15; 17:5, etc.) and from heaven (Gal 1:11-12; Rev 1:8, 11,
17; 22:13, etc.); or b) simply give no account of their Christology's origins.
If Rahner wishes to assert that the New Testament writers inferred the pre-
existence of Jesus as a distinct divine person from some source other than verbal
testimony, moreover, he should explain how this could have occurred. In the
passage quoted above, however, which represents Rahner's principal effort to meet
this challenge, Rahner explains, on the basis of Christ's filial consciousness, not how
Jesus' followers could have recognized him as the pre-existent Son of God, but how
they could have recognized him as the Son of God after the decisive event of divine
self-communication.
195 Ibid., 65; ebd.
196 Ibid.; ebd..
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That, however, is not at all to the point. For the question at hand is not how the
disciples could have recognized Jesus as the intra-divine Logos, but rather how the
disciples could have known, without simply being told, that the God who, according
to Rahner, can and even must metamorphose when communicating himself, must
have possessed a Logos prior to this self-communication. Rahner seems, then, not to
substantiate his claim that Christ's disciples did, or even could have, inferred the
eternal pre-existence of the Logos from their experience of Jesus and his resurrection
without explicit, divinely authenticated, verbal testimony; and Rahner does not
explain how the early community could have discovered the pre-existence and
personality of the Holy Spirit.
It seems doubtful, moreover, that Rahner could explain how the disciples could
reasonably have inferred these doctrines from their experience. What experience,
short of the beatific vision, would suffice to justify, of itself, an inference to such
subtle conclusions? What reason, short of a verbal revelation, moreover, could
suffice to prove that a mutable God could not alter the structure of the intra-divine
relations when he communicates himself in such a way as to render it impossible for
human beings to infer the relational structure of his inner being before he
communicated himself from the structure he exhibits in the communication? Rahner
seems to supply insufficient evidence for this last proposition, which is equivalent to
the Grundaxiom; and, if one disallows a verbal revelation, it is difficult to imagine in
what such evidence might consist. Rahner's argument for the Grundaxiom from
divine self-communication, therefore, seems to face practically insuperable
objections.
ii. The argument from the non-occurrence ofverbal revelation. Although Rahner
explicitly proposes only one full-fledged argument for the Grundaxiom, viz. that
from self-communication, a second, implicit argument seems to underlie that from
divine self-communication and to account, in large measure, both for Rahner's
vigorous advocacy of the Grundaxiom and for the theological public's enthusiastic
embrace of it. The pith of this argument seems to appear in the following sentence
from Rahner's tractate on the Trinity in Mysterium Salutis. "For him who rejects our
basic thesis," Rahner writes, "the Trinity can only be something which, as long as we
do not contemplate it immediately in its absolute 'in itself,' can be told about in
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purely conceptual statements, in a merely verbal revelation, as opposed to God's
salvific activity in us."197
In other words, if we understand the thrust of Rahner's thought correctly, Rahner
thinks along the following lines: if a) verbal revelation never occurs; and b) the
church nonetheless knows the doctrine of the Trinity to be true; then c) the church
must possess the capacity to prove this doctrine true without appealing to a verbal
revelation. If, moreover d) the economy of salvation constitutes the only possible
source of knowledge about the Trinity besides a verbal revelation; then it seems e)
that the economy of salvation, by itself, must supply all the data necessary for a valid
inference to the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity. Since the economy of salvation
could supply sufficient data, apart from a verbal revelation, for a valid inference to
the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity only if: e) the Trinitarian relations that appear, or
seem to appear, in the economy necessarily correspond to those of the immanent
Trinity; and f) human beings can ascertain this correspondence and its necessity with
certainty in the absence of a verbal revelation; then g) Rahner's Grundaxiom must be
not only true, but also recognizable as such by human reasoning. On such grounds as
these, presumably, Rahner accepts the Grundaxiom as virtually self-evident in spite
of difficulties such as those addressed in the previous subsection.
d. Conclusion. In Rahner's view, then, one can: a) discern from one's experience
of divine self-communication as objectified in Scripture that this communication
contains irreducibly distinct, inseparable, and definitely ordered modes of
subsistence; and b) by virtue of one's knowledge of the necessary correspondence
between oucovopia and OsoAoyia expressed by the Grundaxiom, reasonably infer
that these modes of subsistence correspond precisely and, indeed, are identical to
those of the immanent Trinity. In the foregoing, we have expressed serious
reservations about the a priori rule by which Rahner seeks to establish the soundness
of such an inference.
We have not yet discussed in any detail, however, Rahner's account of the
revelatory event which this a priori rule allows one to interpret as a revelation of the
immanent Trinity: an account, which, as we shall see, proves equally complex and, in
some respects, equally problematic as Rahner's defense of the Grundaxiom. Before
197 Ibid., 39; ebd., 340.
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proceeding to this topic, we would simply like to note that this account, no less than
the Grundaxiom itself, plays an essential role in justifying Rahner's overall
understanding of how God reveals the doctrine of the Trinity. A consistent
application of the Grundaxiom itself, that is to say, could yield radically unorthodox
conclusions if the economy of salvation did not display the proper relational structure.
The account of the revelatory event and its Trinitarian structure summarized and
critiqued in the next segment, therefore, constitutes an integral aspect of Rahner's
case for a revelation of orthodox Trinitarianism mediated through divine self-
communication.
3. The Trinitarian structure of the revelatory event.
a. Rahner's objective. Rahner seeks to demonstrate that divine revelation
displays a Trinitarian structure by analyzing the concept of divine self-
communication. In his words, he desires to show "how the Incarnation and the
descent of the Spirit can, in the properties we know about them through revelation,
be so 'conceptualized' [aufden 'Begriffgebracht'], or understood that they look like
moments of the one self-communication ofGod, hence as one economic Trinity, and
not merely as two 'functions' of two divine hypostases, which might be exchanged at
will."198
b. Dual modalities ofdivine self-communication. Rahner seeks, more specifically,
to conceive of divine self-communication in such a way that the very idea implicitly
contains within itself dual modalities, corresponding to the missions of the Spirit and
the Son, that: a) characterize such a self-communication necessarily; b) are
irreducible to each other; and c) relate to each other in a certain taxis that
corresponds to the taxis of the Son and Spirit within the immanent Trinity. In this
way, Rahner hopes to render credible his claim that the structure of God's self-
communication necessarily mirrors the structure of his inner life.
By divine self-communication, Rahner means, here as elsewhere, "the act
whereby God goes out of himself into 'the other' in such a way that he bestows
198 Ibid., 87; ebd., 373-4. Cf. ibid., 84-5; ebd., 372.
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himself upon the other by becoming the other."199 In Rahner's view, moreover,
divine self-communication includes creation as a moment within itself and renders
God "the very core of the world's reality"200 and "the innermost constitutive element
of man."201 In consequence, Rahner reasons, one may characterize divine self-
communication in terms of human beings' experience of it without fear of projecting
the merely creaturely into the divine. Such a procedure, he writes, "does not
necessarily imply that we add something to this self-communication, which would be
extrinsic to it in itself, insofar as it comes from God."202
Rahner believes, therefore, that he possesses some basis for speaking of divine
self-communication on the basis of human experience, prescinding from the
testimony of Scripture and, in fact, produces quite a detailed account of God's self-
communication from precisely this perspective. "Once we presuppose this concept
of the self-communication of God," he writes, "it reveals to us a fourfold group of
aspects: (a) Origin—Future; (b) History—Transcendence; (c) Invitation—Acceptance;
(d) Knowledge—Love."203 By opposing the first of each pair of aspects to the second
and understanding the resultant "correlative axes"204 as unities, Rahner holds, one
can gain knowledge of the "specific character" 205 of the "two basic manners
[<Grundweisen] of the self-communication of God"206 and, therefore, of the nature
and relationships of the two divine processions of the Son and Spirit.
199 "Mystery," 77 iv, 68; "Geheimnis," SzTh iv, 93.
200 "Specific Character," TI xxi, 191; "Eigenart," SzTh xv, 190.
201 Foundations, 116; Grundkurs, SmtWk xxvi, 116.
202 Trinity, 89; "Der dreifaltige Gott," MS ii, 375.
203 Ibid., 88; ebd., 374.
204 yje borrow thjs term from Emmanuel Durand, "L'autocommunication trinitaire: Concept cle de la
connexio mysteriorum rahnerienne," RT 102 (2002), 569-613 at 587.
205 Trinity5 94; "Der dreifaltige Gott," MS ii, 378.
206 Ibid.; ebd..
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c. Rahner 's dyads.
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i. Introduction. In order to evaluate Rahner's schematization of the human
experience of divine self-communication adequately, it seems, one must, first, gain
some sense of why Rahner considers the dyads, origin-future, history-transcendence,
invitation-acceptance, and knowledge-love, correlative opposites that correspond to
the processions of the Son and the Spirit; and, second, ask whether, given the
presuppositions of Rahner's larger theology, these dyads constitute apt
representations of the relations between the two divine processions.
ii. Origin-future. "Origin" and "future" belong among the correlative modalities
of divine self-communication as experienced by viatores, according to Rahner,
insofar as: a) divine self-communication possesses "a beginning, in which the
addressee of a possible divine self-communication is constituted by the will which
decided this self-communication;"207 and b) "this beginning or origin aims at a future
(the total communication of God), which should not be considered as that which
develops naturally from the beginning, but as something which, despite the latter's
finalization towards the future, stands opposed to the beginning as the other moment
of something radically new, something separated by a real history of freedom."208
In other words, Rahner identifies: 1) the beginning of divine self-communication
with creation itself, either of the individual or of the cosmos or possibly both; and 2)
the future of divine self-communication with "the total communication of God," by
which Rahner presumably means either the finalization of one's fundamental option
for God achieved in death209 or the "recapitulation" of the cosmos into God at the
eschaton210 or, again, possibly both.
If one prescinds from Rahner's knowledge that, according to dogma, the Son's
procession logically precedes that of the Spirit, it is difficult to see why Rahner
associates "origin" with the procession of the Son rather than that of the Spirit. An
understanding of the atonement as a satisfaction of divine justice would, admittedly,
207 Ibid., 91; ebd., 376.
208 Ibid.; ebd..
209 Cf., e.g., "Dogmatic Questions on Easter" ["Easter"], 77 iv, 121-133 at 128; "Dogmatische Fragen
zur Osterfrommigkeit" ["Osterfrommigkeit"], SzTh iv, 157-72 at 165.
210 Cf. Foundations, 189; Grundkurs, SmtWkxxvi, 184.
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guarantee a priority of the Son's work in the economy over the Spirit's insofar as the
Son's appeasement of divine wrath would, on such a theory, constitute a prerequisite
ofGod's bestowal of grace on repentant sinners by the Holy Spirit. Rahner, however,
pointedly rejects all theories of the atonement that portray Christ's death as a
satisfaction or substitution,211 choosing, instead, to conceive of Christ as savior only
to the extent that he constitutes: a) salvation's perfect exemplar, and so its final
cause;212 and b) the sign of divine self-communication's eschatological irreversibility,
and so salvation's "sacramental" cause, which causes salvation by signifying it.213 In
"origin" and "future," then, Rahner finds aspects of the human experience of divine
self-communication that do seem both correlative and opposed. Their
correspondence to the processions of the Son and Spirit respectively, however, seems
far from obvious.
iii. History-transcendence. History and transcendence form the second pair of
modalities identified by Rahner as constitutive of the human experience of divine
self-communication. "There belongs to man," writes Rahner:
essentially the following open difference which we indicate with these two words: the difference (in
knowledge and in action) between the concrete object and the "horizon" within which this object
comes to stand, between the apriori and the aposteriori of knowledge and freedom, between the way
in which knowledge and activity reach the well-determined concrete here and now (so and not
otherwise) and the open range which knowledge and action anticipate, from whose vantage point, by
limiting themselves, they ever again establish the "object," while ever again discovering its
contingency.214
In this, in itself rather cryptic, sentence, Rahner seems to appeal to a
transcendental Thomistic metaphysics of knowledge to endow the terms "history"
and "transcendence" with unconventional meanings. If this is the case, one can
reasonably identify the "history" to which Rahner refers as the human experience of
concrete particulars within the infinite, athematic horizon opened up by the
211 Cf., e.g., "Reconciliation and Vicarious Representation," 77 xxi, 255-69 at 265-6; "Versohnung
und Stellvertretung," SzTh xv, 251-64 at 261.
212 Cf., e.g., "Jesus Christ in the Non-Christian Religions," 7/ xvii, 39-50 at 46; "Jesus Christus in der
nichtchristlichen Religionen," SzTh xii, 370-83 at 377.
213 Cf., e.g., "The Christian Understanding ofRedemption," 7/ xxi, 239-54 at 250-1; "Das christliche
Verstandnis der Erlosung," SzTh xv, 236-50 at 246-7.
214 Trinity, 91-2; "Der dreifaltige Gott," MS ii, 377.
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dynamism of the human spirit towards the totality of possible objects of its
knowledge and love.
This dynamism, likewise, which is presumably what Rahner means here by
"transcendence," constitutes human beings as knowing subjects over against the
particular things of the world by enabling them to perceive themselves and the
objects of their sensation as distinct and limited concretizations of the esse commune
that ( along with esse absolutum according to the later Rahner) constitutes: a) the
horizon within which human subjects experience particular things of the concrete
world; and b) the term of their athematic, and yet both conscious and free, primal
striving.
"History" and "transcendence," thus understood, correspond to the missions of the
Son and Spirit, as Rahner conceives of them, in that: a) Rahner considers the
Incarnation merely the most profound among many manifestations of the same,
transcendental, divine self-communication responsible for creation and all events of
human history; and b) he identifies the indwelling of the Holy Spirit with the divine
endowment of all human intellects with a supernatural, formal object: i.e. an a priori
horizon of consciousness that consists not merely in esse commune, but in God
himself.
In Rahner's view, accordingly, just as, according to Christian proclamation, one
accepts God's offer of grace poured out in the Holy Spirit through faith in his Son, so
one correctly aligns oneself vis-a-vis one's supernatural, formal object by faithfully
responding to the categorical particulars encountered in concrete experience. Just as
"no one can say 'Jesus is Lord' except by the Holy Spirit" (1 Cor 12:3), likewise,
Rahner believes that categorical particulars can mediate the experience of grace to
persons only insofar as these particulars are experienced within a supernaturally
elevated, transcendental horizon. One who accepts Rahner's transcendental-
anthropological formulation of the Gospel, therefore, cannot reasonably question the
aptness of "history" and "transcendence" as characterizations of the divine missions
as experienced by human beings.
iv. Offer-acceptance. Rahner supplies few details, at least in Mysterium Salutis,
about the third pair of aspects he identifies as constitutive of the human experience of
divine self-communication: offer and acceptance. "If," he writes, "man is the being
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with the one duality of origin and future, if he is history in (into) transcendence, and
thus the free being, then God's self-communication must also mean the difference
between offer and acceptance (the third couple of aspects) of this self-
communication."215
Rahner seems to think, then, that offer and acceptance evidently characterize the
human experience of divine self-communication and that they do so in a way that
corresponds to the missions of the Son and Spirit if one understands this experience
and those missions in the terms in which Rahner describes them. It seems difficult,
moreover, reasonably to dispute this verdict. If, as Rahner claims, "God has really
and in a strict sense offered himself in Jesus,"216 after all, "offer" seems an eminently
appropriate way to characterize the modality of Christ's presence to the world.
Likewise, if the light of faith, through which one accepts God's offer of salvation in
Christ, is "brought about by the Spirit and ultimately identical with him,"217 then one
can fittingly describe the Holy Spirit as present to human beings in the modality of
"acceptance."
v. Knowledge-love.
a. The problematic. The fourth and final dyad of modalities identified by Rahner
as constitutive of human beings' experience of divine self-communication consists in
"knowledge and love, [i.e.] actuation of truth and actuation of love."218 Although the
words, knowledge/truth and will/love, constitute traditional characterizations of the
Son and Spirit, Rahner assigns unconventional senses to his terms in order to render
them suitable for employment in his transcendental-anthropological account of
divine self-communication.
215 Ibid., 92; ebd..
216 Foundations, 280; Grundkurs, SmtWk xxvi, 267.
217 "Considerations on the Development ofDogma," 77 iv, 25; Oberlegungen zur
Dogmenentwicklung," SzTh iv, 37.
218 Trinity, 93; "Der dreifaltige Gott," MS ii, 377.
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/3. Truth. Specifically, Rahner insists that truth, properly understood:
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is not first the correct grasping of a state of affairs. It consists first [rather] in letting our own personal
essence come to the fore, positing ourself without dissimulation, accepting oneself and letting this
authentic nature come to the fore in truth also in the presence of others....This true
"revealing"—letting our nature come to the fore in the presence of others— is (when it includes a free
commitment to the other) what we call "fidelity." Hence truth is first the truth which we do, the deed
in which we firmly posit ourself for ourself and others.219
The clearest defense of this understanding of truth in Rahner's corpus appears not,
as one might expect, in his early investigations into the metaphysics of knowledge,
but in one of Rahner's spiritual writings: the essay, "Uber die Wahrhaftigkeit." In
the first of three stages of a particular argument about the nature of truth in this essay,
Rahner asserts:
Reality is essentially not the objective status of things which cognitive being is 'set over against' as
something independent, alien and separate....Reality is ultimately spirit and person, and in the
measure that a given reality is not this, is incapable of realizing itself, is not objectified to itself, is not
apparent to itself, in the same measure the being of this reality is itself as such weak and lacking in
ultimate validity.220
In other words, Rahner postulates at the outset of his argument the understanding
of being as being's-presence-to-itself that he achieves in his early writings on the
metaphysics of knowledge. On this basis, then, Rahner asserts in the second stage of
his argument: 1) that truth considered as a characteristic of being rather than as a
property of statements, consists fundamentally in self-awareness; and 2) that
truthfulness in its most primordial sense thus consists in the accurate self-disclosure
of one's being to oneself. In Rahner's words:
Truth, as the givenness of a thing to itself, is an intrinsic element in reality itself, so that a given being
has being and exists to the extent that it...discloses to itself the truth that is its own nature. From this
point of view, therefore, truthfulness is not, in the first instance, a virtue, a moral prescription which
regulates human intercourse, but... the self-confrontation of a reality in so far as this self-confrontation
219 Ibid., 95-6; ebd., 379-80.
220 "On Truthfulness," TI vii, 229-59 at 257; SmtWkx, 447-68 at 466-7.
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is faithful and really reproduces this 'being to itself clearly and luminously, undistorted and really
achieved, expressed and really accepted.221
Rahner presumably includes acceptance among the criteria of truthfulness,
because, in his view, knowledge and freedom are, at least in their most primordial
senses, identical.222 According to Rahner, then, one can truly know oneself only to
the extent that one accepts oneself.
In the third and final stage of the present argument, then, Rahner introduces the
notion of truthfulness to others and states explicitly a conclusion implicit in the
previous citation: that truth and truthfulness are ultimately identical. Referring back
to the last sentence of the previous block quote in which he describes interior
truthfulness as "the self-confrontation of a reality in so far as this self-confrontation
is faithful," Rahner writes:
It is here, then, that truthfulness towards others as well has its source. It imparts to the other person
only what the individual himself is. It makes his own unique personality emerge from its hidden
background and appear before that other pure and undistorted. This truthfulness is in the first instance
the free self-disclosure of one's personal being as rendered present to one's self, made available to
others, the conveying of one's own personal truth to others. And for this reason it is true that truth
and truthfulness are at basis the same: the act of uttering one's own truth faithfully to others. Truth is
in origin not the emergence of any kind of thing, but the self-bestowal of being upon itself. As such it
is essentially personal, and truthfulness is the disclosure precisely of this personal being to others in
freedom and love.223
In other words, Rahner claims that just as truthfulness towards oneself consists in
accurate self-disclosure of one's being to oneself, so truthfulness towards others
consists in accurate disclosure of one's being to others. Why Rahner, in this passage,
identifies the first kind of truthfulness with truth itself seems relatively clear: one
possesses self-awareness, i.e. what Rahner means in this context by truth, to the
extent that one faithfully discloses one's being to oneself. How truth, in the sense of
self-awareness, can be identical with truthfulness towards others, as Rahner also
claims in this passage, seems, by contrast, obscure.
221 Ibid., 257-8; ebd., 467.
222 Cf. HW, 83, 126 (Horer, SmtWk iv, 152, 154, 224); "An Investigation of the Incomprehensibility
ofGod in St. Thomas Aquinas" ["Incomprehensibility"], 77 xvi, 244-54 at 254 ("Fragen zur
Unbegreiflichkeit Gottes nach Thomas von Aquin" ["Unbegreiflichkeit"], SzTh xii, 306-19 at 319).
223 "On Truthfulness," 77 vii, 258; "Ober die Wahrhaftigkeit," SmtWk x, 467.
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The obscurity dissolves, however, when one realizes that, in Rahner's view,
truthfulness towards others is a necessary consequence of the self-awareness and
self-acceptance that constitute truthfulness towards oneself. It is nothing more than
truthfulness towards oneself, that is to say, as this truthfulness manifests itself to
other persons. That Rahner does, in fact, understand truthfulness towards others in
this manner follows from the following remarks, also taken from the essay "Uber die
Wahrhaftigkeit," about lying and liars. "What is a liar?" Rahner asks, "or, more
precisely: Who finds it necessary to lie?"
Evidently it is he who feels himself insecure,... who has something to hide which in his opinion would,
if it were known, lower him in the esteem of others. The liar attaches value to this esteem as if it were
something vitally necessary to his existence. In this sense the lie appears as a weapon, presumed to be
necessary, in the struggle for self-assertion....Considered in this light, as a weapon necessary for one's
self-assertion, the lie must seem, in the long run, unavoidable to anyone who has not been interiorly
liberated from himself in interior truthfulness, and found the absolute courage he needs in order to
discover his true nature in the infinite mystery of truth....Only one who has hidden his own true and
ultimate selfhood in God, and delivered it into his protection, only one who has thereby become
secure and unassailable in a truly ultimate sense, finds it no longer necessary...to defend himself.
And only one who no longer has to defend himself can in all cases be truthful to his neighbour.224
Precisely how this quotation resolves the obscurity in the previous citation might,
admittedly, seem obscure. Again, however, the obscurity dissolves when one
realizes that Rahner identifies self-acceptance, which on account of the presumed
identity of knowing and willing constitutes self-awareness and interior truthfulness,
with the athematic acceptance of the self-communication of God. "Anyone who
really accepts himself''' Rahner writes, "accepts a mystery in the sense of the infinite
emptiness which is man. He accepts himself in the immensity of his unpredictable
destiny and—silently, and without premeditation—he accepts the One who has
decided to fill this infinite emptiness (which is the mystery of man) with his own
infinite fullness (which is the mystery of God)."225
In Rahner's view, accordingly, the person who is truthful to others is precisely the
person who accepts God; and the person who accepts God is the person who accepts
himself. If, then, the person who accepts himself is precisely the person who is
interiorly truthful, the person who is interiorly truthful is, likewise, truthful to others:
224 Ibid., 240; ebd., 454-5.
225 "Thoughts on the Possibility of Belief Today," 77 v, 3-22 at 7-8; "liber die Moglichkeit des
Glaubens heute," SmtWk x, 574-89 at 578.
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in which case truthfulness to others constitutes nothing other than interior
truthfulness as it manifests itself in interpersonal relations. Now, if exterior
truthfulness is interior truthfulness, and interior truthfulness is truth itself, then it
seems that truth does consist in "letting our own personal essence come to the fore,
positing ourself without dissimulation, accepting oneself and letting this authentic
nature come to the fore in truth also in the presence of others."226 Given Rahner's
presuppositions, then, his definition of truth seems quite accurate.
y. Love. Rahner says relatively little, by comparison, in his two, principal
statements about love as a modality of divine self-communication. In the first
statement, by which Rahner seeks to refute the view that the human spirit possesses
three basic modalities rather than two, Rahner writes, "If we understand will,
freedom, 'good' in their true and total essence, that is, above all, not only as a mere
drive but as love for a person, a love which does not simply strive towards this
person but rests in his full goodness and 'splendor,' then we can see no reason for
adding a third and higher power to this duality."227
In the second statement, by which Rahner seeks to vindicate the appropriateness
of placing love alongside "transcendence-futurity-acceptance of the future"228 on the
axis representing characteristics of the Spirit's mission, Rahner writes, "The self-
communication which wills itself absolutely and creates the possibility of its
acceptance and this acceptance itself, is precisely what is meant by love. It is the
specifically divine 'case' of love, because it creates its own acceptance and because
this love is the freely offered and accepted self-communication of the 'person.'"229
These brief remarks about the nature of love seem self-explanatory. In their
similarities and contrasts with Rahner's statements about truth, however, they are rife
with implications. The concern Rahner evinces in the first remark for demonstrating
that truth and love require no complement, for instance, may explain why Rahner
employs an expansive definition of truth, encompassing truth as a characteristic of
being, truthfulness towards oneself, truthfulness towards others, and even, in a
secondary sense, truth as correspondence between thought and reality.230 Rahner's
226 Trinity, 95-6; "Der dreifaltige Gott," MS ii, 379-80.
227 Ibid., 93-4; ebd., 378.
228 Ibid., 97; ebd., 381.
229 Ibid., 97-8; ebd..
230 Ibid., 95, n. 14; ebd., 379, Anm. 14.
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second statement about love, in which he seeks to characterize the "specifically
divine 'case' of love," however, at least hints at the limitations of Rahner's definition
of truth.
5. Criticism. This definition's principal limitation seems to consist in Rahner's
failure to distinguish between truth's notional and essential senses. Rahner defines
truth, and to a lesser extent love as well, that is to say, without regard to the
distinction between essential properties, which the divine persons possess in common
and which correspond to created analogates; and notional properties, i.e. the purely
relative properties that distinguish the divine persons and which, as purely relative,
have no created counterparts. In one sense, admittedly, Rahner is quite justified in
ignoring this distinction. For: a) the divine relations being objectively identical with
the divine essence, one can never experience one in the concrete without also
experiencing the other;231 and b) as Rahner himself, somewhat surprisingly, notes, "a
'personal,' 'notional' concept of the word and 'inclination' of love cannot be derived
from human experience."232
To the extent that Rahner describes the modalities of divine self-communication
precisely in order to show how the economic Trinity that human beings experience
corresponds to the immanent Trinity, however, Rahner's failure to differentiate
between essential and notional properties defeats his purpose. For Rahner admits
that the "Father, Son, and Spirit are only 'relatively' distinct":233 "the persons are
distinct," he writes, "only through their esse ad."2M He admits, moreover, that in all
other aspects of their being, including knowledge (= self-presence) and love (=will),
the divine persons are absolutely identical: "there exists in God," he writes, "only
one power, one will, only one self-presence, a unique activity, a unique beatitude,
and so forth."235
Rahner implicitly acknowledges, therefore, that if one equates the distinction
between the Logos and the Spirit qua communicated with the distinction between
divine knowledge and divine love simpliciter, one posits a non-relative distinction
231 "In both 'economic' self-communications ofGod," Rahner writes, "he is given in his (essential)
fullness" (ibid., 116; ebd., 394).
232 Ibid., 19; ebd., 326.
233 Ibid., 68; ebd., 361.
234 Ibid., 71; ebd., 363.
235 Ibid., 75; ebd., 366.
Chapter 1: Rahner on the Revelation of the Trinity 70
between the divine persons in the economy of salvation. Now, the existence of such
a distinction in the economy of salvation would imply one of two consequences,
neither of which is acceptable to Rahner: either a) non-relative distinctions must exist
within the immanent Trinity; or b) the economic Trinity does not correspond
precisely to the immanent Trinity.
It would be unfair, of course, to claim that Rahner equates the modalities of the
Son's and the Spirit's communication ad extra with divine knowledge and love
simpliciter. As we have seen, Rahner takes particular care to depict the love that
constitutes a modality of the Spirit's communication ad extra in such a way that one
can neither equate it with the love of God in se nor with a merely human,
interpersonal love. Nevertheless, Rahner does seem to operate with "global"
conceptions of knowledge and love, whose essential and notional moments remain
undifferentiated. It seems, therefore, that one can reasonably apply to Rahner a
criticism he levels against scholastic theologians who, like himself, attempt to
correlate the divine processions with knowledge and love. The scholastic
theologian's "Augustinian-psychological speculations on the Trinity," Rahner writes:
result in that well-known quandary which makes all of his marvelous profundity look so utterly
vacuous: for he begins from a human philosophical concept of knowledge and love, and from this
concept develops a concept of the word and 'inclination' of love; and now, after having speculatively
applied these concepts to the Trinity, he must admit that this application fails, because he has clung to
the 'essential' concept of knowledge and love, because a 'personal,' 'notional' concept of the word
and 'inclination' of love cannot be derived from human experience.236
Rahner's unwillingness to distinguish between notional and essential senses of
knowledge and love, therefore, renders the dyad "knowledge-love," as Rahner
characterizes it at least, inapt for the task to which Rahner puts it: viz. specifying the
process by which the relations of Son and Spirit in the economy of salvation mirror
their relations in the immanent Trinity.
vi. Evaluation. Rahner neglects, in fact, to distinguish between the notional and
the essential significance of any of his four dyads. It seems, accordingly, that one
can reasonably generalize our unfavorable conclusions about Rahner's treatment of
236 Ibid., 19; ebd., 326.
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knowledge and love to each of the four dyads, at least as Rahner unfolds their
content.
d. Results. Rahner's attempt to generate a concept of divine self-communication
that manifests how such a communication contains two correlative and irreducible
modalities that relate to each other precisely as the processions of the Son and Spirit
relate to each other in the immanent Trinity, therefore, seems unsuccessful. Rahner's
lack of success in this endeavor, nonetheless, in no way invalidates his Grundaxiom.
The weaknesses of his systematic conception of divine self-communication as
Trinitarian indicate at most, rather, that Rahner's treatment of the relation between
the Son and Spirit in the economy of salvation would have benefited from attention
to certain "subtle considerations of school theology,"237 such as the distinction
between notional and essential truth, which Rahner chooses to ignore.238
237 Ibid., 81; ebd., 370.
238 Cf. Ghislain Lafont's more pointed criticisms of Rahner along the same lines in his Peut-on
connaitre Dieu en Jesus-Christ? (Cogitatio Fidei; Paris: Cerf, 1969), 202-5, 208-9, 216.
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VII. Conclusion.
Both Rahner's Grundaxiom and his account of the event of Trinitarian self-
revelation, therefore, face formidable difficulties to which he supplies no
unambiguously satisfactory response. These difficulties, however, by no means
render the critique of Rahner's Grundaxiom mounted in the following two chapters
superfluous. For one could plausibly argue that an implicit answer to our concerns
about change in a simple being appears in Rahner's dialectical understanding of
God's immutability in himself and mutability in another and/or in his equally
dialectical understanding of divine self-communication. We intend to address these
possibilities, accordingly, in chapter two.
Likewise, one could plausibly argue that the Grundaxiom or a close analogate of
it like Eberhard Jiingel's "God corresponds to himself," 239 possesses, if not
unmistakable warrant, at least sufficient plausibility to serve as a basis for the
theology of the Trinity in the absence of a verbal revelation. In chapter three,
therefore we intend to show that, even if one granted the soundness of the
Grundaxiom, one could not derive the orthodox, Latin doctrine of the Trinity from
the economy of salvation with its aid, because: a) Rahner's explicit statements about
the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity preclude the possibility of the Trinitarian
persons' indicating their distinctness by their actions; and b) the New Testament
accounts of Christ's anointing with the Holy Spirit, when interpreted in accordance
with the Grundaxiom, entail consequences unacceptable to Rahner and Latin
Trinitarians in general. The brief, preliminary criticisms of this chapter, therefore,
convey some sense of why one might question the soundness of Rahner's
Grundaxiom. They hardly suffice, however, for a comprehensive refutation.
239 Eberhard Jiingel, The Doctrine of the Trinity: God's Being is in Becoming (Horton Harris, tr.;
SJTh.OP; Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1976), 24.
Chapter 2: Counterarguments on Rahner's Behalf
I. Introduction
In the previous chapter, we introduced Rahner's views on the revelation of the
Trinity while leveling two preliminary criticisms of his idea of the identity of the
economic and the immanent Trinity. First, we argued, if God is simple, as Rahner
admits, then the slightest change in any aspect of his being would effect more or less
radical changes in every aspect of his being. It seems, then, that if God must change
in order to communicate himself, as Rahner maintains he must, then the intra-
Trinitarian relations of God as communicated must differ in some measure from
those relations as they subsist eternally and necessarily in the immanent Trinity
We also noted that Trinitarian patterns within the experience of divine self-
communication and its objectification in salvation history seem not, by themselves,
to warrant inferences to the doctrine of the immanent Trinity. For, if God could alter
his very being, then it would seem difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish novel
from permanent aspects of that being on the basis of mere religious experience. We
examined Rahner's response, to the extent that he supplies one, to this criticism in
the last chapter, moreover, and found it wanting in crucial respects.
We have yet to explore the resources offered by Rahner's theology for a response
to the first criticism. It seems vitally necessary for us to explore these resources,
however, insofar as a successful rebuttal of the first criticism would seem to blunt the
force of the second considerably. If one assumed, that is to say, that God reveals
himself only through the experience of divine self-communication, then one would
have reason to suspect that the relational structure of the divine being as
communicated in time corresponds rather exactly to that which characterizes him in
eternity. Admittedly, one could not deduce the point, but if: 1) the experience of
divine self-communication did constitute the sole medium of revelation; and 2) if one
could vindicate Rahner's vision of becoming in a simple being from the charge of
absurdity; then, it seems, 3) one could reasonably hope that one's experience of God
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pro nobis corresponds in some analogous way to God's being in se. There is a
certain intrinsic plausibility to the dictum, "God corresponds to himself."240
In the remainder of this chapter, therefore, we shall: a) rehearse some of Rahner's
emphatic statements in favor of both classical and quasi-Hegelian understandings of
the divine attributes in order to illustrate the tension in Rahner's thought exploited by
the second criticism; b) analyze Bert van der Heijden's argument that Rahner's views
on divine self-communication, when correctly interpreted, do not ultimately conflict
with the doctrine of divine immutability; and c) assess an indirect argument
concerning sanctifying grace and the Incarnation for the compatibility of the
doctrines of divine immutability, simplicity, etc. with Rahner's views on divine self-
communication.
240 Ibid.
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II. Divine Transcendence and Self-Communication
1. Introduction. We intend in this section, as we just announced, to document the
tension in Rahner's thought between divine transcendence and divine self-
communication as Rahner conceives of it and thus to demonstrate the relevance of
the first criticism in the context of an immanent critique of Rahner's position.
2. Rahner's acknowledgement of divine transcendence. Throughout his corpus,
Rahner upholds, at least guardedly and with qualifications, at least six elements of
classical theism that might seem to exclude his understanding of divine self-
communication peremptorily.
a. Simplicity. Rahner states, first, that "God...is absolutely 'simple' precisely
because of his infinite fullness of being (because every differentiation in a common
dimension of being is an indication of reference to another and so bespeaks finitude),
so that everything (not merely relatively) plural, antagonistic, and contradictory is an
indication of non-divine worldliness."241 In other words, "God...is absolute and
simple spirit."242
b. Immutability. Rahner affirms in various places, second, that "God is and
remains unchangeable in himself."243 Christians, Rahner writes, and "all really
theistic philosophers...proclaim God as the 'Unchangeable', he who simply is—actus
purus—who...possesses from eternity to eternity the absolute, unwavering...fullness
of what he is."244 They proclaim these things, moreover, "not," in Rahner's view,
"only under the tyranny of a rigid metaphysics of infinity";245 they "say it because
we need someone who is not as we are, so that we may be redeemed in that which we
are."246 Rahner, in fine, affirms in no uncertain terms God's immutability.
241 "Gott V. Die Lehre des kirchl. Lehramtes," LThK2 iv in SmtWk xvii/i, 264-7 at 266.
242 "Immanent and Transcendent," 77 x, 287; "Immanente und transzendente," SmtWk xv, 555.
243 "Christology Today," TI xxi, 220-27 at 222; "Christologie heute," SzTh xv, 217-24 at 219.
244 "Incarnation," TI iv, 112; "Menschwerdung," SzTh iv, 145.
245 "Current Problems," TI i, 178; "Probleme," SzTh i, 198.
246 Ibid.; ebd., 198-9.
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c. Atemporality. Rahner, third, avows his belief in God's atemporality.
"Christian theology must hold firm," he writes, "to the 'immutability' and 'eternal'
timelessness of God 'in themselves.'"247
d. Impassibility. He does not shrink, moreover, fourth, from affirming God's
impassibility even in the death of the God-Man on the cross. "Jesus' fate," he writes,
"does not impinge upon God's own life, with its metahistorical character and its
freedom from suffering and its beatitude without guilt, since God's reality and Jesus'
creatureliness remain unmixed."248 Even through the darkness of Golgotha, Rahner
affirms, the eternal Logos "has remained eternally the same, untouched."249 Rahner,
in other words, seems at times to evince a firm and uncompromising faith in the
impassibility ofGod.
e. No real relations to the world. Indeed, fifth, Rahner endorses that perennial
quarry for critics of classical theism, the doctrine that God has no real relations to the
world. The deity, he writes, "cannot experience himself as defined in relation to
another or limited by another."250 God possesses, according to Rahner, "infinite and
abiding unrelatedness."251
f. Distinctness from the world. Sixth and finally, Rahner maintains that God
"inexpressibly transcends everything that is or can be thought outside himself."252
He insists on "a radical distinction between God and the world."253
Rahner, then, admits that God transcends the world in at least six respects. He
does not partake of its: 1) composition; 2) mutability; 3) temporality; or 4) passibility.
Indeed; 5) he does not even possess real relations to it so that one can justly consider
247 "Theological Observations on the Concept of Time" ["Concept of Time"], 77 xi, 288-308 at 307;
"Theologische Bemerkungen zum Zeitbegriff' ["Zeitbegriff'], SmtWk xv, 622-37 at 636.
248 "Jesus Christ—The Meaning of Life," TI xxi, 208-19 at 215; "Jesus Christus—Sinn des Lebens,"
SzTh xv, 206-16 at 212.
249 "Current Problems," TI i, 178; "Probleme," SzTh i, 198.
250 Foundations, 74; Grundkurs, SmtWk xxvi, 75.
251 "Incarnation," TI iv, 114; "Menschwerdung," SzTh iv, 148.
252 "Priest and Poet," TI iii, 294-317 at 309; "Priester und Dichter," SzTh iii, 349-75 at 366.
253 "Specific Character," TI xxi, 191; "Eigenart," SzTh xv, 190.
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him 6) radically distinct from it. Rahner, in sum, endorses, at least occasionally and
with, as we shall see, severe qualifications, a fairly traditional understanding of
divine transcendence.
3. Absolute self-communication. Rahner expresses views on divine self-
communication, however, that seem to conflict with his guarded endorsements of
classical theism.
a. "God becomes world." Rahner's avowals of divine transcendence
notwithstanding, for instance, he insists on the existence of an "immediate self-
communication of God in quasi-formal causality"254 to human beings. As he
explains:
When we speak of God's self-communication, we should not understand this term in the sense that
God would say something about himself in some revelation or other. The term "self-communication"
is really intended to signify that God in his own most proper reality makes himself the innermost
constitutive element of man.255
In Rahner's view, this implies that humanity constitutes "the event [Ereignis] of
God's absolute self-communication." 256 "When God 'lets himself go out of
himself," he writes, "then there appears man."257 Again, "if God wills to become
non-God, man comes to be."258 Rahner seems very much to consider humanity the
product of God's "self-alienation"259 and "self-exteriorization."260
By no means, moreover, does he restrict this radical self-communication of God
to human beings. "There is no problem," he writes, "in understanding what is called
creation as a partial moment in the process in which God becomes world."261 God,
254 "Mystery," TI iv, 66; "Geheimnis," SzTh iv, 91.
255 Foundations, 116; Grundkurs, SmtWkxxvi, 116.
256 Ibid., 119; ebd., 119.
257 "Thoughts on the Theology of Christmas" ["Theology of Christmas"], 77 iii, 24-34 at 32; "Zur
Theologie der Weihnachtsfeier" ["Theologie der Weihnachtsfeier"], SzTh iii, 35-46 at 44.
258 "Incarnation," TI iv, 116; 'Menschwerdung," SzTh iv, 150.
259 "Current Problems," TI i, 176, n. 1; "Probleme," SzTh i, 196, Anm. 1.
260 "Symbol," TI iv, 239; "Symbols," SmtWk xviii, 439. Cf. also "Nature and Grace," TI iv, 176;
"Natur und Gnade," SzTh iv, 222.
261 Foundations, 197; Grundkurs, SmtWkxxvi, 190. Cf. "Christianity and the 'New Man'" ["'New
Man'"], TI v, 135-53 at 147; "Das Christentum und der 'Neue Mensch'" ["'Neue Mensch'"], SmtWk
xv, 138-53 at 148.
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according to Rahner, "has inserted himself into the world as its innermost
entelecheia"262 and as such propels it towards a final "recapitulation into itself and
into its ground."263 By divine self-communication, then, Rahner seems to mean an
act which renders "God himself ..the very core of the world's reality."264
b. Real relations to the world. When speaking of the Incarnation, which he
considers a singularly potent instance of divine self-communication, furthermore,
Rahner seems to contradict his endorsements, in a different context, of divine
unrelatedness. "We, scholastics," he writes, "we say frequently that God has no real
relations ad extra. This formula expresses something true, but, nevertheless, who is
this God who has no real relation to me? This is absurd."265 Rahner affirms, then,
that his idea of divine self-communication, at least in this instance, nullifies any
straightforward assertion of divine unrelatedness, and, accordingly, declares "the
assertion of...the lack of any real relation between God and the world," 266 a
"dialectical statement."267
c. Temporality. Similarly, in the context of the Incarnation understood as self-
communication, Rahner asserts that "God himself...undergoes history, change, and so
too time; the time of the world is his own history"268 and thus seems to contradict his
affirmations of divine atemporality.
d. Possibility. Likewise, Rahner insists on affirming the "death of God,"269 i.e.
not merely the death of his human nature, in Christ's crucifixion: a sentiment
difficult to reconcile with his statements quoted above in support of divine
impassibility.
262 "The Position ofChristology in the Church Between Exegesis and Dogmatics" ["Position of
Christology"], 77 xi, 185-214 at 200; "Kirchliche Christologie zwischen Exegese und Dogmatik"
["Kirchliche Christologie"], SzTh ix, 197-226 at 213.
263 Foundations, 189; Grundkurs, SmtWk xxvi, 184.
264 "Specific Character," 77 xxi, 191; "Eigenart," SzTh xv, 190.
265 "Debats sur le rapport du P. Rahner," in Henri Bouesse and J. J. Latour, ed., Problemes actuels de
Christologie: Travaux du Symposium de L 'arbresle 1961 (Bruges: Desclee de Brouwer, 1965), 407.
266 "Current Problems," 77 i, 181, n. 3; "Probleme," SzTh i, 202, Anm. 2.
267 Ibid.; ebd..
268 "Concept ofTime," 77 xi, 307-8; "Zeitbegriff," SmtWk xv, 636.
269 Foundations, 305; Grundkurs, SmtWk xxvi, 290.
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e. Mutability. Rahner does not attempt, moreover, pellucidly to reconcile his
understanding of divine self-communication with the dogma of divine immutability.
He rests satisfied, instead, with the paradoxical formula: "He who is not subject to
change in himself can himself be subject to change in something else."210 This
statement, he admits, "is not intended to offer a positive insight into the compatibility
of the dogma of God's immutability and the possibility of becoming in the eternal
Logos, nor a positive solution to the duality of this fundamental Christian assertion.
It is [merely] a formulation which clearly and seriously maintains both sides of it.271
4. Conclusion. Rahner does, then, seem to say that God changes radically in at
least some respects. In view of his emphatic endorsement of divine simplicity (cf. 2a.
above), then, the first criticism, viz. that if God is simple, then any divine becoming
would alter every aspect of God and thus guarantee that the inter-personal relations
in the economic Trinity do not correspond to those of the immanent Trinity, seems to
exploit a genuine inconsistency in Rahner's thought.
270 Ibid., 220; ebd., 212.
271 Ibid.; ebd..
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III. Bert van der Heijden.
1. Introduction. Bert van der Heijden admits this inconsistency in Rahner's
thought insofar as he recognizes that Rahner intends dialectically to ascribe both a
radical immutability and a radical mutability to God. In Heijden's view, however,
Rahner, so neglects the personal aspect of divine self-communication that he
ultimately, if only implicitly, denies any real mutability in God. Heijden argues, that
is to say, that if one interprets Rahner's endorsements of divine mutability in terms of
his larger theology, they affirm nothing more than God's ability to unite changeable
realities to himself: a kind of "mutability" not incompatible with the doctrine of
God's absolute unchangeableness.
Heijden himself, incidentally, considers Rahner's putative failure to ascribe
thoroughgoing mutability to God a glaring weakness of his thought. In the context of
our investigation, however, Heijden's interpretation of Rahner's views on divine
self-communication will function as a defense of Rahner against the first criticism.
2. Heijden's argument.
a. Selbstmitteilung vs. Seinsmitteilung. Heijden attributes what he perceives as
Rahner's failure fully to thematize the reality of divine becoming principally to a
lack of reflection on the personal element in divine self-communication. "The
personal as such in Rahner," he writes:
scarcely becomes thematic. He can, therefore,...with a sense of unproblematic self-evidentness
convert the revealed datum of the self-communication of God into the thesis, that the divine being
[.Sein] is communicated to the created spirit....[But] is the divine "self' precisely the same as the
divine being [Sein]l Rahner does not expressly reflect on this problematic. Hence his two theological
basic concepts—self-communication and formal causality—remain ambiguous: do they concern a
communication of God's being [Sein] or the Person (or "self') of God? Are they both the same? If
not, then what can the immanent difference between the divine being [Sein] and the divine "self'
be?272
272 Karl Rahner: Darstellung und Kritik seiner Grundpositionen (Einsiedeln: Johannes, 1973), 12.
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This ambiguity, this failure of Rahner's to "distinguish expressly between being-
self and being-being [Selbstsein und Sein-Sein\,"213 leads him, in Heijden's view, to
commit fundamental errors when treating each of what Heijden describes as the three
Hauptakzenten of Rahner's theology: "the identity of being and being's-presence-to-
itself, the struggle against monophysitism, and the struggle against tritheism."274 The
errors Heijden detects, which we discuss in inverse order, constitute, in turn, the
proximate causes of what Heijden regards as Rahner's implicit, but decisive, denial
of any real mutability in God.
b. Der Kampfgegen Tritheismus. In the third Hauptakzent of Rahner's theology,
his in itself justified struggle against the obvious error of tritheism, Rahner goes to
what Heijden regards as the unjustified extreme of claiming that "there can be no
inner-Trinitarian relations which are 'personal' in what is today the normal sense of
that term." 275 As Heijden explains, in Rahner's view, "the Logos does not
differentiate himself from the Father through a personal, I-Thou relation. That is to
say, he is a...relative mode of subsistence that has the fullness of being's-presence-
to-itself." 276 This implies, Heijden concludes, that "one can make no [real]
differentiation between Logos and divinity:"277 i.e. that person and nature do not
really differ in God. By identifying the divine persons as relations, of course, Rahner
intends, in Heijden's view, only to combat tritheism. According to Heijden,
however, by affirming the strictly relative character of the divine persons and,
therefore, implying the real, though not quidditative, identity of the Logos and the
divine essence, Rahner indirectly implies the impossibility of real change in God.
For, as Heijden notes, correctly, "mutability cannot be in God if he is
understood... as essence or nature. That would mean the destruction ofmetaphysics
and the theological truth of the fulfilled perfection of God."278 Rahner's decision to
posit a merely relative distinction between the divine persons thus constitutes, in
Heijden's view, an implicit endorsement of the doctrine of absolute divine
immutability.
273 Ibid., 124.
274 Ibid., 410.
275 Ibid., 409.
276 Ibid., 405.
277 Ibid., 411.
278 Ibid., 381.
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c. Der Kampfgegen Monophysitismus. In the second Hauptakzent of his theology,
i.e. the "struggle against monophysitism," Rahner, likewise, according to Heijden,
carries an in itself legitimate concern to unwarrantable extremes. Reacting against
what he perceives as monophysitic tendencies within conventional theology, Rahner
characterizes Christ's human nature, in Heijden's words, as "a human person, when
one understands 'person' in the sense normal today, namely as a conscious subject as
such."279 Heijden, moreover, considers such a stance perfectly justified on the basis
of both "Christological dogma"280 and "the Gospel image of Christ [die evangelische
Christusgestalt]."28 1
Heijden objects, however, when Rahner ascribes to this human subject autonomy
even over against the divine Logos. For, in that case, Heijden reasons, one could not
truthfully assert that "the person—'in the modern sense'—of Jesus is the Logos;"282
and, in that case, the flesh of Christ which others see and touch would constitute not
the expressive symbol of the Logos, but the expressive symbol of a mere human
subject. If Rahner correctly ascribed autonomy over against the Logos to Christ's
humanity, Heijden explains, logic would dictate that: "when Jesus expresses himself,
he speaks out his being-present-to-himself: i.e. the same human being that we also
have."283
The presence of such a mere, human subject in the world does not establish the
radically supernatural, personal relationship which, in Heijden's view, can alone
bring about salvation. In order to attain to truly supernatural communion with God,
Heijden believes, human beings need, rather, "a relation of God to us that
corresponds in a special measure to our mode of being." 284 "The basic
correspondence," Heijden elaborates, "consists herein, that divine love also acquires
categoriality as its self-expression and self-communication, as its personal, real
symbol, in a similar way as we exist and encounter one another through
categoriality."285
279 Ibid., 402.
280 Ibid..
281 Ibid..
282 Ibid., 411.
283 Ibid., 410.
284 Ibid., 382.
285 Ibid..
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The Logos, as Rahner understands it, cannot assume categoriality in this way,
according to Heijden, because it does not possess itself as a subject distinct from the
divine essence and, therefore, capable of independent action. Instead, it constitutes a
Subsistenzweise, a mode of subsistence of the divine essence which as such partakes
of its perfections, including immutability. The Logos, as Rahner understands it, can
thus serve at most, in Heijden's view, as "a mere suppositum of an autonomous
human nature."286
In his Christology as in his doctrine of the Trinity, then, Rahner, as Heijden
interprets him, identifies essence and person in God in such a way as implicitly to
deny that the divine persons can change in the ways that Heijden thinks essential to
any genuinely supernatural communion between God and human beings; and, as we
have seen, Rahner thus identifies essence and person in God, at least according to
Heijden, in order sharply to distinguish his own positions from viewpoints he
considers monophysitic or tritheistic.
d. Sein = Beisichsein. In Heijden's view, nonetheless, Rahner possesses in the
first Hauptakzent of his theology a more basic reason for identifying essence and
person in God, one not tinged, like the others, by specifically polemical motives.
Rahner believes, on philosophical grounds, that Sein is Beisichsein: that being is
being's-presence-to-itself. If Sein and Beisichsein, at least in God, are strictly
identical, then the God who possesses only one Sein can possess only one
Beisichsein, or personality in the Cartesian sense, so that his Sein and his personality,
likewise, must be strictly identical.
Heijden, therefore, in explicating what he considers the Rahnerian idea of grace as
a new relation to the Deus unus, writes, "This conception corresponds to Rahner's
identification of Sein and Beisichsein: a divine Sein, also a divine Beisichsein = a
divine self or person."287 Likewise, Heijden explains, in Rahner's view, "the
personal [in the Cartesian sense] is in God an essentiale, not something that
differentiates the persons. For Sein is Beisichsein and Beisichsein is Sein."2SS
The first Hauptakzent of Rahner's theology, the identity of Sein and Beisichsein,
thus renders unthinkable any real distinction between self and being in God. On this
286 Ibid., 411.
287 Ibid., 409.
288 Ibid., 403.
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presupposition, "self-communication, love, personal relation,"289 etc., the sort of
things Heijden considers indispensable to a higher, more personal relation to God
than that given with creation, become "identical with the metaphysically immutable
and absolute essence of God." 290 Heijden concludes, therefore, that Rahner
effectively denies the possibility of God's so exteriorizing himself as actually to
change in a finite, material other; and he interprets Rahner's formula, "He who is not
subject to change in himself can himself be subject to change in something else,"291
accordingly.
e. Rahner's immutabilityformula. "The formula," he writes:
is situated in the background of the conception of man as being-present-to-oneself in being-present-to-
another. Man is as "he himself' transcendence, openness to the fullness of being, remaining "I." He
exists thus, however, only in "another," i.e. in the lower degree of being that belongs to him: in his
material mode of being and in the formal principle ofmateria prima....This fact is transferred to God.
Also God has the "other from himself:" the immanent Logos and the sub-divine that is assumed in the
Incarnation. This is God's own. Insofar as it changes, it unites God to a becoming. He "himself,"
however, does not change. For God himself is—in contrast to ourself—the already fulfilled and,
consequently, unchangeable being.292
Heijden does not, it is important to note, believe that Rahner interprets his own
formula in this way. He understands Rahner to mean, rather, that "the Incarnation is
before all else the becoming of God"293 and quotes Rahner to the effect that the
Incarnation constitutes "die Selbstentauberuns, das Warden, die Kcnosis und Genesis
Gottes selbst"294 to substantiate his claim. Heijden explicitly and repeatedly states,
moreover, that Rahner's ideas of divine self-communication and the absolute savior
presuppose "a relational becoming strictly immanent in God."295 In Heijden's view,
however, "Rahner does not reflect thematically on this strictly immanent becoming
of God."296
289 Ibid., 412.
290 Ibid..
291 Foundations, 220; Grundkurs, SmtWk xxvi, 219.
292 Karl Rahner, 380.
293 Ibid., 373.
294 "Menschwerdung," SzTh iv, 148 as quoted in Karl Rahner, 373. We reproduce the quote exactly
as it appears in Heijden's text. Cf. "Incarnation," 77 iv, 114.
295 Karl Rahner, 382.
296 Ibid..
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Likewise, Heijden recognizes that Rahner considers his immutability formula "an
ontological ultimate," i.e. a paradox which does not admit of further clarification. He
holds, nevertheless, that this belief of Rahner's manifests Rahner's failure adequately
to reflect on the meaning of the term "self' in his formula. "If the formula, 'God
himself changes in another without himself changing,'" Heijden writes, "is not
supposed to be a contradiction, 'self cannot mean precisely the same thing both
times. The unreflected ambiguity of this word of Rahner's appears here very plainly.
For this reason he can believe, with this formula, 'to have reached an ontological
ultimate.'"297
Heijden seeks to dispel this mistaken belief by eliminating all "unreflected
ambiguity" in Rahner's terms. "Himself/self [sich/Selbst] in this formula," he writes
"is understood on the one side as absolute being and on the other side as the self of
man differentiated from absolute being." 298 This twofold meaning of "self'
notwithstanding, Heijden argues, the personal relation of God to human beings which
Rahner unsuccessfully attempts to describe through his immutability formula does,
when properly understood, require some becoming on the part of God. Nonetheless,
Heijden writes, Rahner's "attention goes immediately to the acquisition of a sub-
divine being of which, then, it must naturally be said: God does not become a sub-
divine being, but remains transcendent being [Sew]."299 In a variation of what
constitutes a virtual refrain throughout Heijden's work, he writes that in Rahner's
theology, "the personal determination of God, to which the acquisition of determined
categoriality corresponds and that really adds to what we understand as the essence
of God, is neither in its concrete meaningfulness nor in its distinction from this
essence thematically reflected."300 Heijden believes, in other words, that Rahner
does not delve sufficiently deeply into his own thought and words and that, if he did,
he would recognize the necessity, according to his own principles, of unambiguously
ascribing mutability to the "self' of God.
3. Response. In response to all of this, one can truthfully say, first, that Heijden
unquestionably launches the lengthiest and most sophisticated argument ever
presented for the view that Rahner denies that God changes in the Incarnation. One
297 Ibid., 380-1.
298 Ibid., 381.
299 Ibid., 382.
300 Ibid..
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can also truthfully say, however, that it is astonishing that someone with the
extensive knowledge of Rahner's corpus that Heijden evidently possesses would
defend such a thesis. One may shrink from speaking, with Klaus Fischer, of
"citations ripped out of context and abused by the blade of definite prejudice"301 in
Heijden's work. Nevertheless, Heijden seems inaccurately to portray Rahner's
thought at least from the perspective of the history of ideas.
Heijden's purpose, however, seems to consist not so much in accurately
recounting Rahner's claims as in eliciting from Rahner's ideas unspoken
presuppositions and consequences and evaluating them from his own radically
personalist perspective. Heijden's interpretation of Rahner's theology, in fact,
resembles in this respect Rahner's own work on the gnoseology of Aquinas in which
Rahner attempts to "relive the philosophical event...in Thomas"302 without paying
unnecessary attention to historical details.
a. Selbstmitteilung vs. Seinsmitteilung. In any event, it seems quite possible to
exculpate Rahner at least partially from each of the charges Heijden levels at him.
Heijden's first and principal charge, viz. that Rahner does not thematize the
distinction between "self' and "being" in God, for instance, seems palpably false. In
his essay, "Theos in the New Testament," for instance, Rahner writes that "God is
never appealed to in the New Testament as simply Being, his entitative infinity is
never mentioned. It is not so much to the Absolute and Necessary—and thus easily
impersonal and abstract—that the New Testament turns its gaze...; its eyes are upon
the personal God in the concreteness of his free activity."303 One reads in the same
essay, likewise, that "love is not the emanation of a nature but the free bestowal of a
person." 304 These are not, to say the least, the words of one for whom
"
Selbst=Seinsmitteilung,"305
Heijden may be correct, of course, in his judgment that, in Rahner's thought, "the
difference between a natural relation to the creative ipsum esse and the self-
301 Klaus Fischer, "Kritik der 'Grundpositionen'? Kritische Anmerkungen zu B. van der Heijdens
Buch uber Karl Rahner," ZKT 99 (1977), 74-89 at 88.
302 SfV, li; GW, SmtWk ii, 13.
303 77 i, 114; "Theos im Neuen Testament," SmtWk iv, 375.
304 Ibid., 123; ebd., 383.
305 Heijden, Karl Rahner, 384.
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communication of God is not thematized."306 This seems to be the case, however,
not because Rahner allows for no genuine self-communication at all, but, rather,
because divine self-communication so permeates the universe, in Rahner's view, that
one cannot adequately distinguish, on the basis of experience, between the natural
and the supernatural: i.e. between aspects of life which reflect the relations that must
obtain between creatures of a particular sort and God and aspects of life owing
particularly to God's free, but universally effective, will to communicate himself to
his creation. Rahner finds himself unable to distinguish unambiguously between
nature and supernature, then, not because he systematically reduces the supernatural
to the natural, but because he considers the supernatural so all-encompassing that he
shrinks from attributing any aspect of reality to nature alone. Rahner does not reduce
God's self to his being, therefore, either in God's interior life or in his self-
communication ad extra; if anything, he so emphasizes the supernatural, personal
aspect of God that it overshadows almost completely God's natural and necessary
being.
b. Persons and essence. Heijden's second charge, viz. that Rahner, by
characterizing the divine persons as relations of opposition, identifies them with the
divine essence in such a way that they share its immutability, would "convict"
Rahner of denying the divine persons' mutability if, like Heijden, Rahner
unambiguously ascribed immutability to the divine essence. Rahner, however, seems
nowhere, at least in his mature works, explicitly to affirm the divine essence's
immutability without also qualifying this immutability dialectically. The very idea
that God could consist in a necessarily changeless essence really, and not merely
rationally, distinct from three radically mutable persons, moreover, seems highly
questionable. If the persons lacked any of the perfections of the divine essence, for
instance, how could they qualify as fully divine? If the divine essence did not
constitute an at least incompletely subsistent,307 individual nature,308 but rather a non-
306 Ibid., 128.
307 The divine essence is incompletely subsistent in that it possesses existence, individuality, and the
capacity for action, sc. three of the four notes of subsistence, and yet lacks the fourth, viz.
incommunicability to multiple supposita. We derive these criteria from Charles Rene Billuart, Cursus
Theologiae: Tomus II: De Trinitate: De Angelis: De Opere Sex Dierum et Pars Prima de Incarnatione
(Paris: LeCoffre, 1878), 101b.
308 John of Damascus distinguishes between three senses of the term "nature:" the purely intentional,
universal nature that does not inform any individual; the universal nature that informs every individual
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subsisting oucna SsuTEpa instantiated by three, distinct individuals, how could one
intelligibly speak of only one God?
Rahner avoids such imposing difficulties of which Heijden seems scarcely aware,
by positing a rational, but not a real distinction between the divine persons and the
divine essence. This does not mean, as we have already noted, that for Rahner,
Selbst=Seinsmitteilung. It implies, rather, that, just as grace pre-supposes nature, so,
in Rahner's view, communication of the divine self (or selves?)309 presupposes
communication of the divine being. The objective identity of the divine essence with
the divine persons, in any event, does not entail, according to Rahner, those persons'
absolute immutability.
c. Autonomy of Christ's humanity. Heijden's third charge, viz. that Rahner, by
ascribing radical autonomy to the humanity of Jesus, logically precludes his
functioning as the self-expression of the Logos, seems justifiable only if one
dismisses, or misinterprets, Rahner's repeated statements to the effect that
"autonomy...does not decrease, but increases in direct proportion to dependence on
God."310 Rahner emphatically denies that:
God's grace and mastery and the...exercise of freedom are realities encroaching upon one another—in
the sense, for instance, of a Pelagian synergism—as if they were realities of which the one could
assert itself or grow only at the expense of the other. The divine freedom and mastery [rather] are
included under its aegis; and the individual nature, i.e. the universal nature as determined by
individuating features. In his words:
Nature is either understood in bare thought (for in the same it does not subsist); or commonly in all
hypostases of the same species uniting them, and [in this case] it is said to be considered in the
species; or entirely the same, having received accidents in addition, in a single hypostasis, and [in this
case] it is said to be nature considered in an individual (Expositio Fidei 55 in Die Schriften des
Johannes von Damaskos 2 [Bonifatius Kotter, ed.; PTS 12; Berlin and New York: Gruyter, 1973],
131).
We owe this reference to Richard Cross, "Perichoresis, Deification, and Christological Predication
in John of Damascus," Medieval Studies 62 (2000), 69-124 at 81. Cf. his discussion of the idea of
individual nature in ibid., 74-86.
309 Elmar Salmann correctly observes that the identity of the "Selbst" in "Selbstmitteilung," as Rahner
employs the term, seems, at times at least, quite ambiguous. (Neuzeit und Offenbarung: Studien zur
trinitarischen Analogik des Christentums [StAns 94; Rome: Pontificio Ateneo S. Anselmo, 1986], 38).
"What means now SelbstmitteilungV Salmann asks. "Which self communicates what? Does God
communicate—God, hence his nature, his knowledge and will? Or the Father (who in no case can
communicate his fatherhood) his loving knowledge in the form of the Logos and Pneuma?"
310 Foundations, 79; Grundkurs, SmtWk xxvi, 81.
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experienced from the outset as the reason for the possibility of the creature's...freedom, so that both
grow in equal and not in inverse proportion.311
Given this presupposition, one cannot reasonably claim that the Logos could
exteriorize itself in a human nature only if it subjected that nature to total control.
One could object, of course, that the idea of dependence and autonomy growing in
equal, and not inverse, proportions, seems self-contradictory. Yet Rahner, here as
elsewhere, thinks that he can justify such "dialectical" statements without
establishing their harmony with the law of non-contradiction. In resolving the
inconsistency between dependence and autonomy in Rahner's Christology in favor
of autonomy, then, Heijden seems more to obscure than to clarify Rahner's actual
meaning.
d. Unity and distinction in God. Heijden's fourth and final charge, viz. that by
equating Sein with Beisichsein, Rahner implicitly depreciates multiplicity in God
seems, like the previous charge, reasonable only if one ignores or misunderstands
Rahner's statements concerning the dialectical relationship between unity and
distinction in and with God. Rahner explicitly states that "here [i.e. in 'being as such,
and hence as one'] unity and distinction are correlatives which increase in like
proportions, not in inverse proportions which would reduce each to be contradictory
and exclusive of the other."312
As we shall see in section IV.3.d.i, moreover, the idea of being as being's-
presence-to-itself requires, in the view of the later Rahner, a certain plurality intrinsic
to every being and especially to God. In order to attain presence-to-itself, every
being, to the degree that it possesses being, must, according to Rahner's theory,
produce an internal other simultaneously identical with and distinct from itself so
that one can intelligibly describe the being as present to itself. In Rahner's view,
then, the identity of Sein and Beisichsein, so far from eradicating the multiplicity in
God affirmed by the doctrine of the Trinity, actually requires such multiplicity as an
indispensable prerequisite of God's presence to himself.
311 "Guilt—Responsibility—Punishment," TI vi, 197-217 at 200; "Schuld—Verantwortung—Strafe,"
SzTh vi, 238-61 at 242.
312 "Symbol," TI iv, 228; "Symbols," SmtWkxviii, 429-30.
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As before, Heijden could point out that the idea of unity and distinction between
two realities in the same respect increasing in direct proportion seems flatly self-
contradictory; and he would, perhaps, be abundantly justified in so doing. He is not
justified, however, in ignoring, or explaining away, one of two seemingly
incompatible positions Rahner holds and then criticizing Rahner as if he
unequivocally affirmed one of the two contradictory positions and just as
unequivocally rejected the other. Rahner, in any event, rejects the idea that one can
truthfully posit a real distinction between an immutable essence and one or more
mutable selves in God; he does not rule out, in fact, the possibility that every aspect
of God is just as immutable and/or mutable as every other. Rahner, therefore, rejects
the premise on which Heijden's fourth objection is based: viz. that God's essence is
immutable to such an extent that, if God changes, he must possess a "self' in some
way extrinsic to that essence.
4. Conclusion. Heijden succeeds, then, in proving neither: a) that Rahner denies,
implicitly or explicitly, the mutability of the Logos in the Incarnation; nor b) that
Rahner's formula, "He who is not subject to change in himself can himselfbe subject
to change in something elsef3X3 coheres with an unqualified doctrine of divine
immutability. His arguments, though strikingly original and obviously grounded in
thorough research, thus seem insufficient to neutralize our first criticism of Rahner's
Grundaxiom.
313 Foundations, 220; Grundkurs, SmtWk xxvi, 212.
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IV. Conciliar Authority and the Consistency of Rahner's Views
1. Introduction. A counterargument to the first criticism, it seems, might be
drawn from Rahner's confidence in the teaching authority of ecumenical councils in
union with the Pope. One might argue, that is to say: a) that Rahner considers the
teachings of such councils, when approved by the Pope and when intended as
definitive statements of faith, infallibly true; b) that such councils, in union with the
Pope, have definitively affirmed the doctrine of divine immutability, the reality of
sanctifying grace, the Incarnation of the Logos, and Christ's "absolute saviorhood";
c) that Rahner demonstrates the integrality of divine self-communication, in his sense
of that term, to sanctifying grace and/or the Incarnation and/or Christ's "absolute
saviorhood"; d) that the charism of infallibility precludes the possibility of self-
contradiction in definitive teaching; e) that Rahner's understanding of divine self-
communication and the doctrine of divine immutability, therefore, must be
compatible; and f) that any criticism of Rahner's Grundaxiom that presupposes the
incompatibility of divine self-communication as Rahner conceives of it with divine
immutability, as our first criticism does, must, consequently, be invalid.
In the context of a strictly immanent critique, such an argument seems practically
invincible. For one cannot reasonably call Rahner's belief in the infallibility of
definitive, conciliar teaching definitively authorized by the Pope into question. In a
1976 lexicon article on "Unfehlbarkeit,"314 for instance, Rahner, after identifying "an
ecumenical council together with the Pope" 315 as one of the "bearers of
infallibility,"316 writes:
The historicity of a dogma does not mean... that the infallibility of the church must be interpreted thus,
as: God guarantees an eschatological perseverance of the church in the truth, while dogmas of the
magisterium or statements of Scripture could always also be erroneous. The perseverance in the truth
realizes itself also in true propositions; every ultimate Grundentscheidung ofman, which (through the
grace of God) establishes him in the truth, expresses itself always and necessarily in true propositions.
The church as a tangible substance [Grofie] would not persevere in the truth if the objectivations of its
3HKThW10, 425-7.
315 Ibid., 425.
316 Ibid..
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perseverance in the truth, viz. its actual propositions of faith as the concrete form of its perseverance
in the truth, were erroneous.317
It seems, however, that one can reasonably question the cogency of Rahner's
arguments for the integrality of divine self-communication as he understands it to
sanctifying grace, the Incarnation, and Christ's status as "absolute savior." In the
following, accordingly, we intend to ask whether, and in what degree, Rahner
actually demonstrates that the doctrines of sanctifying grace, the Incarnation, and
Christ's absolute saviorhood presuppose or imply the reality of divine self-
communication in his sense of the term. We intend, in other words, to test the
soundness of premise c) in the above counterargument to our first criticism: the only
premise of this counterargument, in our view, that admits of challenge within the
context of a strictly immanent critique.
2. Sanctifying grace.
a. Introduction. Few Christians deny, of course, that God communicates himself
to at least some human beings by a certain uncreated grace insofar as he sanctifies
and dwells within the souls of the justified.318 In this section, accordingly, the issue
in dispute is not whether sanctifying grace necessarily involves divine self-
communication and uncreated grace; it is, rather, whether these realities constitute
"the act whereby God goes out of himself into 'the other' in such a way that he
317 Ibid., 426-7.
318 "Grace," writes Adolphe Tanquerey, "is said to uncreated or created: (a) uncreated grace is God
himself communicating himself to the intellectual creature; (b) created grace is the gratuitous gift
distinct from God and, as it were, the effect of divine love" (Synopsis Theologiae Dogmaticae
Specialis 2 [Paris: Desclee, 191414], §8, p. 24. Uncreated and created grace, Tanquerey explains,
constitute the two elements of habitual grace, which, "as it is uncreated grace, is a special union of
God with the soul in which he dwells, and, insofar as it is created grace, is a supernatural quality,
permanently and intrinsically inhering in the soul through which we are made partakers of the divine
nature" (ibid., § 11, p. 25).
Protestants, incidentally, do not deny that God infuses created grace into the regenerate. The
Synod of Dordt specifically condemns those "who teach.. .that in the true conversion ofman no new
qualities, powers or gifts can be infused by God into the will.. ..For thereby they contradict the Holy
Scriptures, which declare that God infuses new qualities of faith, of obedience, and of the
consciousness of his love into our hearts" (Canons of Dordt, Chapter III-IV, Rejection of Errors,
paragraph 6 in The Creeds ofthe Evangelical Protestant Churches [Philip Schaff, ed. and trans.;
London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1877], 569-70).
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bestows himself upon the other by becoming the other."319 The issue in dispute, in
other words, is whether these realities ought to be conceived of in Rahnerian terms.
In order to resolve this issue, we intend, for the remainder of this section: first, to
outline Rahner's arguments for the identity of the uncreated aspect of sanctifying
grace with divine self-communication in his distinctive sense of that word; and,
second, to respond to those arguments by evaluating their adequacy for this purpose
b. Rahner's arguments. In order to establish that sanctifying grace in its
uncreated aspect consists in divine self-communication as he understands it, Rahner
proposes two, basic arguments: one from the believer's possession of the Holy Spirit
as the "earnest of our inheritance" (Eph 1:14; cf. 2 Cor 1:22 and 5:5)320 and another
from the priority of uncreated to created grace.
i. Uncreated grace as presupposition of the beatific vision.
a. Introduction. In the first, Rahner contends that, because "the possession of the
Pneuma (and thus primarily uncreated grace) is conceived of in Scripture as the
homogeneous germ and commencement of the beatific vision,...we have the right to
apply to uncreated grace in this life the concepts of formal ontology relating to the
possession of God in the visio beatifica,"321 In other words, if uncreated grace, the
possession of the Holy Spirit, constitutes the earnest of the life of glory, whose
principal blessing is the beatific vision, then this uncreated grace must constitute, in
some sense, a presupposition of that vision. In such a case, Rahner reasons, one
could determine something of the essence of uncreated grace by determining the
ontological presuppositions of the beatific vision. Indeed, he seems to consider such
319 "Mystery," 77 iv, 68; "Geheimnis," SzTh iv, 93.
320 The NRSV's rendering of appa(3cbv tt)c KAppovopiac ppdov as "pledge of our inheritance"
suggests that Paul means in Eph 1:14 to identify the Holy Spirit as he dwells in the righteous on earth
as a temporary and inferior substitute for the joys of heaven of which he constitutes the pledge. In
extra-Biblical usage, however, the term appa(3cov almost always signifies "earnest money...[i.e.] a
real part of the object of contract, given in advance both to insure final payment and also to contribute
to it" (Barnabas Ahern, "The Indwelling Spirit, Pledge ofOur Inheritance (Eph 1:14)," CBQ 9 [ 1947],
179-89). We think it appropriate, therefore, to translate appa(3cov as "earnest" rather than "pledge."
321 "Some Implications of the Scholastic Concept ofUncreated Grace" ["Uncreated"], TI i, 319-46 at
334; "Zur scholastischen Begrifflichkeit der ungeschaffenen Gnade" ["Ungeschaffene"], SzTh i, 347-
76 at 362.
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delving into the presuppositions of the beatific vision the only viable method for
determining the essence of uncreated grace. "Uncreated grace," he writes, "is only to
be determined in terms of the visio."322
Rahner reasons, in other words: a) that the uncreated grace bestowed on the
blessed constitutes an ontological presupposition of the beatific vision; b) that,
according to the testimony of Scripture, the uncreated grace in which God
communicates himself to the wayfarer323 is of the same kind as that in which he
communicates himself to the blessed; and c) that whatever characterizes the
uncreated grace of the blessed insofar as it constitutes a presupposition of the beatific
vision must, therefore, characterize equally the uncreated grace received already by
the wayfarer. Acting on these assumptions, then, Rahner seeks to prove that God
must communicate himself to the blessed in the way that Rahner envisions in order
to endow them with the beatific vision; and that God, therefore, already
communicates himself in the radical, Rahnerian sense of that term to wayfarers. To
this end, specifically, Rahner employs two arguments: one from the nature of
knowledge itself and another from the absolute immediacy of the beatific vision.
(3. Being and knowing. In the first, Rahner contends that, because "knowing, in its
first and original sense, is the self-presence of being,...something is known to the
extent that it becomes in its being identical with the knowing subject."324 One cannot
know God, therefore, according to Rahner, unless one becomes, in some measure,
identical with him. Hence, in Rahner's view, human beings cannot know God in the
beatific vision or even in this life unless "God goes out of himself into 'the other' in
such a way that he bestows himself upon the other by becoming the other;"325 unless,
that is to say, God communicates himself in the Rahnerian sense of the term. Rahner
attempts to prove this argument's fundamental premise, viz. that "being and knowing
are the same,"326 by the following rationale.
322 Ibid., 335; ebd., 363.
323 We employ the term "wayfarer" in this work in the sense of viator, sc. as a name for regenerate
persons who do not yet enjoy the beatific vision.
324 HW, 32-3; Horer, SmtWk iv, 68.
325 "Mystery," 77 iv, 68; "Geheimnis," SzTh iv, 93.
326 SW, 69; GW, SmtWk ii, 62.
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1. Human beings are evidently capable of asking "the question: what is the being of
beings?"327
2. "We cannot inquire about something absolutely unknown."328
3. "Thus some kind of knowing is asserted and expressed when we inquire about the
meaning of being."329
4. Yet "the question about being as such inquires about everything."330
5. The human capacity to ask the question of being thus implies that "all being is
basically knowable or intelligible"331 to human beings.
6. "This intrinsic ordination of every being to possible knowledge is an a priori and
necessary statement."332
7. Now, "an essential relation of correlativity between two states of affairs must...be
founded in an original unity of both of them."333
8. "Therefore, being and knowing are related to each other, because originally, in
their ground, they are the same reality."334
9. "This does not imply anything less than that being as such, to the extent that it is
being, is knowing."335
In this case, Rahner concludes, "knowledge cannot at its ultimate basis consist in
a state of having something intentionally 'over against' one as an object; the only
way still open to us to conceive of it is as a state...in which the knower in the true
sense and the known in the true sense are one and identical in being."336 If Rahner is
correct in so concluding, it seems, something like the beatific vision can, indeed,
occur only if God communicates himself to human beings in the Rahnerian sense of
those words.
327 HIV, 25; Horer, SmtWk iv, 54.
328 Ibid., 29; ebd., 60..
329 Ibid., 28; ebd..
330 Ibid.; ebd..
331 Ibid., 29; ebd..
332 Ibid.; ebd.. 62.
333 Ibid.; ebd..
334 Ibid.; ebd..
335 Ibid.; ebd..
336 "Thomas Aquinas on Truth," 77 xiii, 29; "Die Wahrheit bei Thomas von Aquin," SmtWk ii, 315.
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y. God as impressed species. In his second argument for the indispensability of
divine self-communication, as he understands it, to the beatific vision, Rahner asserts
that God, in the beatific vision, does not manifest himself to the blessed through a
created, impressed species, but rather absolutely immediately, "face to face." Rahner,
upon the authority of Aquinas, moreover, claims that in order to compensate for the
lack of a created, impressed species, ordinarily a sine qua non of human knowledge,
"God's essence itself takes the place of the species (impressa) in the created
mind."337
Rahner admits, of course, that God's transcendence prevents him from informing
the human intellect in precisely the same way that a created, impressed species, in
other instances, informs it. Yet he also maintains that God, his transcendence
notwithstanding, exercises "an active formal causality (eine formale
Wirkursachlichkeit)"338 on the minds of the blessed.
Rahner concedes, again, that, on account of the uniquely transcendent nature of
God, one could reasonably refer to this causality as merely "quasi-formal."339 Yet he
insists:
all this 'quasi' implies is that this 'forma', in spite of its formal causality, which must be taken really
seriously, abides in its absolute transcendence (inviolateness, 'freedom'). But it does not imply that
the statement, 'In the beatific vision God occupies the place of a species in virtue of a formal
causality', is a mode of speech lacking all binding force; on the contrary, it is the quasi which must be
prefixed to every application to God of a category in itself terrestrial.340
Rahner again attempts to moderate his position, however, by associating the
quasi-formal causality which he ascribes to God with the scholastic idea of an "actus
terminans,"m which he correctly, although only partially, defines as "that which in
itself is and remains a perfect reality in spite of and prior to the act of
determination."342
337 "Uncreated," 771, 327; "Ungeschaffene," SzTh i, 355.
338 Ibid.; 330; ebd., 358.
339 Ibid.; ebd..
340 Ibid.; ebd., 358-9.
341 Ibid., 331, n.l; ebd., 359, Anm. 1.
342 Ibid.; ebd..
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For an actus terminans, or terminative cause, at least as commonly understood,
influences a reality distinct from itself only in the sense that a point influences a line;
i.e. it serves only as an object or a limit, and no more.343 Louis Billot does not err in
the slightest degree, therefore, when he explains that God, qua terminative cause of
the beatific vision, "informs not physically, but merely intentionally."344
Rahner, however, declares that if Billot means "that God is in fact an 'intentional'
known object, the whole explanation is false, for it is a question here precisely of an
ontological (hence 'physical') presupposition of knowledge."345 Rahner cannot,
therefore, mean merely to assert that God must exert a terminative causality in order
to bestow the beatific vision upon the souls of the blessed. Rahner states quite
clearly, rather, that he regards a "communication of the divine being taking place by
way offormal causality to the created spirit...[as an] ontological presupposition of
the visio."346
"The reality of the mind in the beatific vision," he writes, "so far as such a reality
in itself is due to a species as the means of knowledge, is the very Being of God."347
The beatific vision, then, cannot occur, in Rahner's view, without "the one self-
communication of God to the creature, which is essentially the act whereby God goes
out of himself into 'the other' in such a way that he bestows himself upon the other
by becoming the other."348
On the basis of this argument and the former, then, Rahner concludes that one
cannot deny the reality of divine self-communication as he conceives of it without
also implicitly denying that the saints departed enjoy an immediate and beatifying
vision ofGod: something which few Western Christians would wish to do.
5. Conclusion. In his first argument for the necessity of divine self-
communication in the distinctively Rahnerian sense of that term to uncreated grace,
then, Rahner argues: a) that the uncreated grace of the blessed constitutes an
ontological presupposition of the beatific vision; b) that the uncreated grace of the
343 Cf. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Christ the Savior: A Commentary on the Third Part ofSt.
Thomas' Theological Summa (Bede Rose, tr.; St. Louis and London: Herder, 1950), 39-42.
344 De Deo Uno et Trino: Commentarius in Prima Parte S. Thomae (Prati: Giachetti, 19105), 146.
345 "Uncreated," 77 i, 331, n. 1; "Ungeschaffene," SzTh i, 359, Anm. 1.
346 Ibid., 335; ebd., 363.
347 Ibid., 332; ebd., 360.
348 "Mystery," TI iv, 68; "Geheimnis," SzTh iv, 93.
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wayfarer, according to Scripture, differs in no essential respect from that of the
blessed; c) that whatever must be true the uncreated grace of the blessed in order for
it to function as an ontological presupposition of the beatific vision must, therefore,
be equally true of the uncreated grace of the wayfarer; d) that the identity of being
and knowing and the absolute immediacy of the beatific vision imply that the
uncreated grace of the blessed must consist in divine self-communication as Rahner
understands it; and e) that the uncreated grace of the wayfarer as well, consequently,
must consist in divine self-communication in the Rahnerian sense.
ii. The priority ofuncreated over created grace.
a. Introduction. In his second argument to the effect that a proper understanding
of grace entails a belief in divine self-communication as he conceives of it, Rahner
contends that if one denies that uncreated grace consists fundamentally in such
divine self-communication, one thereby implicitly denies the ultimate priority of
uncreated to created grace. Such a denial, Rahner contends, places one in conflict
with the plain sense of Scripture and the overwhelming consensus of the Fathers.
"For St. Paul," Rahner observes, correctly, "man's inner sanctification is first and
foremost a communication of the personal Spirit of God, that is to say, in scholastic
terms, a donum increatum; and he sees every created grace, every way of being
nvEupaTiKoc, as a consequence and manifestation of the possession of this
uncreated grace." 349 Likewise, Rahner observes, again correctly, "the Fathers
(especially the Greek Fathers) see the created gifts of grace as a consequence of
God's substantial communication to justified men."350
f. The "scholastic" view of uncreated grace. The scholastic theories of the
relation between created and uncreated grace, however, in Rahner's view at least,
teach precisely the opposite. "However diverse they may be among themselves," he
writes, "all the scholastic theories...see God's indwelling and his conjunction with
the justified man as based exclusively upon created grace."351 As he summarizes the
349 "Uncreated," TI i, 322; "Ungeschaffene," SzTh i, 349-50.
350 Ibid.; ebd., 350-1.
351 Ibid., 324; ebd., 352.
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scholastic viewpoint, "In virtue of the fact [dadurch] that created grace is imparted to
the soul God imparts himself to it and dwells in it."352
Rahner, moreover, thinks this departure from Scriptural and traditional teaching
entirely understandable, albeit regrettable. From the perspective of the scholastic
theologians he criticizes, Rahner explains, the "new relation of God to man"353
brought about by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit "can only be conceived of as
founded upon an absolute entitative modification of man himself."354 For God
cannot change, and one cannot speak of a new relation between two terms at all if
neither changes in any way.
Yet, in Rahner's view, such an understanding of human salvation fails
satisfactorily to account for the presence of uncreated grace in human beings, and
that in two respects. First, Rahner holds, it manifestly reduces uncreated grace to "a
function [eine abhangige Funktion] of created grace"355 and thus opposes the view of
Scripture and the Fathers. Second, and perhaps even more importantly, Rahner
contends that it, implicitly and unintentionally, denies that sanctifying grace effects a
new relationship with God at all. For, according to Rahner:
an accidental modification, from without, of the creature's being in itself and with regard to
itself,...could not be the basis for a fundamentally and essentially new 'relationship' of God to the
creature....The only fresh feature such an accidental absolute modification of the creature could bring
with it is that relation to God which is a constituent [mitgesetzt isf] of any creaturely being, namely the
transcendental reference of absolute finite being to God as to its cause.356
Recalling his discussion of uncreated grace as the ontological presupposition of
the beatific vision, Rahner insists also that "here it is a question precisely of a
'relation' which does not immediately imply an absolute created determination; for
otherwise the species of the beatific vision would ultimately be yet again a created
quality."357
352 Ibid.; ebd..
353 Ibid.; ebd..
354 Ibid.; ebd..
355 Ibid.; ebd..
356 Ibid., 328-9; ebd., 357.
357 Ibid., 329; ebd..
Chapter 2: Counter Arguments on Rahner's Behalf 100
y Rahner's alternative. In articulating his own perspective, however, Rahner
does not wish to claim that uncreated grace does not bestow created grace as its
concomitant effect; for, if he claimed such a thing, he too, no less than the scholastics
whom he opposes, would render himself unable to "say with St. Paul that we possess
our pneumatic being [Pneumatischsein] (our 'created sanctifying grace') because we
have the personal Pneuma of God."358 In such a case, furthermore, Rahner could
also not consistently affirm that divine self-communication stands in a relationship of
mutual causality to the created lumen gloriae,359 as he himself explicitly states.360
When Rahner asserts that "here it is a question precisely of a 'relation' which
does not immediately imply an absolute created determination,"361 then, he seems to
mean that uncreated grace, although unrealizable apart from created grace, engenders
a new relation between a human being with God in a sense in which this created
grace does not. In such an event, the new relation would depend directly on
uncreated grace as its formal cause and only indirectly on created grace as uncreated
grace's necessary complement. In this sense and in this sense only, then, does
Rahner mean to assert that the new relation between human beings and God
established by uncreated grace "does not immediately imply an absolute created
determination."
Rahner does not, therefore, declare the indwelling of the Holy Spirit absolutely
and in every respect logically prior to the presence of created grace in the soul.362 He
does, however, distinguish sharply between: a) the relation engendered directly by
uncreated grace in virtue of which one can reasonably claim that a soul possesses the
Holy Spirit; and b) any relation constituted by created grace simpliciter or by some
uncreated grace bestowed solely for the purpose of imparting created grace. By so
distinguishing, Rahner implicitly pronounces every form of merely extrinsic, divine
causality insufficient to the task of effecting a divine indwelling in the souls of the
just.
358 Ibid., 322; ebd., 350.
359 "The lumen gloriae," writes Adolphe Tanquerey, "is a supernatural habit that perfects the intellect
of the blessed and renders him proximately capable of seeing God intuitively" (Synopsis 2, §1014, p.
720).
360 "Uncreated," 77 i, 333; "Ungeschaffene," SzTh i, 361.
361 Ibid., 329; ebd., 357.
362 "The point which we must not lose sight of in this," Rahner writes, "is the unity which exists
between uncreated grace considered as causa quasiformalis and created grace as the necessary prior
condition and at the same time the consequence of the uncreated grace" ("Immanent and
Transcendent," 77 x, 282; "Immanente und transzendente," SmtWkxv, 551.
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For God, in Rahner's view, cannot through efficient causality or exemplary
causality or final causality bestow anything whose value does not depend, in some
degree at least, on the value of its created effects. If, as Rahner holds, the uncreated
grace that effects divine indwelling must possess some significance irrespective of its
created effects, it must, then, consist in some supra-categorical assimilation to God.
It must consist, in Rahner's words, in "a taking up into the ground":363 which is
precisely what Rahner intends to signify by the term quasi-formal causality.
5. Conclusion. Rahner, in sum, concludes in this second argument from the
reality of sanctifying grace to the reality of divine self-communication as he
understands it that one who does not equate the uncreated grace which effects divine
indwelling with quasi-formal causality in Rahner's sense of the term cannot account
for the logical priority of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit to the possession of
created grace. Rahner concludes, in fact, that such a person cannot even explain why
the indwelling of the divine persons in the souls of the justified transcends God's
general presence of immensity. On the basis of this second argument and the first,
that from sanctifying grace's relation to the beatific vision, then, Rahner rests his
case for the indispensability of divine self-communication, as he conceives of it, to
sanctifying grace.
c. Response.
i. Introduction. If Rahner could actually prove that divine self-communication as
he understands it constitutes an essential component of sanctifying grace, it seems,
the Rahnerian belief: a) that ecumenical councils teaching in unison with the Pope
are infallible when speaking definitively on matters of faith and morals; when
combined with the data b) that such councils have "infallibly" affirmed the doctrine
of divine immutability and the existence of sanctifying grace; and c) that the charism
of infallibility precludes the possibility of self-contradiction in such affirmations;
would, indeed, imply that Rahner's understanding of divine self-communication does
not ultimately conflict with the dogma of divine immutability. Such a result, as we
have seen, would prove our first criticism of Rahner's Grundaxiom unsound at least
363 "Uncreated," TI i, 329; "Ungeschaffene," SzTh i, 358.
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in the context of a strictly immanent critique. In the following response, therefore,
we intend to evaluate not only Rahner's arguments concerning the relation of
uncreated grace to the beatific vision and the priority of uncreated to created grace,
but also, indirectly, one of the central contentions of the first half of this work.
ii. Uncreated grace as ontologicalpresupposition of the beatific vision.
a. Introduction. In the first of his arguments for the integrality of divine self-
communication in his distinctive sense of that term to sanctifying grace, Rahner, as
we have seen, reasons: a) that if the uncreated grace possessed by wayfarers differs
in no essential respect from that possessed by the blessed; and b) that if the uncreated
grace of the blessed must consist in divine self-communication in the Rahnerian
sense of that term in order for the beatific vision to occur; then c) the uncreated grace
of wayfarers as well must consist in divine self-communication according to
Rahner's conception of it.
Now, Rahner's first premise, viz. that "grace...is a commencement of the blessed
life, homogeneous with the ontological presuppositions of the vision,"364 seems, in
the main at least, unexceptionable. For Scripture does incontestably describe the
indwelling Holy Spirit as "the earnest of our inheritance" (Eph 1:14; cf. 2 Cor 1:22,
5:5). In the indwelling divine persons, that is to say, Christians possess no mere
pignus, distinct from their heavenly reward and inferior to it, but an appa(3cov of
their inheritance, a substantial share in the great recompense to come.
Likewise, it seems evident that grace, uncreated and created, does constitute a
prerequisite of the beatific vision. One who beholds God face to face, after all, must
not lack that "holiness without which no one will see the Lord" (Heb 12:14).
Regardless of one's views as to whether Rahner fully appreciates the difference
between grace and glory, then, one cannot reasonably dispute Rahner's fundamental
claim that "grace...is...an inner entitative principle (at least a partial principle) of the
vision of God."365 Neither, then, can one reasonably dispute this claim's immediate
consequence, viz. that "the inner nature of grace as a whole in this life must allow of
364 Ibid., 326; ebd., 354.
365 "Uncreated," TI i, 326; "Ungeschaffene," SzTh i, 354.
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being more closely determined in terms of the nature of the ontological
presuppositions of the immediate vision ofGod."366
It seems, accordingly, that if one can prove divine self-communication, as Rahner
conceives of it, indispensable to the beatific vision, then one can also establish the
identity of the uncreated grace bestowed on wayfarers with divine self-
communication in Rahner's sense of the term. If one cannot establish the former
conclusion, however, the connection Rahner perceives between the uncreated grace
of wayfarers and that of the blessed will not suffice, of itself, to demonstrate the
integrality of divine self-communication, as Rahner understands it, to sanctifying
grace. We shall devote the following two subsections, therefore, exclusively to the
question of whether Rahner succeeds in demonstrating that (1) the relation between
being and knowing as such and (2) the absence of a created species in the beatific
vision render divine self-communication, according to Rahner's understanding of it,
indispensable to the beatific vision.
j3. Being and knowing. As we have already seen, in Rahner's view, the beatific
vision presupposes divine self-communication as he conceives of it, because: a)
"being is knowing;"367 and b) knowledge can, therefore, occur only to the extent that
"the knower in the true sense and the known in the true sense are one and identical in
being."368 We do not intend to contest the logical validity of Rahner's inference. It
seems transparently obvious that if "being is knowing," then knowledge presupposes
a substantial union between knower and known.
It is by no means obvious, however, that non-intentional, creaturely being is even
relatively identical with creaturely knowing. For, as Aquinas explains:
the action of an angel is not its esse, neither is the action of any creature its esse. For the genus of
action is twofold.... One action is that which passes into something exterior, inflicting passion on it,
as to burn and to cut. Another action...is that which does not pass into an exterior thing, but remains
in the agent itself: as to sense, to understand, and to will. For through action of this sort nothing
extrinsic is changed, but the action is conducted entirely within the agent itself. Of the first action,
therefore, it is manifest that it cannot be the very esse of the agent. For the esse of the agent is
indicated to be within the agent itself. Such action, however, is an effluxus from the agent into the act.
The second action, moreover, has infinity of its own nature, either simply or secundum quid. Such
366 Ibid.; ebd..
367 HW, 35; Horer, SmtWk iv, 70.
368 "Thomas Aquinas on Truth," TI xiii, 29; "Die Wahrheit bei Thomas von Aquin," SmtWk ii, 315.
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actions have infinity simply as to understand, whose object is the true, and to will, whose object is the
good, either of which [object] is convertible [or co-extensive] with being; and thus to know and to
understand,...bear relation [habent se]to all things; and each also receives its species from its object.
To sense, moreover, is infinite secundum quid, because it bears relation [se habet] to all things
sensible, as sight bears relation to all things visible. The esse of any creature, however, is limited to
one in genus and species [577? Ia, 54, 2 corp.].
Admittedly, Rahner rejects a central premise of Thomas' argument: viz. that
human beings' membership in a single species precludes the possibility of infinite,
human self-transcendence. Rahner maintains, rather, that each human being
possesses "an indefinable nature whose limits—'definition'— are the unlimited
reference to the infinite fullness of the mystery"369 that is God so that "it would be
wrong to define him [the human being], to delimit and put bounds to his
possibilities."370 In the context of a strictly immanent critique, therefore, one cannot
reasonably censure the view that "being is knowing" simply because it entails a
radical openness of human nature to higher levels of reality.
One can plausibly argue, nonetheless, that Rahner's relative identification of
created being and knowing conflicts even with his own understanding of human
nature to the extent that it implies the possibility of transcendence in reverse: the
confusion of the human spirit with the sub-spiritual objects of its knowledge. Rahner
holds, after all, that a human being's "spiritual quality and transcendence towards
being as such prevents its being 'defined', that is 'delimited' in the same way that
sub-human entities can. For these are 'defined' by the fact that it is their essence to
be restricted to a certain realm of reality It is therefore impossible, for instance,
for them to be 'elevated' to a supernatural fulfillment: such an elevation would
destroy their being which is essentially limit."371
Rahner, admittedly, possesses an answer to this objection in his understanding of
human sensibility as the capacity for self-presence in a material other. This
understanding, insofar as it pertains to the present question, consists fundamentally in
the following three propositions. Rahner's proposes, first, that "the sensible object,
insofar as it is outside the soul, projects itself into sensibility (wherefore sensibility
itselfmust be 'outside itself) and in this medium (and only in it) acquires through its
369 "Incarnation," 77 iv, 109; "Menschwerdung," SzTh iv, 141.
370 Ibid., 110; ebd., 143.
371 "Nature and Grace," 77 iv, 183; "Natur und Gnade," SzTh iv, 231.
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own operation that intensity of being which implies consciousness;"372 second, that
"the intensity of being which makes the self-realization of the sensible object in the
medium of sensibility actually sensible must [nonetheless] be bestowed upon it by
sensibility itself;"373 and, third, that "the self-realization of the sensible object must
[therefore] be identical with the self-realization of sensibility."374
In other words, Rahner holds that the thesis, "being is knowing,"375 implies "the
identity of knowing and the actually known"376 so that "what is actually [as opposed
to potentially] knowable is by that very fact actually knowing."377 This result need
not imply that sub-spiritual beings possess consciousness in their own right, Rahner
argues, for: a) the sensible object acquires an intensity of being that entails
consciousness "only in the medium of sensibility, so that in this and not in itself it is
actually sentient;"378 and b) this self-realization of the sub-spiritual object derives
from the human knower and not the sub-spiritual object itself. Each of these
conditions can obtain, Rahner argues if the self-realization of the subhuman object of
knowledge in the realm of human sensibility is identical with the self-realization of
the same human sensibility.379 "The species, which is the actuality of the object
itself, must be produced by the sentient knower himself, because otherwise it would
not possess the intensity of being which implies self-reflection; and, on the other
hand, the species must be the self-realization of the sensible object itself, because
otherwise this would not be intuited in its own self."380
Rahner's theory of sensibility, if it consisted merely in propositions a) and b),
would blunt the force of Aquinas' argument from the nature of immanent action to
the real distinction of created being and knowing considerably. To his credit,
however, Rahner notes that these relatively innocuous claims imply a third, more
controversial proposition: viz. that that sensible object and human sensibility must
share a single, conscious act in order for sensation to occur. Now, operare sequitur
372 SW, 94; GW, SmtWk ii, 80.
373 Ibid.; ebd., 81.
374 Ibid.; ebd..
375 HW, 35; Horer, SmtWk iv, 70.
376 SW, 93; GW, SmtWk ii, 80.
377 Ibid.; ebd..
378 Ibid., 94; ebd., 80.
379 In asserting the very possibility of an agent's and a patient's sharing a single act in a material
medium, of course, Rahner implicitly rejects the view of transient action sketched by Aquinas in STh
la, 54, 2 corp..
380 SW, 92; GW, SmtWk ii, 79.
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esse; if the sensible object, which in itself is utterly unconscious, truly "acquires
through its own operation that intensity of being which implies consciousness"381 and,
in so doing, shares the self-same actuality with a human being, then it must possess
quite a substantial capacity for self-transcendence. If Rahner's understanding of
sensibility were objectively justified, then: 1) Rahner's claims about the radical
distinctness of spiritual and sub-spiritual being would prove false; and 2) our
objection that an ontological union of spiritual knower and sub-spiritual known
would require a negative transcendence on the part of the spiritual knower would
prove invalid as well.
Rahner's theory of sensibility, then, supplies an answer to our objection
concerning negative transcendence, but only at the cost of undermining the sharp
distinction between personal and sub-personal being that Rahner draws, to a certain
extent at least, throughout his career.382 To the extent, accordingly, that Rahner's
relative identification of created being and knowing requires, for its own vindication,
the diminution of a distinction consistently affirmed by Rahner, one can reasonably
claim that Rahner's views on being and knowing conflict with certain of his own
presuppositions. Rahner's metaphysics of knowledge, insofar as it entails that all
objects of human perception possess, albeit only under certain conditions and in an
analogous sense, the capacity for consciousness, seems, in any event, unjustifiably to
narrow the spectrum of beings. Such considerations, however, are only tangentially
relevant in the context of an immanent critique.
y. God as impressed species. Rahner attempts to establish the indispensability of
divine self-communication, as he understands it, to the beatific vision, second, by
arguing that God must compensate for the absence of a created, impressed species in
the beatific vision by quasi-informing the human intellect in a manner analogous to
an impressed species' information of a human being's possible intellect in ordinary
instances of human knowledge.
381 Ibid., 94; ebd., 80.
382 Cf., e.g., "Relationship," 77 i, 317 ("Verhaltnis," SzTh i, 344); "Concupiscentia," TI i, 356, n. 1
("Konkupiszenz," SmtWk viii, 11, Anm. 11); "Easter," TI iv, 130, n. 10 ("Osterfrommigkeit," SzTh iv,
169, Anm. 10); "Immanent and Transcendent," TI x, 279 ("Immanente und transzendente," SmtWk xv,
548); and Trinity, 89 ("Der dreifaltige Gott," MS ii, 375).
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Now, Rahner is correct in observing that no created species informs the human
intellect in the beatific vision. For, as Aquinas explains:
Through no created similitude can the essence of God be seen...because the essence of God is his
existence itself..., which can be admissible of no created form. No created form whatsoever,
therefore, can be a similitude representing the essence of God to the seer....[This is the case also]
because the divine essence is an uncircumscribed thing, containing in itself super-eminently whatever
can be signified or understood by a created intellect....In no way through any created species can this
be represented: because every created form is limited.... Hence to say that God through a similitude is
seen, is to say that the divine essence is not seen: which is erroneous [STh la, 12, 2 corp.].
Rahner seems to err, however, when he asserts that God compensates for the
absence of a created species in the beatific vision by entitatively informing the
human intellect. For the agent intellect in natural human knowledge impresses a
created species on the possible intellect, so that the impressed species entitatively
informs the possible intellect, only in order to render intelligible that which is: a)
absent; b) present only through the mediation of the senses; or c) immaterial and thus
not directly perceptible by human beings' natural sensitive and cognitive faculties.
In the case of the beatific vision, however, the object intuited is neither absent nor
material nor, on account of the lumen gloriae, inaccessible to human intuition. The
peculiar character of the object intuited, along with the elevation of the human
intellect by the lumen gloriae, thus renders an entitative information of the possible
intellect superfluous in the beatific vision.383
This is not to say that God does not, in a certain sense, perform the function of an
impressed species in the beatific vision. For, as William J. Hill observes, the
entitative information of the possible intellect constitutes only one of the impressed
species' contributions to natural, human knowledge. In Hill's words:
Ordinarily, the species has a twofold function: one entitative, the other intentional. In the first way, it
is an accident, a quality modifying the soul, a form which in informing is absorbed in the actuation of
a subject and constitutes with it a new accidental thing. In the second way, it transcends this function
of entitative information (and this is due to its spirituality which in turn derives from the spirituality of
the intellect) and without any fusing with its subject merely actuates or terminates the soul precisely in
383 We follow the account of Reginald Garrigou.-Lagrange in his The One God: A Commentary on
the First Part ofSt. Thomas' Theological Summa (Bede Rose, trans.; St. Louis and London: Herder,
1944), 348.
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the line of knowledge. It makes the knower to be the known, to be...identified therewith—but only
"intentionaliter."384
On account of the terminative causality God exercises in the beatific vision,
therefore, one can and ought to speak of his being united to the created intellect as an
intelligible species without in any way suggesting that God communicates himself, in
the Rahnerian sense of those words, to the blessed in the beatific vision.
5. Conclusion. Neither Rahner's argument from God's role as quasi-species in
the beatific vision nor his argument from the putative identity of being and knowing,
then, suffices to establish the integrality of divine self-communication, as Rahner
conceives of it, to the beatific vision. Rahner's success in establishing a certain
continuity between the ontological presuppositions of the visio beatifica and the
uncreated grace already possessed by wayfarers notwithstanding, then, his researches
into the ontological presuppositions of the beatific vision yield no conclusive proof
that the uncreated grace of wayfarers consists in divine self-communication
understood in Rahnerian terms.
Hi. The priority of uncreated over created grace. Rahner's second argument for
the necessity of divine self-communication, in his sense of the word, to the bestowal
of uncreated grace consists principally in the claim that his understanding of the
divine indwelling alone is compatible with the precedence of uncreated over created
grace.
a. The scholastic views. That uncreated grace, at least broadly speaking, does, in
fact, precede created grace both logically and ontologically seems incontestable.
People do not, according to Scripture, receive the Holy Ghost, because they love
God; rather, "the love of God385 has been poured into our hearts through the Holy
Spirit that has been given to us" (Rom 5:5). Didymus of Alexandria, likewise, avers,
"Never, indeed, does anyone receive the spiritual blessings of God unless the Holy
384 "Uncreated Grace—A Critique of Karl Rahner," Thomist 27 (1963), 333-356 at 343-4.
385 We deviate from the NRSV by translating "f] ayatrq tou 0eou" as "the love of God" rather than
"God's love" in order: a) to render the direct article, q; and b) to show that tou 0eou can constitute an
objective as well as a subjective genitive.
Conciliar Authority and the Consistency of Rahner's Views 109
Spirit has gone before. He, indeed, who has received the Holy Spirit [however] shall,
consequently, have blessings: i.e. wisdom and understanding and the others of which
the Apostle...writes."386 Rahner, in fact, seems to misrepresent his fellow scholastic
theologians when he alleges that they universally dissent from this obvious truth.387
For, first, a great number, including, for instance, Adolphe Tanquerey388 and Paul
Galtier,389 subscribe to subjective, causal theories of the indwelling according to
which the divine persons impart themselves to the elect when they regenerate and
sanctify these souls thus rendering themselves present in a radically new way.
According to advocates of this theory, the indwelling divine persons bestow created
grace, and there can be no question of a mere creature's introducing uncreated grace,
i.e. the divine persons themselves as causing created grace, into the souls of the just.
A considerably greater number, admittedly, including, for instance, Camillo
Mazzella390 and Bernard Jungmann,391 conceive of the divine indwelling in souls as
logically and ontologically subsequent to the presence of created grace in those souls.
Such scholastics do not, however, imagine that created grace somehow antecedes the
presence of the divine persons as bestowing created grace. They merely hold that
such a presence differs from God's natural presence too little to qualify as indwelling.
As Aquinas explains:
God is in all things by essence, power, and presence, according to his one common mode, as a cause
in effects that participate in his goodness. Above this common mode, however, there is one special
mode, which convenes to the rational creature, in whom God is said to be as the known in the knower
and the loved in the lover....Because, by knowing and loving, the rational creature by its own
operation attains to God himself, according to this special mode, God is not only said to be in the
rational creature, but to habitare in it as in his own temple [STh la. 43, 3 corp.],
A creature can know and love God in a supernatural manner, of course, only if it
possesses the created grace which enables it so to do. Scholastics of this persuasion
386 De Spiritu Sancto 10; PG 39, 1042A-B. We owe this reference to Gaine, Indwelling Spirit, 36.
387
assumSi as many since Rahner have done," writes Gaine, "that all neo-scholastic theories
before Rahner supported the priority of created grace is to take no account of the intention of certain
of the theologians concerned and of what they claimed for their theories" (Indwelling Spirit, 6).
388 Synopsis 2, §184, pp. 135-6.
389 L 'Habitation en nous des trois Personnes: Lefait—le mode (Paris: Beauchesne, 19282), 209-56.
390 jje gratia Christi: Praelectiones scholastico-dogmaticae (Rome: Iuvenes Opifices a S. Ioseph,
1905s), disp. 5, a. 9, § 2, nn. 1043-51, pp. 734-9.
391 Institutiones theologiae dogmaticae specialis: Tractatus de gratia (Rome: Marietti, 1873), § 264,
p. 193.
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consider created grace prior to the divine indwelling, therefore, only because they
identify this indwelling exclusively with God's objective presence as known and
loved.
Rahner's position. No scholastic theologian, then, speaks as if some created
gift determines where God does and does not dwell. Advocates of subjective, causal
theories, moreover, explicitly affirm the logical and ontological priority of uncreated
grace in the narrowest sense of the term. Why does Rahner, then, accuse the
advocates of causal theories of subordinating uncreated to created grace? Simon
Gaine finds the answer to this question in a footnote which appears in Rahner's
earliest and principal treatment of the subject and in which Rahner asserts that "a
logical (not temporal) priority to created grace should be ascribed to uncreated grace
(as given, not just as to be given or as causing grace."392 In this remark, Gaine
writes:
one may find the reason why Rahner believed that a theory modelled on efficient causality collapses
into the priority of created grace. Efficiency may provide a special divine presence, a communicating
of self so as to be given in the causing of created grace, but the givenness of uncreated grace is
complete only on the basis of the completed created effect when uncreated grace is possessed....This
would appear to be insufficient for Rahner because [in his view] created grace must be a logical
consequence of God as somehow already given (in a non-temporal sense)....And efficiency cannot
establish this full givenness, but only the causation of an effect.393
According to Gaine's interpretation, which seems to us essentially correct, then,
Rahner objects to causal theories, at least in part, because they make a human being's
reception of uncreated grace contingent, in an unacceptable way, on the presence of a
merely created effect. Rahner himself, however, maintains that a human being
cannot receive uncreated grace without a created dispositio ultima which stands to
uncreated grace in a relation of reciprocal causality. It is unlikely, therefore, that he
condemns causal theories solely on the grounds that they make the divine indwelling
contingent, albeit in an attenuated sense of the term, on the bestowal of created grace.
Rahner seems to reject causal theories, rather, principally because he disagrees
with these theories' advocates about what constitutes divine indwelling, i.e.
392 "Uncreated," 77 i, 323, n. 5; "Ungeschaffene," SzTh i, 351, Anm. 5.
393 Simon G. Gaine, Indwelling Spirit and a New Creation: The Relationship between Uncreated
Grace and Created Grace in Neo-Scholastic Catholic Theology (Oxford: D.Phil. Diss., 1994), 221-2.
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uncreated grace in the strictest sense of the term. Causal theorists, as we have
already seen, view the possession of God as an object of knowledge and/or love as an
inevitable consequence of uncreated grace, but not, strictly speaking, as a necessary
constituent of it. On this question, however, Rahner takes the side of the objective
theorists. In Rahner's unpublished tractate, De Gratia Christi, Gaine relates:
Vasquez's theory [frequently considered the causal theory par exemplar] 394 ...is rejected as
insufficient to explain the indwelling as (allegedly) taught by the Fathers, in which the divine
substance is not only present but also possessed. Possession of God as object is thus taken to be an
integral part of the indwelling which must then be given an objective explanation of some kind.395
Rahner thus places himself in a virtually unique position within scholastic
theology. With the advocates of subjective, causal theories, he maintains
uncompromisingly that uncreated grace must possess an absolute precedence over
created grace. Yet, with the advocates of objective theories, he maintains that one
cannot reasonably describe God as "inhabiting" a soul until it possesses God as an
object of knowledge and love: a stance frequently thought to require that created
grace precede uncreated grace in order to enable the soul to possess God as the object
of its supernatural knowledge and love.
If both of these seemingly contradictory viewpoints are, in fact, objectively valid,
then it seems that Rahner's theory is probably the most acceptable account
available396 of the relation between uncreated and created grace. For Rahner's theory
posits the relative identity even in creatures of being, knowing, and loving397 so that
God cannot impart his being without also, by that very act, imparting knowledge and
love of himself.
The subjective, causal theories, that is to say, identify God's initial, supernatural
action on the soul as indwelling and thus maintain the primacy of uncreated grace
only by excising the subsequent acts of knowledge and love from the indwelling's
concept. The objective theories, likewise, treat the knowledge and love of God as
integral to the divine indwelling only at the expense of excising God's initial,
394 Cf., however, the revisionist interpretation of Leo D. Sullivan in his Justification and the
Inhabitation ofthe Holy Ghost: The Doctrine ofFather Gabriel Vasquez, S.J. (Rome: PUG, 1940).
395 Gaine, Indwelling Spirit, 220.
396 We praise Rahner's theory as "the most acceptable account available" under the specified
conditions in order to allow for the possibility of another theologian's developing a superior
alternative.
397 Cf. HW, 83, 126 (Horer, SmtWk iv, 152, 154, 224); "Incomprehensibility," TI xvi, 254
("Unbegreiflichkeit," SzTh xii, 319).
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supernatural contact with the soul from the indwelling's concept and thus
subordinating uncreated to created grace.
Both subjective and objective theories, then, sacrifice one or the other ofRahner's
concerns, viz. the primacy of uncreated grace and the indispensability of supernatural
knowledge and love to the indwelling, because neither can conceive of the
knowledge and love of God as anything other than logically subsequent to God's
initial, supernatural contact with the soul. Rahner, however, by: a) relatively
identifying even created being with both knowledge and love; and b) understanding
God's supernatural contact with the soul in terms of intrinsic, quasi-formal causality;
can c) satisfy both concerns by making human knowledge and love of God not
merely temporally, but logically simultaneous with his initial, supernatural action on
the soul. Rahner succeeds, therefore, as few others have before or since, in
reconciling the two basic orientations of scholastic theology on this subject: a not
inconsiderable intellectual feat.
y. Criticisms. For all its brilliance and originality, however, Rahner's theory of
the relation between uncreated and created grace is by no means unproblematic.
Critics of Rahner's position on this subject complain principally, in Hill's words, that
"it is impossible to see that it does not slight the transcendence of God."398 Since our
concern here is to determine whether one must accept Rahner's idea of divine self-
communication as true in spite of its apparent inconsistency with divine
transcendence, we shall pass over Hill's and similar objections without comment.
At least two other difficulties, however, seem quite relevant in this context. First,
as we have seen, Rahner's belief in the relative identity of being, knowing, and
loving seems unjustifiably to narrow the spectrum of being by implying that all
potential objects of human knowledge can attain some measure of consciousness in
the medium of human sensibility. To the extent that Rahner's theory of the relation
of uncreated to created grace presupposes the relative identity of created being,
knowing, and loving, then, it appears similarly questionable.
A more properly theological objection, second, concerns the seemingly
conflicting claims that Rahner's theology of grace seeks to accommodate. As we
noted above, Rahner's theory satisfies the most fundamental concerns of both
398 "Uncreated Grace," 356.
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subjective and objective theories of the divine indwelling. If the subjective theorist
rightly insists that uncreated grace precedes created grace, and the objective theorist
rightly insists that God dwells only in those who know him and love him, then
Rahner's theory possesses few plausible alternatives. If, however, either school's
central claim is objectively invalid, then the synthesis of the two schools' views in
Rahner's theory constitutes not an advantage, but a defect. In such a case, Rahner's
theory would, in fact, prove false at least to the extent that it affirms the erring
school's claim.
Now, it does not seem impossible to supply at least prima facie evidence to the
effect that one of the two theories might prove, upon examination, more probable
than the other. Specifically, certain evidence suggests that those theories which posit
a subjective, causal indwelling may prove more tenable than those that envision an
objective indwelling in which the soul possesses God as the object of its knowledge
and love. Objective theories, for instance, seem ill-equipped to explain how God can
dwell as in his temple in the souls of regenerate infants. As regenerate, these infants
certainly possess the Holy Spirit, and yet, as infants, they neither know nor love him.
"It is a very amazing thing," Augustine writes:
how God is the inhabitator of some who do not yet know him and is not of some who do know him.
For those do not pertain to the temple of God, who knowing God have not glorified him as God or
given thanks, and [yet] to the temple of God pertain infants sanctified by the sacrament of Christ,
regenerated by the Holy Spirit, who certainly, on account of their age, cannot yet know God; whence,
those have been able to know God, but not to possess him; these [however] have been able to possess
him before they knew him.399
Admittedly, one ought not to consider the knowledge of God by the wicked as a
counterexample to the objective theory, because the wicked never attain the intimate,
experimental knowledge of God possessed by the righteous: a knowledge which,
incidentally, presupposes his real and not merely intentional presence. Likewise, it
seems, one could reasonably concede to the objective theorist that adults possess God
as the object of their knowledge and love habitually even when they sleep.
The case of infants, however, seems altogether different. For, when objective
theorists claim, as they typically do when faced with this objection, that God dwells
in regenerate infants by virtue of his mere bestowal of the unactualized and, at least
in early infancy unactualizable, habits of faith and charity, then they at least
399 Epistula. 187.21 in CSEL 57, 99-100.
Chapter 2: Counter Arguments on Rahner's Behalf 114
implicitly admit that divine action alone suffices to constitute the indwelling in
logical and, in this case, even temporal priority to regenerate persons' possession of
God as the object of their actual knowledge and love.
The possession, even by infants who can neither know nor love God, of the
indwelling, divine persons strongly suggests, then, at least the possibility of
establishing definitively the superiority of a subjective, causal theory of the divine
indwelling to objective approaches to the same subject. We do not claim,
incidentally, to have accomplished this. We have, however, attempted to show that
resolution of the controversy between subjective and objective theories of the divine
indwelling by means other than a compromise solution like Rahner's is not
inconceivable.
d. Conclusion. It seems, then, that Rahner does not prove that his theory of the
divine indwelling alone, with its emphasis on divine self-communication in the
Rahnerian sense of the term, can account for the Scripturally attested primacy of
uncreated over created grace. For Rahner's theory rests on two highly questionable
presuppositions: a) that being, knowing, and loving are relatively identical even in
the created sphere; and b) that the fundamental claims of both objective and
subjective theorists of the divine indwelling are equally valid.
Neither, it seems, can Rahner prove that the beatific vision requires that uncreated
grace, as its ontological presupposition, consist in divine self-communication as
Rahner understands it. Although Rahner rightly discerns a close relationship
between the grace of the wayfarer and the beatifying vision of God, he cannot
establish that the beatific vision itself requires divine self-communication, according
to his conception of it; a fortiori, neither can he demonstrate its integrality to the
ontological presupposition of the beatific vision that constitutes the wayfarers'
uncreated grace. Rahner does not succeed, then, in demonstrating that divine self-
communication in his sense of that term must occur in order for God to impart
himself to human beings in uncreated, sanctifying grace.
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3. The Incarnation ofthe Logos.
a. Introduction. Rahner argues, nonetheless, that not only uncreated grace, but
also the Incarnation of the Logos, as defined by various ecumenical councils teaching
in union with the Pope, constitutes an instance of divine self-communication in the
Rahnerian sense of those words. Since: a) Rahner presupposes the infallibility of
ecumenical councils when teaching definitively in union with the Pope; b) the
charism of infallibility precludes the possibility of self-contradiction; and c)
ecumenical councils have definitively taught, in union with the Pope, the doctrines of
divine immutability and the Incarnation of the Logos; then d) if Rahner can establish
that the Incarnation constitutes an instance of divine self-communication as he
understands it, then his presuppositions concerning the infallibility of ecumenical
councils dictate that divine self-communication in the Rahnerian sense of that term
must be ultimately compatible with divine immutability. If this were, in fact, the
case, then our first criticism of Rahner's Grundaxiom, a criticism that presupposes
the incompatibility of divine self-communication as Rahner conceives of it with
divine immutability, would, at least in the context of a strictly immanent critique,
prove invalid.
In the following, accordingly, we intend: first, to outline Rahner's theory of the
"uniting unity" in the Incarnation, the keystone of Rahner's case for the integrality of
divine self-communication, as he understands it, to the event of the hypostatic union;
second, lo examine briefly certain of the advantages of Rahner's llieoiy of the uniting
unity; third, to explore a number of difficulties for this theory; and, fourth, to
determine whether Rahner's theory of the "uniting unity" in the hypostatic union
actually constitutes proof that the Incarnation consists in or presupposes divine self-
communication in the Rahnerian sense.
b. Rahner's theory of the "uniting unity" in the Incarnation. In his theory of the
"uniting unity" in the Incarnation, Rahner attempts to specify "by what (i.e. by what
uniting unity) they [= Christ's two natures] are united (in the united unity [= Christ's
person in both natures])."400 The term "uniting unity" as Rahner employs it, seems
to denote something at least rationally distinct from the agent that unites Christ's
400 "Uncreated," 77 i, 182, n. 1; "Ungeschaffene," SzTh i, 202, Anm. 3.
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human nature to the person of the Logos. For the IV Lateran Council binds Rahner
to attribute the hypostatic union to the agency of "the whole Trinity in common,"401
and he, accordingly, explicitly attributes the bringing about of the Incarnation to the
Trinity as a whole: "the effecting of this [hypostatic] union," he writes, "is common
to the three divine persons."402
When Rahner asks by what "uniting unity" Christ's two natures come to be united,
then, he seems to ask: by what process or mode of causality does the Trinity unite
Christ's human nature to the person of the Logos?403 Rahner recognizes that some
may consider this question unanswerable. In response, however, he writes:
If someone goes on to maintain that it is impossible to provide a further answer here because it is
precisely a mystery with which we are dealing here, it would be necessary to reply that this account
[i.e. the statement that "the human nature and the divine nature are united in the person of the Logos"]
would suffice provided that the mystery given expression in the original formula remains clear in its
meaning (though not in its explanation) even when no answer is offered to the further question. But if
this is not the case, i.e. if the united unity in the sense intended (a sense which, though undetected,
must be there even in a mystery) does not permit of being thought unless the uniting unity comes into
sight, then...[a] docta ignorantia...is simply not appropriate here—no matter how far the ancient
tradition provides or fails to provide a further explicit question and answer as to the uniting unity 404
Rahner does not explain precisely why the mystery's meaning must remain
unclear as long as one lacks an account of the uniting unity. He does, nonetheless,
make this assumption: an assumption which implies that one can hardly speak of the
Incarnation without a theory of the uniting unity, and that the dogma of the
hypostatic union thus presupposes at least the possibility of such an account. Given
Rahner's presuppositions, then, a proof that his theory, which dictates that the
401 DH 801.
402 "Incarnation C. The Official Teaching of the Church," SM(E) iii, 112a-14b at 113b; "Inkarnation
III. Die kirchenamtliche Lehre," SM ii in SmtWk xvii/ii, 1098-1102 at 1101.
403 The following remarks confirm this interpretation. "Someone may object," Rahner writes:
that it is in fact the one hypostasis which is the uniting unity for the two natures. To this we must
reply that this may well be true, so far as it is a matter of the two natures in their mutual concord. But
the question here is to what extent the divine hypostasis unites the human nature to himself. When the
question is formulated like this, the hypostasis, in sofar as it is just the static concept of ens per se et
in se which is involved, is something to be united—one 'parf of the united unity, and not the uniting
unity. Thus it must be asked by what (i.e. by what uniting unity) the hypostasis unites to himself the
human nature. Putting the same thing in another way: unity (as a formal transcendental property of an
entity) is never something which can be set up as such, but is always the result of some other state or
process among entities. Thus one has not explained nor even understood what one is saying when one
elucidates unity by—unity ["Uncreated," 77 i, 182, n.l; "Ungeschaffene," SzTh i, 203, Anm. 3].
404 Ibid.; ebd., 202-3, Anm. 3.
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Incarnation occurs through an act of divine self-communication as Rahner
understands it, constitutes the only adequate account of the uniting unity would
imply that the Incarnation constitutes an instance of divine self-communication in the
Rahnerian sense.
Rahner's theory of the "uniting unity," in itself, is disarmingly simple. The
principle, which Rahner considers axiomatic, that "nearness to God...and genuine
creaturehood grow in the same, and not in inverse proportions"405 dictates, in
Rahner's view, that Jesus Christ, in order to be perfect God, need do no more than
perfectly realize the essence of creaturehood. The man Jesus, he writes, "precisely
by being man in the fullest sense...is God's Existence into the world."406
Since Christ, as perfect man, is ipso facto also perfect God, Rahner reasons, the
act whereby God constitutes Christ as perfect man must be identical to the act
whereby God unites Christ's human nature to the eternal hypostasis of the Logos.
"The positing of Christ's humanity in its free distinction from God itself," Rahner
writes, "becomes in this way the act of unification...with the Logos."407 In Rahner's
view, therefore, the uniting unity in the Incarnation "unites precisely by making
existent;"408 the uniting unity unites Christ's human nature with the Logos, that is,
simply by creating it.409
c. Advantages of Rahner's theory. Rahner finds the idea of assumption by
creation advantageous, it seems, for three principal reasons: a) this understanding of
the "uniting unity" obviates any seeming contradiction between the divinity of Christ
and his full humanity; b) it reflects what Rahner considers a correct view of the
relation between the intra-Trinitarian processions and the divine acts ad extra', and c)
it corresponds to what Rahner considers a contemporary view of God and the world.
405 "Intellectual Honesty and Christian Faith," TI vii, 47-71 at 68; "Intellektuelle Redlichkeit und
christlicher Glaube," SzTh vii, 54-76 at 73.
406 "Current Problems," 77 i, 184; "Probleme," SzTh i, 205.
407 Ibid., 183; ebd., 204.
408 Ibid., 182; ebd., 202-3.
409 In Rahner's view, Joseph Wong explains, "God 'assumes by creating' and 'creates by assuming'"
{Logos-Symbol, 127). William V. Dych echoes this language almost exactly (Karl Rahner [London:
Geoffrey Chapman, 1992], 77). Philipp Kaiser, likewise, notes that, according to Rahner, "the
humanity of Christ is.. .not only created 'by the union with the Logos,' but the creation itself, the
constitution of the humanity of Christ is itself already its union with the Logos" {Die Gott-
menschliche Einigung in Christus als Problem der spekulativen Theologie seit der Scholastik
[MThS.S 36; Munchen: Max Hueber, 1968], 275).
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i. Reconciling Christ's divinity with his full humanity. Probably the strongest
point in favor of Rahner 's theory of assumption by creation is that it eliminates any
appearance of conflict between the unity and the distinctness of Christ's natures. As
Rahner explains:
if what makes the human nature ek-sistent as something diverse from God, and what unites this nature
with the Logos, are strictly the same, then we have a unity...which does not make the aauyicuTcoc
look like a sort of external counterbalance to the unity, always threatening to dissolve it, but
shows...how...unity and distinction [can] become mutually...intensifying characteristics, not
competing ones.410
Rahner's theory of assumption by creation serves, therefore, to counteract in some
measure tendencies to exalt Christ's diversity over his unity and vice versa: a quality
Rahner correctly views as evidence in its favor.
ii. Correlating intra-divine processions and divine acts ad extra. Rahner also
seems attracted to his theory, because it corresponds to his understanding of the
relation between the intra-Trinitarian processions and God's action vis-a-vis the
world. In Rahner's view, all divine acts ad extra constitute various aspects of a
single "continuation of the immanent constitution of 'image and likeness' [i.e. of the
divine Word]"411 within God. In other words, just as the Father communicates his
essence to the Son for all eternity, so, in Rahner's view, he communicates his essence,
albeit in a much less profound sense and without compromising his transcendence, in
creating extra-divine being; God, that is to say, creates by assuming.
Rahner believes, accordingly, that in all divine acts ad extra God creates and
assumes, at least in some measure, by one and the same act. Given this
presupposition, the idea that God creates Christ's human nature and unites it to the
Logos by one undifferentiated act of creation-assumption follows as a matter of
course. Rahner's theory of the uniting unity in the Incarnation, then, construes this
dogma in such a way that it fits seamlessly into his more general theory of divine
action as such.
410 "Current Problems," 77 i, 181-2; "Probleme," SzTh i, 202-3.
411 "Symbol," TI iv, 236-7; "Symbols," SmtWk xviii, 437.
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Hi. Adjusting to a contemporary worldview. Why Rahner would subscribe to this
general theory of divine action appears from the third concern that leads Rahner to
adopt his theory of the uniting unity in the Incarnation: his belief in the necessity of
demythologization. "The theology of the future," he writes, "must be a
'demythologizing' theology."412 For, in his view, as we have seen, the doctrines of
the Christian faith constitute mere "verbalized objectifications of the 'revelation'
which is already present in the gratuitous radicalizing of human transcendentality in
God's self-communication."413 Rahner, consequently, considers it his duty to re¬
interpret Christian doctrine so as to manifest its connection to contemporary persons'
experience of divine self-communication.
Since, in his view, "modern man finds nothing illogical in pantheism or
panentheism,"414 Rahner considers himself free to claim that God communicates
himself to creation so radically as to become "the very core of the world's reality,"415
"the total unity of reality,"416 "the single whole of reality,"417 and "the innermost
constitutive element of man."418 Rahner rejects the idea of divine intervention,
however, as alien to "our modern experience and interpretation of the world"419 and,
accordingly, seeks to understand divine action exclusively in terms of divine self-
communication. One can speak truthfully of divine intervention, he writes, only if:
a special "intervention" of God...[is] understood as the historical concreteness of the transcendental
self-communication of God which is always already intrinsic to the concrete world....Every real
intervention of God in his world...is always only the becoming historical and...concrete of that
"intervention" in which God as the transcendental ground of the world has from the outset embedded
himself in this world as its self-communicating ground.420
412 "Possible Courses for the Theology of the Future," 77 xiii, 32-60 at 42; "Uber kunftige Wege der
Theologie," SzTh x, 41-69 at 51. For more on this theme, cf. Michael Barnes, "Demythologization in
the Theology of Karl Rahner," TS 55 (1994), 24-45.
413 "The Act of Faith and the Content of Faith," 77 xxi, 158; "Glaubensakt und Glaubensinhalt," SzTh
xv, 158.
414 "The Works ofMercy and Their Reward," TI vii, 268-74 at 272; "Preis der Barmherzigkeit," SzTh
vii, 259-64 at 262.
415 "Specific Character," TI xxi, 191; "Eigenart," SzTh xv, 190.
416 "The Dignity and Freedom ofMan," TI ii, 235-63 at 239; "Wtirde und Freiheit des Menschen,"
SzTh ii, 247-77 at 251.
417 Foundations, 48; Grundkurs, SmtWkxxvi, 51.
418 Ibid., 116; ebd., 116.
419 Ibid., 259; ebd., 255.
420 Ibid., 87; ebd., 87-8. We have inserted the word "always" between "the historical concreteness of
the transcendental self-communication of God which is" and "already intrinsic to the concrete world"
in the translation in order more accurately to render Rahner's German text in which one reads of the
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According to this understanding of divine action, an Incarnation, if it can occur at
all, can constitute no more than a "historical manifestation"421 of the same, universal
divine influence responsible for creation. The view that God assumes Christ's
human nature by creating it and, likewise, creates it by assuming it thus serves to
reconcile the doctrine of the Incarnation with what Rahner considers a contemporary
view of the world.
d. Difficulties for Rahner's theory. When considered from Rahner's perspective,
therefore, his theory of assumption by creation possesses considerable advantages.
Two difficulties, however, appear, at least prima facie, to threaten the theory's
plausibility. First, Rahner's view that the uniting unity "unites precisely by making
existent"422 seems to rest on a self-contradictory premise: viz., that two entities can
be united by their differentiation simpliciter. Second, and more significantly, the
principle that God assumes by creating seems to imply that every human being
possesses the grace of union with the divine Logos. If to create is to assume, then it
seems that God cannot create an individual human nature423 without also assuming it.
i. Unification through differentiation. Rahner attempts to extricate himself from
the first difficulty by appealing to his philosophical ontology. Two things can be
united by their differentiation simpliciter, Rahner affirms, because the thesis, "being
is knowing,"424 perhaps the most fundamental tenet of Rahner's philosophy, seems to
entail that such unification through differentiation occurs.
In Geist in Welt, specifically, Rahner argues that if being is knowing, then, at least
in human beings, "knowing will know something to the extent to which it is this
something."425 Rahner conceives of human knowledge, accordingly, as "a result of
"geschictliche Konkretheit der transzendentalen Selbstmitteilung Gottes..., die der konkreten Welt
immer schon innerlich ist" (ebd.; our emphasis).
421 "Christology in the Setting ofModern Man's Understanding of Himself and of His World," TI xi,
215-29 at 226; "Christologie im Rahmen des modernen Selbst- und Weltverstandnisses," SzTh ix,
227-41 at 238.
422 "Current Problems," TI i, 182; "Probleme," SzTh i, 202-3.
423 Cf. n. 244.
424 HW, 35; Horer, SmtWk iv, 70.
425 SW, 97; GW, SmtWk ii, 83.
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the ontological unity of object and cognitive faculty."426 Nevertheless, Rahner also
recognizes that in human cognition:
something is always known about something....Every objective knowledge is always and in every
case the reference of a universal to a "this." Hence the "this" appears as the reference point standing
over against the knowing to which the knower refers what is...known by him. But then the subject
with the content of his knowledge (the universal concept) always stands to some extent at a distance
from "this" to which he refers the content of his knowledge.427
Every act of human knowledge, then, requires a simultaneous unification with and
differentiation from the object known: something at least roughly analogous to the
unification through differentiation which, in Rahner's view, occurs in the Incarnation.
While it is not immediately evident that the unification and differentiation
characteristic of human knowing as Rahner understands it must coincide in a single
act, Rahner argues at great length in his early philosophical work, Spirit in the World,
that unification and differentiation here do in fact coincide in the one act of
"conversion to the phantasm" 428 : a term Rahner borrows from Aquinas to
characterize "the one human knowing."429
In his later essay, "Zur Theologie des Symbols," Rahner exploits this model of
human cognition in order to characterize the eternal generation of the Logos: an
intra-divine procession that, in Rahner's view, the Father extends ad extra in the
Incarnation. The eternal generation of the Logos, Rahner claims, constitutes a self-
differentiating self-communication of the Father's being to that of the Son by which
the Father knows himself in the Son. "This process," Rahner writes, "is necessarily
given with the divine act of self-knowledge, and without it the absolute act of divine
self-possession in knowledge cannot exist."430
Since Rahner maintains that being is knowing, a correct assumption, of course, in
divinis, he considers this generation essential not merely to the Father's self-
426 Ibid.; ebd..
427 Ibid., 122; ebd., 101-2.
428 Rahner maintains, that is to say, that both: 1) the apprehension of a known object in sensibility,
which he considers a self-alienating union with the other; and 2) the act of abstraction, which Rahner
characterizes as a reditio subjecti in seipsum in which human beings recognize themselves as distinct
from the objects of their cognition; are identical with the one, internally differentiated act of
conversion to the phantasm. In the preface to Geist in Welt, Rahner writes, "the work could have been
entitled, Conversion to the Phantasm [ibid., liii; ebd., 15]."
429 Ibid., liv; ebd..
430 "Symbol," TI iv, 236; "Symbols," SmtWk xviii, 436.
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awareness but to his very existence. "The Father is himself," writes Rahner, "by the
very fact that he opposes to himself the image which is of the same essence as
himself, as the person who is other than himself; and so he possesses himself."431
The Father, in other words, necessarily generates another by communicating himself
and communicates himself by generating another; he unifies himself to the Son, then,
precisely by making the Son existent. God in himself, in Rahner's view, and not
merely God incarnate, thus constitutes "the initially existing uniting unity."432
Since Rahner identifies being and knowing at least relatively in all beings
whatsoever, furthermore, he holds that each being must constitute itself by a self-
communicating self-differentiation analogous to the Father's. "Each being," Rahner
writes, "forms, in its own way, more or less perfectly according to its degree of being,
something distinct from itself and yet one with itself, 'for' its own fulfillment."433 In
other words, each being constitutes something of a uniting unity; absolutely
everything, not excluding the God-man himself, constitutes itself through some act of
unification through differentiation.
One can reasonably ask, however, whether Rahner's ontology really justifies such
a sweeping conclusion. In Geist in Welt, after all, Rahner specifically admits that a
"differentiation of subject and object...does not belong to the essence of knowing as
such. On the contrary, knowing as such is to be understood first of all as a being's
being-present-to-self....The apprehension of an 'in-itself is therefore conceivable
without setting apart in opposition the knowing subject and the object, [i.e.] without
a judgment as affirmative synthesis."434
In a footnote to this last sentence, the young Rahner concludes, "therefore God,
for example, does not judge."435 At this stage of his career, then, Rahner specifically
rejects the view that divine self-knowledge presupposes an interior opposition
between subject and object. Evidently, Rahner changes his mind at some point
between the composition of Spirit in the World and that of "The Theology of the
431 Ibid.; ebd..
432 "Unity of the Church—Unity ofMankind," 77 xx, 154-72 at 162; "Einheit der Kirche—Einheit der
Menschheit," SzTh xiv, 382-404 at 391. We substitute "uniting unity" for the translator, Edward
Quinn's, rendering, "unifying unity," because Rahner himself writes here not einigende Einheit, of
which "unifying unity" would be the more literal translation, but einende Einheit, the terminus
technicus from "Probleme," which the translator of SzTh i, Cornelius Ernst, renders as "uniting unity."
433 "Symbol," TI iv, 228; "Symbols," SmtWk xviii, 429.
434 SW, 130; GW, SmtWk ii, 107.
435 Ibid., n. 22; ebd., Anm. 24.
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Symbol." Yet he nowhere explains precisely why he comes to reject his former
position. It seems less than obvious, therefore, that Rahner's ontology actually
dictates that God does, or even can, execute the kind of unificative self-
differentiation required by his theory of the uniting unity.
ii. The singularity of the hypostatic union. The graver and more properly
theological of the two difficulties, in any event, is surely the second: viz. that
Rahner's view of the uniting unity in the Incarnation seems not to cohere with the
revealed datum that the Word became flesh in Jesus Christ alone. In the following,
accordingly, we intend to examine this difficulty and Rahner's response(s) in their
various facets and to measure Rahner's success in reconciling the idea of assumption
by creation with the exclusivity of the hypostatic union.
a. The extent of the problem. Even a cursory glance at Rahner's statements on
this subject will show that he tends to emphasize the continuities between Christ and
his fellow human beings. "The Incarnation of God," writes Rahner, "is the unique
and highest instance of the actualization of the essence of human reality."436 Again,
Rahner affirms, "the God-Man...neither is nor can be graced in itself with a closeness
to God and an encounter with God which is essentially different from the encounter
and self-communication of God which is in fact intended for every person in
grace."437
Rahner maintains, moreover, that the very act of creating a human being
constitutes also an at least partial assumption into the person of the Logos so that the
grace possessed by all human beings constitutes an "unfolding within human nature
of the union of the human with the Logos."438 Rahner affirms, therefore, the
existence of a "universal God-manhood inherent in the spiritual creature as such."439
He believes, however, that he can advance such theses without even tacitly
imputing the hypostatic union to the entire human race as long as he treats the "God-
436 Foundations, 218; Grundkurs, SmtWk xxvi, 210.
437 Ibid., 218-19; ebd..
438 "Current Problems," 77 i, 199-200; "Probleme," SzTh i, 221.
439 "Methodology," 77 xi, 97; "Methode," SzTh ix, 109. Cf. Rahner's similar remarks in "Thoughts
on the Possibility of Belief Today," 77 v, 15; "Uber die Moglichkeit des Glaubens heute," SzTh v, 24;
and Ich glaube an Jesus Christus (Theologische Meditationen 21: Einsiedeln: Benziger, 1975), 37.
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manhood" possessed by human beings other than Christ as "deficient modes of this
primary Christological relation."440 It seems, moreover, that this proviso would
abundantly suffice to vindicate Rahner from the charge of universalizing the
hypostatic union but for two difficulties.
[3. The absoluteness of the divine nature. First, if the "primary Christological
relation" consists in the possession of a divine and a human nature by a single,
ontological subject; and if, as Rahner correctly observes, "God...is absolute and
simple spirit,"441 then one cannot intelligibly speak of "deficient modes" of this
relation. For a truly absolute being does not admit of being morcellated into distinct
degrees so that various subjects can instantiate it to a greater or lesser extent. As
Gerald O'Collins justly observes: "One who is God is beyond degrees (and hence
differences of degree), because being truly divine means being indivisible."442
y. The oscillating hypostasis. Second, and viewing the problem from the opposite
angle, one cannot intelligibly refer to a human nature as both enhypostatic in itself
and anhypostatic in the same respect. Yet Rahner's position seems to imply, and
Rahner himself explicitly states, that all individual, human natures other than Christ's
oscillate between these two extremes. Rahner claims, specifically: a) that "man is
insofar as he abandons himself to the absolute mystery whom we call God";443 b)
that Christ's individual, human nature abandons its hypostasis to the Logos when
"this is done in the strictest sense and reaches an unsurpassable pitch of
achievement";444 and c) that every human nature other than Christ's gives itself to the
Logos in some measure, but fails to give itself absolutely so that "in its ek-stasy [it]
constantly falls back upon itself and becomes hypo-static in itself."445
In thesis a) Rahner seems to identify human existence with the act of self-
abandonment to God. As we have already seen, such an identification is highly
problematic; for "as an act of knowing or striving the immanent action is
440 "Current Problems," TI i, 165; "Probleme," SzTh i, 186.
441 Immanent and Transcendent," TI x, 287; "Immanente und transzendente," SmtWkxv, 555.
442 Gerald O'Collins, "The Incarnation under Fire," Greg 76 (1995), 263-80 at 263.
443 Foundations, 218; Grundkurs, SmtWkxxvi, 210.
444 "Incarnation," TI iv, 109; "Menschwerdung," SzTh iv, 142.
445 "Person" in CTD, 351-4 at 352; "Person" in KThW\ SmtWk 17/1, 752-5 at 753-4.
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characterized by a certain indeterminacy or infiniteness:...one can think whatever is
true and love whatever is good....The being of things, however, is always limited to
this or that individual in a particular species and a particular genus. It is the...reality
of precisely this or that thing."446 If human existence were identical with some
immanent, human act, therefore, human beings could never constitute mere human
beings.
Rahner, admittedly, seems not only to accept, but to celebrate this consequence of
his position. "The very definition of man," he writes, "is his indefinability, i.e.
precisely his transcendence as absolute openness to being in the absolute."447 Indeed,
the limitless elasticity of the human essence seems to constitute a presupposition of
his theory of assumption by creation. "Only someone who forgets that the essence of
man...is to be unbounded (thus in this sense, to be un-definable)," Rahner asserts,
"can suppose that it is impossible for there to be a man, who, precisely by being man
in the fullest sense..., is God's Existence into the world."448
Such a hollowing out of the essence of humanity, however, seems inconsistent
with the Chalcedonian formula insofar as: a) one cannot reasonably speak of an
infinitely elastic nature as aTpsTTTCoc; and b) such a nature would seem to possess
no particular ISicoTqc. Rahner's understanding of human nature also raises the
question of how an identical subjectivity could survive a process of infinite,
ontological self-transcendence. Thesis a), then, on account of the highly
unconventional view of human nature it implies, seems liable to a number ofweighty
objections.
Thesis b), Rahner's claim that Christ's human nature abandons its hypostasis to
the second person of the Trinity proves similarly problematic. For Christ could not
have abandoned a merely human hypostasis to the Logos if, as Rahner correctly
grants, he never possessed a merely human hypostasis. If he had somehow managed
to donate his hypostasis to God, moreover, this would not necessarily have rendered
his human nature enhypostatic in the eternal Logos. It seems, rather, that such an act
would have added a hypostasis to the divine nature and thus converted the holy
Trinity into a quaternity. Yet, according to the fifth canon of the II Council of
446 Leo Elders, The Metaphysics ofBeing ofSt. Thomas Aquinas in a Historical Perspective (Leiden,
Boston, and Koln: Brill, 1993), 260.
447 "Immanent and Transcendent," 77 x, 279; "Immanente und transzendente," SmtWk xv, 548.
448 "Current Problems," TI i, 184; "Probleme," SzTh i, 205.
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Constantinople, "the Holy Trinity did not receive the addition of a person, i.e. a
hypostasis, even through the Incarnation ofGod the Word."449
Rahner attempts to avoid these difficulties by identifying the divine act of creating
Christ's human nature with the Logos' act of surrendering his own subsistence in
Jesus to himself. When Christ's human nature surrenders itself to the Logos, Rahner
writes, "this 'act' of self-surrender is...primarily the 'act' of the Creator in making
human nature, and not something done 'accidentally' by man as a creature in his
actus secundus deriving from his own decision."450 It seems, however, that one
could reasonably identify the divine act of creating Christ's human nature with the
actus primus of Christ qua creature only if one identified this creaturely actus primus,
i.e. the sacred humanity's act of existing, with the divine existence of the Logos.
By identifying the divine act of creating Christ's human nature with his creaturely
actus primus, that is, it seems that Rahner either: 1) identifies a divine creative act
with a merely creaturely act of existing and thus confuses an act with its
presupposition; or 2) commits himself to a "one esse" account of Christ's ontological
constitution according to which Christ lacks a distinctively human act of existence.
Such an account, of course, might prove reasonable in itself, but it would ill accord
with Rahner's explicit condemnation of Christological "mono-existentialism,"451
449 DH 426.
450 "Incarnation," 77 iv, 109, n. 1; "Menschwerdung," SzTh iv, 142, Anm. 1.
451 "Current Problems," TI i, 160; "Probleme," SzTh, i, 181. John M. McDermott, ordinarily a highly
perceptive commentator on Rahner's works, does, admittedly, claim that Rahner's
"Christology...ignore[s] the question of the existence(s) of Jesus Christ," and that Rahner
"nowhere...explicitly considers] the question of the number of existences in Christ" ("The
Christologies of Karl Rahner," Greg 67 [1986], 87-123, 297-327 at 89-90, n. 12 and 309). At a 1961
symposium on Christology, however, Rahner offers what he regards as a reconciliation of the view
that Christ's human nature exists by the existence of the Word with the view that this nature possesses
its own esse secondarium. "The esse secondarium," he asks:
can it not be conceived as that which is given by the divine esse to this nature, insomuch as it exists?
This question is truly quite complex: in effect, on the one hand, one must assign to the divine esse a
formal causality, and not solely efficient....On the other hand, an infinite act communicating itself to a
finite potency...is neither limited nor restrained. Nevertheless, that which is in the [human] nature
itself, is and remains finite and limited in a certain manner. That is why we are only able to
distinguish in God a formal cause and its formal effect. It is in this sense that a conciliation between
the two opinions is possible [ "Debats sur le rapport du P. Patfoort," Problemes actuels, 414-15].
In these remarks as well as in the condemnation of "mono-existentialism" referred to in the main
text, Rahner at least seems to ascribe two esses, the Logos' esse divinum, and a creaturely esse
secondarium, to the incarnate Christ. Rahner's beliefs, moreover: a) that creatureliness increases in
direct, and not inverse, proportion to unity with God; b) that Christ possesses a creaturely as well as a
divine self-consciousness ("Current Problems," TI i, 158; "Probleme," SzTh i, 178), at least when this
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which he treats as a species of the heresy of monotheletism. It seems, therefore, that
one can construe thesis b) as defensible only if one imputes to Rahner an
understanding of Christ's existence(s) that conflicts with his explicit statements on
this subject.
Thesis c), likewise, presents Rahner with something of a paradox. As we have
seen, in order to view the hypostatic union as the perfect fulfillment of a relation
partially realized by all human beings, Rahner claims that every merely human
person attempts to become enhypostatic in the Logos. "We always attempt in
principle," he writes, "to come nearer to this goal without ever reaching it."452
"Precisely in his transcendence," however, the merely human person, in Rahner's
view, "always falls back again into his separating subsistence."453
Yet Rahner nowhere answers the question: from whence does the human being
fall? A human nature can be enhypostatic in itself and, as the case of Christ proves,
anhypostatic in itself. But the idea: a) that human beings can launch themselves from
a state of merely human enhypostasia towards the asymptotically approachable goal
of anhyspostasia and fall back again; and b) that human beings do so continually, as
if bouncing on an ontological trampoline; seems highly counter-intuitive, if not
absurd.
e. Assessment. Rahner, then, sincerely and creatively attempts to establish the
possibility of unification through differentiation and to reconcile his theory of
assumption by creation with the revealed fact that the Word became flesh in only one
human being. Rahner's efforts in the latter direction, however, land him in a
belief is considered in conjunction with his identification of being and knowing (SW, 69; GW, SmtWk
ii, 62); and c) that created essence and existence are not really distinct (cf. the texts adduced and the
implications drawn from them in Denis J. M. Bradley, "Rahner's Spirit in the World: Aquinas or
Hegel," Thomist 41 [1977], 167-99 at 180-83); all seem to demand that Christ possess a second,
creaturely esse. We follow Heijden, to whom we owe argument b (Karl Rahner, 408-10), and Guy
Mansini, from whom we learned of Rahner's symposium remarks ("Quasi-Formal Causality and
'Change in the Other': A Note on Karl Rahner's Christology," Thomist 52 [1988], 293-306 at 294, n.
7), therefore, in ascribing a two-esse account of Christ's ontological constitution to Rahner.
452 "Thoughts on the Theology of Christmas," TI iii, 24-34 at 33; "Zur Theologie der
Weihnachtsfeier," SzTh iii, 35-46 at 45. Rahner believes that such "attempts" constitute an experience
analogous to the Incarnation. By meditating on "the prolongation of our own spiritual existence," he
writes, "we may get some idea ofwhat it means that God has become man" (ibid.; ebd., 44-5). Cf.
also Rahner's "Christmas in the Light of the Ignatian Exercises," 77 xvii, 3-7 at 6-7; "Weihnacht im
Licht der Exerzitien," SzTh xii, 329-34 at 332-3.
453 "Thoughts on the Theology of Christmas," TI iii, 31; "Zur Theologie der Weihnachtsfeier," SzTh
iii, 43.
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veritable thicket of difficulties. The idea of graded instantiations of divinity, for
instance, seems at least as unorthodox as that of a universal hypostatic union.
Rahner's confusion of human being with particular human acts, moreover, and his
concept of the oscillating hypostasis seem to render his theory incredible to all but
those willing to accept certain highly controversial presuppositions. Rahner's theory
of the uniting unity, consequently, seems intrinsically implausible and, therefore,
insufficient to establish the indispensability of divine self-communication as Rahner
conceives of it to the accomplishment of the Incarnation.
4. Christ's absolute saviorhood
a. Introduction. Rahner argues, nonetheless, that not only the doctrines of
sanctifying grace and the Incarnation, but also that of Christ's status as "absolute
savior" presupposes the occurrence of divine self-communication in the radical,
Rahnerian sense of that term. Now, it does seem that ecumenical councils teaching
in union with the Pope have taught definitively that Christ constitutes in some sense
the "absolute savior," i.e. the one person on whom all salvation history hinges. If,
accordingly, Rahner can prove: a) that Christ could not constitute the "absolute
savior" without being the recipient of a divine self-communication in his sense of the
term; then it seems that his assumption b) of the absolute truthfulness and, therefore,
consistency of ecumenical, conciliar pronouncements ratified by the Pope; when
combined with c) the datum that such councils have unambiguously affirmed the
doctrine of divine immutability; would, indeed, imply d) that God can communicate
himself in the Rahnerian sense of those terms without compromising his absolute
immutability. In this case, our first criticism of Rahner's Grundaxiom, which
presupposes the incompatibility of the kind of self-communication Rahner ascribes
to God with the doctrine of divine immutability, would prove invalid.
b. Rahner's argument. Rahner's argument that Christ's "absolute saviorhood"
requires divine self-communication as Rahner conceives of it takes the following
form.
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1. "What is revealed and then pondered upon in theology is not an arbitrary matter,
but something which is intended for man's salvation;"454 every revealed datum, that
is to say possesses "significance for salvation"455 (Heilsbedeutsamkeit).
2. "Only those things can belong to man's salvation which, when lacking, injure his
being and wholeness."456
3. In order to be heilsbedeutsam, therefore, a reality must be something for which
human beings possess an exigence.
4. The doctrine of Christ's "absolute saviorhood" can be heilsbedeutsam, therefore,
only to the extent that human beings possess an exigence for an "absolute savior."
5. Human beings can possess an exigence for an "absolute savior," however, only to
the extent that he corresponds, in a way no other human being can, to an a priori,
supernatural desire.
6. Jesus of Nazareth can correspond to such an a priori, supernatural desire only
insofar as he guarantees, in a way a mere prophet cannot, the fulfillment of human
hopes for divine self-communication.
7. Jesus can constitute an irrevocable guarantee of the fulfillment of the human desire
for divine self-communication, in a way no merely human prophet can, only if his
being is "the reality of God himself in such a unique way that God would disown his
very self if he should supersede it because of its created finiteness."457
8. Christ's being can constitute a "reality of God himself' in this way only if God
communicates himself to Christ's human nature in the Rahnerian sense of those
terms.
9. Christ's absolute saviorhood is evidently revealed and, therefore, heilsbedeutsam.
10. God, therefore, must have communicated himself to Christ in the distinctively
Rahnerian sense of those terms.
454 "Theology and Anthropology," 77 ix, 28-45 at 35; "Theologie und Anthropologic," SzTh viii, 43-
65 at 51.
455 Ibid.; ebd., 52.
456 Ibid.; ebd., 51.
457 "Jesus Christ—The Meaning of Life," TI xxi, 217; "Jesus Christus—Sinn des Lebens," SzTh xv,
214.
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c. Criticisms.
i. Introduction. If one presupposes Rahner's views as to what the "absolute
savior" must be in order to qualify as heilsbedeutsam, then the hypothesis that God
communicates himself in the radical, Rahnerian sense to Christ's human nature
seems inescapable. The idea that a reality can possess Heilsbedeutsamkeit only to
the extent that human beings possess an exigence precisely for that reality, however,
seems incompatible with: 1) a central tenet of Rahner's Christology, viz. that the
mysteries of the life of Jesus such as his circumcision, his baptism, his
transfiguration, his agony in Gethsemane are significant for contemporary, Christian
life and thought; and 2) a fundamental claim of Rahner's theology as a whole, viz.
that all elements of categorical experience mediate human beings' supernaturally
elevated transcendentality to them.
ii. The mysteries ofJesus' life.
a. The mysteries' significancefor Rahner's Christology. Rahner's insistence on
the importance of the details of Christ's life, admittedly, might seem to constitute a
secondary element in Rahner's Christology in comparison to the theory of the
"absolute savior." Insofar as Rahner's concern for these events results from and, to
some extent, even motivates his theory of the "uniting unity," however, this concern
deserves to be taken seriously.
The connection between Rahner's concern for the mysteries of Christ's life and
the unquestionably central theory of the "uniting unity" appears from the following
passages, taken from the essay in which Rahner originally proposes the idea of a
"uniting unity." In neo-scholastic Christology, Rahner asks:
What do we hear ofChrist's Circumcision, Baptism, his prayer, the Transfiguration, the Presentation
in the Temple,, the Mount of Olives, the abandonment by God on the Cross, the descent into the
underworld, the Ascension into heaven and so on? Nothing, or pretty well nothing....Instead of a
genuine theology of Christ's life, we find that the theology...of certain abstract privileges enjoyed by
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Christ has forced itself into the foreground; and that this theology draws attention to certain
features...which distinguish him from us... ,458
Rahner clearly, then, considers neo-scholastic Christology insufficiently attentive
to the mysteries of the life of Jesus. He attributes this inattentiveness, moreover, to
neo-scholasticism's excessively abstract and formalistic account of the unity of
Christ: an account that, in Rahner's view, addresses the issue of the "united unity" in
the Incarnation as accomplished, but leaves the question of the "uniting unity"
unasked. Rahner writes, accordingly, that neo-scholasticism's turn from the concrete
events of Christ's life to those privileges that distinguish him from ordinary, human
beings:
is conditioned.. .by that purely formal understanding of the unity of Christ as united, of which we have
spoken above. In a conception like this an event in the field of Christ's humanity only has 'interest' in
so far as it is dignified by being adopted by Christ's person, and thus precisely not in itself; or again,
in so far as it possesses special features not to be found elsewhere among human beings.459
Having thus explained the neglect of the mysteries of Christ's life in neo-
scholastic theology, Rahner proceeds to commend his theory of the "uniting unity" in
the Incarnation precisely on the grounds that its conception ofChrist's human nature
as the self-exteriorization of the Logos warrants attention to the details of Christ's
life. "If we are to have a true theology of the life of Jesus (not merely a theology of
the extraordinary in Jesus' life)," Rahner argues:
we must learn to see that what is human in Jesus...not [as] something human...and 'in addition'
God's as well..[but as] God's Ek-sistence...: it is human reality and so God's and vice versa. Then it
will no longer be necessary to ask the question: What is there exceptional about this life over and
beyond ours as we are already familiar with it..., what is there about it...which could make it
important for us too? But the question we must ask is: What does our life mean...when it is first and
last the life of God? It is because we need this ultimate interpretation of our lives, one which is not to
be had elsewhere, that we must study the theology of Christ's life and death.460
The understanding of Christ's human nature that Rahner describes here is, of
course, precisely that which the theory of the uniting unity implies. Insofar, then, as:
1) the theory of the uniting unity, an unquestionably central aspect of Rahner's
458 "Current Problems," 77 i, 190-1; "Probleme," SzTh i, 211.
459 Ibid., 191; ebd..
460 Ibid., 191-2; ebd., 212.
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Christology, implies that one ought to regard the mysteries of Jesus' life as
heilsbedeutsam; and 2) the theory seems to be formulated, to a certain extent at least,
precisely in order to foster an appreciation of these mysteries' Heilsbedeutsamkeit; it
seems reasonable 3) to consider Rahner's insistence on the Heilsbedeutsamkeit of the
mysteries of Christ's life a central tenet of his Christology.
/3. Implications for the concept ofabsolute savior. In one of the central claims of
his Christology, therefore, Rahner grants that relatively minor details of Christ's life
are heilsbedeutsam. This seems to imply that certain events can possess
Heilsbedeutsamkeit even though one cannot reasonably claim that human beings
possess any exigence precisely for those events. In this case, accordingly, Christ's
absolute saviorhood could conceivably be heilsbedeutsam even if human beings
possessed no exigence for an absolute savior.
This implies, it seems, that one cannot validly argue that God must have
communicated himself, in the Rahnerian sense of those terms, to Christ's human
nature simply because, otherwise, Christ would not fulfill an exigence of human
beings. For, if the mysteries of Christ's life can be heilsbedeutsam without
corresponding to some exigence in human beings precisely for them, then it seems
that Christ himself could also be heilsbedeutsam without fulfilling this condition.
Insofar as the mysteries of Christ's life are genuinely heilsbedeutsam, then, it seems
that the absence of divine self-communication, as Rahner conceives of it, to Jesus'
human nature would not pose an insuperable obstacle to his serving as "absolute
savior."
Hi. The Heilsbedeutsamkeit of all categorical experience. Intra-Christological
considerations alone, therefore, suffice to establish that Rahner cannot consistently
treat divine self-communication, as he understands it, to Christ's human nature as a
precondition to Christ's Heilsbedeutsamkeit. One may establish this conclusion
much more directly, however, on the basis of a thesis which, while extrinsic to
Christology as such, forms a basic component of Rahner's theology as a whole:
Rahner's claim that "supernaturally elevated transcendentality is...mediated to itself
by any and every categorical reality in which and through which the subject becomes
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present to itself."461 Insofar as Rahner treats the reality posited by this claim as an
indispensable presupposition of the possibility of accepting God's offer of divine
self-communication in Christ athematically, or "anonymously," one cannot
reasonably dismiss the thesis in question as a secondary element in Rahner's thought.
An unquestionably central, albeit not specifically Christological, tenet of Rahner's
theology, then, dictates that Rahner cannot consistently argue that Jesus could be
heilsbedeutsam only if he received a divine self-communication according to
Rahner's understanding of that term.
iv. Assessment. Rahner's insistence: a) on the Heilsbedeutsamkeit of the
mysteries of Christ's life; and b) more generally, on the Heilsbedeutsamkeit of all
aspects of categorical experience; therefore, conflicts with a central premise of
Rahner's argument from Christ's absolute saviorhood to the occurrence of divine
self-communication as he conceives of it: viz. that something can be heilsbedeutsam
only if it is implicitly anticipated in human beings' athematic hope for divine self-
communication.
d. Excursus on the views ofBruce Marshall.
i. Introduction. This conclusion, incidentally, resonates significantly with
criticisms of Rahner's theory of the absolute savior voiced by Bruce Marshall.
According to Rahner, Marshall explains, "any reality, object, or person can be
significant for our salvation (heilsbedeutsam) only because and in so far as we are
oriented to it by our very nature; only by falling within the scope of...[our]
transcendental orientation can any reality affect us as a whole and so be genuinely
saving."462 Since Jesus, in Rahner's view, can be the absolute savior only to the
extent that he is heilsbedeutsam, it seems to Marshall that Jesus Christ "as a
particular person...[i.e. as] the bearer of a proper name, who has determinate,
describable features and who is located in a unique stretch of space and time"463
461 Foundations, 151; Grundkurs, SmtWkxxvi, 149
462 Christology in Conflict: The Identity ofa Saviour in Rahner and Barth (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987),
56.
463 Ibid., 57-8.
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cannot be the absolute savior in Rahner's sense of the term. Rahner's theory of the
absolute savior, rather, entails, in Marshall's view, that:
this status can apply to Jesus only as a positive person or 'vague individual'. That is, on Rahner's
procedure, Jesus Christ can be the absolute savior only in abstraction from and without regard for, his
proper name, determinate features and unique spatio-temporal location, without, in other words,
everything which makes him Jesus and so distinguishes him from any other individual. He is the
absolute savior only with respect to the bare form of individuality in him, that is, only in so far as he is
an indeterminate, independently existing human subject. For in this respect alone do we anticipate
him in our transcendental orientation and so in this respect alone can we, on Rahner's account, rightly
consider him significant for salvation.464
Marshall concludes, on the basis of these considerations, that Rahner's restrictive
criteria for Heilsbedeutsamkeit implicitly conflict with Rahner's own conviction that
Jesus Christ, qua particular and not merely "positive" 465 person, possesses
Heilsbedeutsamkeit in a pre-eminent degree. This conclusion seems both correct and
identical with that of our own argument from Rahner's assertion of the
Heilsbedeutsamkeit of the mysteries of Jesus' life.
ii. DifficultiesforMarshall's position.
a. Introduction. Marshall's argument for one of this conclusion's presuppositions,
viz. that Rahner actually does consider Jesus, qua particular person, heilsbedeutsam,
however, seems unsound. Specifically, Marshall takes a number of more or less
innocuous statements in Rahner's corpus to mean that Rahner holds to the following
principle: "an admissible account of 'that which is significant for salvation' cannot
fail to include and be governed by reference to Jesus Christ."466 Now, since: a)
Rahner seems explicitly and consciously to repudiate this principle in certain of his
writings; and b) the texts on which Marshall relies to establish Rahner's subscription
464 Ibid., 58.
465 "As a 'positive' reality," writes Marshall, "an individual is simply a single instance of a class or
nature, irrespective of the particular 'when', 'where' and description under which that individual
actually exists" (ibid., 89). Marshall introduces his distinction between positive and particular
individuals in ibid., 44-6.
466 Ibid., 54
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to this principle appear susceptible of other interpretations; it seems that Marshall
does not prove that Rahner unambiguously endorses the principle in question.
/?. Textual evidence against Marshall's thesis. For, first, Rahner explicitly states
that in order to demonstrate Jesus' salvific significance, one must first possess a
more general, pre-Christological concept of salvific significance. The following
remarks, for instance, seem typical of the late Rahner's stance on this subject.
Have we thought out in a reflexive way...how it is that another human being is able to have...an
absolute meaning for me as an individual, that is, for another human being at all, in the way that we
ascribe to Jesus Christ this absolute meaning he has for us?...How can I encounter someone from the
past, Thutmosis or Napoleon or Goethe, and somehow or other discover in their person and work a
meaning that challenges me and summons me to decision? These and similar general anthropological,
existential-ontological considerations would have to be made and developed by us Christians with
much more exactitude, love, thoroughness, and discernment in order to have some kind of a
framework of understanding, a horizon that was reflected upon, for the teaching that tells us, "There is
something crucial in my relationship to Jesus of Nazareth."467
Again, in the opening pages of Ich glaube an Jesus Christus, Rahner insists that a
credible defense of Christian faith in the person of Jesus must present an answer to
"the old question...of whether and how...a contingent thing, encountering one
'accidentally' from without, indeed a reality situated in a vastly remote point in
history, can have...an ultimate significance for the existence of a human being at
all."468 Textual evidence exists, therefore, for the view that Rahner regards a
(logically) pre-Christological understanding of Heilsbedeutsamkeit in general a
prerequisite to the task ofmaking Christ's particular, salvific significance intelligible.
Pace Marshall, accordingly, it seems less than obvious that "Rahner certainly
lakes...for granted" the principle: "an admissible account of'that which is significant
for salvation' cannot fail to include and be governed by reference to Jesus Christ"469
467 "BriefObservations on Systematic Christology Today," 77xxi, 228-38 at 236; "Kleine
Anmerkungen zur systematischen Christologie heute," SzTh xv, 225-35 at 233.
468 Ich glaube, 13.
469 Marshall, Christology, 54.
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y. Evidence for Marshall's thesis? Second, and more importantly, the texts
Marshall proffers as evidence of Rahner's allegiance to this principle do not seem to
prove Marshall's point. The texts in question are three:
a. "Catholic faith and its dogmatics as they have been understood up to now, and also
as they will have to be understood in the future, remain indissolubly bound up
(unabldsbar gebunden) not only with the historical existence of Jesus of Nazareth,
but also with the historical events of a specific kind which took place during his
life;"470
b. "Where 'Jesus is nothing more than one of the relatively numerous exemplary
persons (vorbildlichen Menschen), one would no longer be dealing with
Christianity;"471 and
c. "When the longing for the absolute nearness of God...looks for where this
nearness came—not in the postulates of the spirit, but in the flesh and in the housings
of the earth: then no resting place can be found except in Jesus of Nazareth, over
whom the star of God stands."472
In the first sentence, Rahner asserts, in other words, that the multi-dimensional
wholes, "Catholic faith" and "its dogmatics," are "indissolubly bound up" with the
events of Jesus' life. Now, it seems that one could reasonably assert that the tenets
of Catholic faith and dogmatics in globo are indissolubly bound up with the
particularities of Christ's life and without thereby implying that every, particular
tenet of "Catholic faith" and "its dogmatics" includes and is governed by reference to
Jesus Christ. To the extent that this is the case, Marshall's first text seems not to
constitute an unambiguous endorsement of the dictum: "an admissible account of
470 "Remarks on the Importance of the History of Jesus for Catholic Dogmatics," 77 xiii, 201-12 at
201; "Bemerkungen zur Bedeutung der Geschichte Jesu fur die katholische Dogmatik," SzTh x, 215-
26 at 215 as quoted in Marshall, Christology, 54.
471 Karl Rahner im Gesprach 1 (Paul Imhof and Hubert Biallowons, ed.; Munich: Kosel, 1982), 163
as translated by Marshall and quoted in his Christology, 54.
472 "Incarnation," TI iv, 120; "Menschwerdung," SzTh iv, 155 quoted in Marshall, Christology, 74, n.
108.
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'that which is significant for salvation' cannot fail to include and be governed by
reference to Jesus Christ."473 In the second text, likewise, Rahner seems to indicate
only that belief in the absolute saviorhood of Jesus Christ constitutes an
indispensable element of explicit Christianity: not that every element of official
Christianity conforms to the just-quoted principle. The third text, finally, seems to
indicate only that Rahner considers Jesus alone the absolute savior. Neither in itself
nor in its context does this sentence seem to address the larger question of how
theoretical accounts of Heilsbedeutsamkeit ought to relate to Jesus Christ qua
particular person. Marshall seems, therefore, not to supply adequate, textual warrant
for his claim that Rahner's subscribes to the principle: "an admissible account of
'that which is significant for salvation' cannot fail to include and be governed by
reference to Jesus Christ."474
5. Evaluation. Since Rahner's explicit statements suggest that he considers
reference to Christ in his historical particularity dispensable to accounts of
Heilsbedeutsamkeit, and Marshall does not succeed in proving the contrary, it seems,
in fact, that Rahner at least implicitly denies the principle in question.
Hi. Conclusion. His brilliant critique of Rahner's restrictive criteria for
Heilsbedeutsamkeit and absolute saviorhood notwithstanding, then, Marshall appears
to misunderstand the kind of problem these criteria pose for Rahner's theology.
Marshall errs, that is to say, when he claims that "by attempting to establish the
credibility and meaningfulness of a saving reality...by an appeal to general criteria
for such a reality, without reference to Jesus Christ, Rahner makes it impossible
actually to maintain his assumption that whatever is heilsbedeutsam must be ascribed
only to Jesus Christ as a particular person."475 Rahner makes no such assumption.
The view that Jesus Christ can possess Heilsbedeutsamkeit only to the extent that
humanity's athematic hope for divine self-communication anticipates him, rather,
appears problematic: a) for Rahner's Christology, because it conflicts with his
insistence on the significance of the mysteries of Jesus' life; and b) for Rahner's
473 Marshall, Christology, 54.
474 Ibid..
475 Ibid., 88-9.
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theology as a whole, because Rahner's understanding of revelation as transcendental
commits him to the view that every facet of human experience is heilsbedeutsam.
e. Summary. In any event, prescinding from the validity or invalidity of
Marshall's argument as an immanent critique of Rahner's thought, it seems certain
that Rahner: a) considers the mysteries of Christ's life heilsbedeutsam; and b) that he,
in fact, considers all aspects of the world as experienced by human beings
heilsbedeutsam. Insofar as Rahner's argument from Christ's absolute saviorhood to
the occurrence of divine self-communication as he understands it depends upon an
account of Heilsbedeutsamkeit that precludes the salvific significance of the realities
mentioned in a) and many of those mentioned in b) accordingly, Rahner's argument
seems unsound by the standards of his own theology.
5. Results. It seems, accordingly, that the argument: a) that Rahner acknowledges
the infallibility of ecumenical councils when and to the extent that they teach
definitively and in union with the Pope; b) that such councils have definitively and
with solemn, Papal approbation taught the doctrines of sanctifying grace, the
Incarnation, and divine immutability; c) that these councils' infallibility implies the
consistency of their pronouncements; d) that Rahner proves divine self-
communication, in his distinctive sense of that term, indispensable to the mysteries
of sanctifying grace, the Incarnation, and Christ's absolute saviorhood; e) that
Rahner's views on divine self-communication cannot, therefore, conflict with the
doctrine of divine immutability; and f) that any counterargument to his Grundaxiom
that presupposes, as our first criticism does, that divine self-communication in the
Rahnerian sense and divine immutability are incompatible must, consequently, be
invalid; fails to nullify our first criticism, even in the context of a strictly immanent
critique, because of the falsehood of premise d.
V. Conclusion
We have devoted this chapter to rehearsing and rebutting possible defenses of
Rahner's Grundaxiom against the following counterargument, which we have
referred to as our "first criticism." If God is simple, then every aspect of his being is
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absolutely, albeit not necessarily relatively, identical with every other aspect. A self-
communication on the part of a simple God which altered that God's being,
consequently, would transform every aspect of that God, not excluding the
Trinitarian relations, and thus guarantee that the Trinitarian relations as
communicated would not correspond to the Trinitarian relations as eternal. Rahner's
idea of self-communication, presupposing, as it does, becoming in a simple God,
thus seems implicitly to contradict his famous axiom: "The economic Trinity is the
immanent Trinity and vice versa."
After briefly verifying that Rahner does endorse divine simplicity, immutability,
etc. and does insist that becoming penetrates God's very being, we turned to Bert van
der Heijden's interpretation of Rahner's doctrine of God according to which the
inner logic of Rahner's views concerning divine self-communication, on the whole if
not in every detail, cohere rather well with the doctrine of divine immutability. In
our review of Heijden's arguments, nonetheless, we discovered that he finds in
Rahner a more systematic thinker than we or most of his interpreters have found him
to be. Heijden, that is to say, tends to resolve the paradoxical and seemingly
inconsistent aspects of Rahner's thought into a single, stringently consistent
viewpoint: a viewpoint that frequently serves as a foil for Heijden's articulation of
his own theological system. We found his interpretation of Rahner, accordingly,
unreliable and of little use in vindicating Rahner from our first criticism.
Next, we turned to a complex argument, summarized in the previous section, from
Rahner's belief in the infallibility of ecumenical councils when teaching definitively
with the approbation of the Pope to the consistency of their definitive
pronouncements and, therefore, to the consistency of Rahner's theory of divine self-
communication with divine immutability if and to the extent that Rahner could
establish the integrality of his theory of divine self-communication to some doctrine
definitively authorized by an ecumenical council and ratified by the Pope. We found,
moreover, that Rahner attempts to prove his ideas about divine self-communication
integral to two such doctrines: viz. the doctrines of sanctifying grace and the
Incarnation of the Logos. After reviewing and discussing Rahner's arguments at
length, however, we found them inadequate to their purpose and concluded,
accordingly, that the argument concerning conciliar authority does not invalidate our
first criticism of Rahner's Grundaxiom.
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In tandem with our second criticism, viz. that, even if an unmistakably Trinitarian
structure manifested itself in the experience of divine self-communication, one could
not, solely on the basis of one's experience, distinguish the novel from the permanent
aspects of this structure if God changes when he communicates himself, then, it
seems our first criticism weakens the credibility of Rahner's Grundaxiom
considerably. It seems presumptuous, however, to declare Rahner's Grundaxiom and
related theses positively disproved.
We think it advisable, therefore, to augment our two criticisms of the Grundaxiom
and our brief animadversions on Rahner's Trinitarian interpretation of transcendental
experience with additional counterarguments. In the following chapter, accordingly,
we intend to argue: a) that Rahner's own canons of Trinitarian orthodoxy preclude
the possibility of God's revealing the doctrine of the Trinity in the manner that
Rahner proposes; and b) that the New Testament accounts of Christ's anointing with
the Holy Spirit, if interpreted in accordance with the Grundaxiom, entail conclusions
incompatible with Rahner's own ideal of orthodox Trinitarianism.
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I. Introduction.
We devoted the first two chapters of this work, with the exception of the purely
propaedeutic material in Chapter 1, to developing, and sustaining in the face of
counterarguments, two basic criticisms of Rahner's Grundaxiom. First, we argued,
Rahner guarantees at least some asymmetry between oixovopta and 0eoAoyia by
postulating the indispensability of divine becoming to any genuine divine self-
communication. For ifGod is simple, as Rahner correctly assumes, then he cannot
change any aspect of his being without simultaneously transforming every aspect of
his being: the Trinitarian relations not excluded. If the divine persons, in order to
become the economic Trinity, had to undergo such a metamorphosis, it seems, they
would, perforce, differ, even in their mutual relations, from the immanent Trinity: i.e.
the divine persons as they would have existed in the absence of a divine self-
communication. Second, we observed, even if a mutable God could prevent the
intra-Trinitarian relations from mutating in the act of self-communication, one who
experienced this communication could not know, without simply being told through
a verbal or at least conceptual revelation, that God had preserved his prior476
relational structure intact.
Having defended the first, and more cogent, criticism from possible
counterarguments in the previous chapter, we hope in this chapter to proffer two
further criticisms of Rahner's views on the revelation of the Trinity before resting
our case against Rahner and introducing an alternative account. In this chapter,
specifically, we hope: a) to show that Rahner conceives of the divine persons in such
a way that they cannot manifest their existence qua distinct to wayfarers without
resorting to verbal, or at least conceptual, forms of communication; and b) that the
Biblical accounts of Christ's anointing with the Holy Spirit, when interpreted in
accordance with the Grundaxiom as Rahner understands it, entail conclusions
476 We employ this term in a logical and ontological, but not a temporal, sense.
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incompatible with Rahner's Latin Trinitarianism. One can harmonize the taxis
among the persons displayed in this event with a Western understanding of the intra-
Trinitarian relations, we shall argue, only if one modifies one's understanding of
what qualifies as correspondence between economy and theology to such an extent
as to render the Grundaxiom powerless to perform its principal function: viz.
wan-anting inferences from the economy of salvation to the doctrine of the immanent
Trinity.
II. The impossibility of a non-verbal, non-conceptual revelation of the doctrine
of the Trinity other than the beatific vision.
1. Introduction. The following four syllogisms seem to comprise a valid477
argument for the view that God could not inform human beings of the purely
notional distinctions internal to his being without resorting to some verbal, or at least
conceptual, revelation.
1. Every entity that possesses reality only through its identity with something else
possesses no capacity for action insofar as it is distinct from this something else.
2. The divine persons are entities that possess reality only through their identity with
the divine substance.
3. The divine persons possess no capacity for action insofar as they are distinct from
the divine substance.
1. Every entity that possesses no capacity for action insofar as it is distinct from a
particular substance can impact nothing insofar as it is distinct from this substance.
2. The divine persons are entities that possess no capacity for action insofar as they
are distinct from the divine substance.
477 Not every valid argument, incidentally, yields a true conclusion. As Colin Allen and Michael
Hand explain, "An argument is VALID if and only if it is necessary that ifall its premises are true, its
conclusions are true" (Logic Primer [Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 20012], 1). "An
argument is SOUND," by contrast, "if and only if it is valid and all its premises are true....It follows
that all sound arguments have true conclusions" (ibid., 2).
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3. The divine persons can impact nothing insofar as they are distinct from the divine
substance.
1. Every entity that can impact nothing cannot be known to exist from non-verbal
and non-conceptual aspects of that which is other than itself.
2. The divine persons are entities that can impact nothing insofar as they are distinct
from the divine substance.
3. The divine persons insofar as they are distinct from the divine substance cannot be
known to exist from non-verbal and non-conceptual aspects of that which is other
than they.
1. Every entity that cannot be known to exist from non-verbal and non-conceptual
aspects of that which is other than itself, can be known to exist by other entities, if
other entities can know that it exists at all, only through verbal, or at least conceptual,
forms of communication or through direct intuition.
2. The divine persons insofar as they are distinct from the divine substance are
entities that cannot be known to exist from non-verbal and non-conceptual aspects of
that which is other than they.
3. The divine persons insofar as they are distinct from the divine substance can be
known to exist by other entities, if other entities can know that they exist at all, only
through verbal, or at least conceptual, forms of communication or through direct
intuition.
The validity of the preceding, four syllogisms, each in Darii, seems indisputable.
The major premises of the first, second, and third seem self-evident, moreover, and
the minor premises of the second, third, and fourth consist in the conclusions of prior
valid arguments. One who wished to prove the reasoning summarized in the four
syllogisms above unsound, therefore, would likely focus any attacks on the minor
premise of syllogism 1 and the major premise of syllogism 4. In the following,
accordingly, we shall attempt to respond to objections Rahner either does, or could,
oppose to these two premises.
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2. Rahner's case against the minor premise ofsyllogism 1.
a. What does Rahner actually believe? One might think that Rahner would
strenuously oppose the minor premise of syllogism 1, perhaps the most consequential
premise of the entire argument. Rahner appears, however, explicitly to endorse it.
After alluding to a related question, Rahner writes, "Catholic theologians do not
agree on this point, but all agree that in God the relation is real only through its
identity with the real divine essence."478 One could justifiably conclude, therefore,
that Rahner cannot consistently dispute this precise point in our argument.
A defender of the Grundaxiom, however, might wish to argue that, at this juncture,
Rahner implicitly deviates from one of his most strongly held beliefs, viz. that God
does not possess an absolute subsistence; and that a consistent account of Rahner's
overall position, therefore, would not include an endorsement of the first syllogism's
minor premise. If the relations derive their reality, and, therefore, their subsistence,
solely from the divine essence, such a person might argue, then the divine essence of
itself must possess a subsistence, which the subsistence of each divine person
presupposes and which, therefore, is not identical simpliciter with any of the divine
persons: in other words, an absolute subsistence. Yet the absence of such a
subsistence constitutes an indispensable presupposition of Rahner's belief that "in
the New Testament o 0£O<7 always signifies the First Person of the Trinity and does
not merely stand for him often."479
A brief account of Rahner's argument for the identity of the Biblical o 0soc with
God precisely as Father will show why Rahner's thesis stands or falls with his denial
of the doctrine of an absolute subsistence. At the outset of Rahner's explicit inquiry
into the question of "whether o 0eoc not only stands for the Father, but also signifies
him"4S0 in New Testament usage, he remarks, "it might seem that this question has
already been decided in the negative"481 for two reasons. The first, the only one that
concerns us here, he summarizes as follows:
478 Trinity, 71; "Der dreifaltige Gott," MS ii, 363.
479 "Theos in the New Testament," TI i, 126; "Theos im Neuen Testament," SmtWk iv, 386.
480 Ibid., 130; ebd., 388.
481 Ibid.; ebd..
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It might be said that even in the New Testament o 0soc is used as a name for the object of natural
knowledge of God; and this God is not the Father but the one God who is cause of the world in virtue
of the numerical unity of his nature: this attribute, then, belongs equally to all three divine Persons,
since all three possess the one nature.482
"But," Rahner responds:
just this assertion—that what we know from the world is the Triune God in the unity of his nature, and
not the Father—is open to question. It is obvious that the Father is not known as Father in natural
theology, i.e. not as He who communicates his nature to the Son by an eternal generation....But we
can still say that he who is in actual fact known from the world, is concretely the Father....For natural
theology itself ascends not just to a divinity but to a God: it knows, that is, that this divine nature
necessarily subsists....Unless we wish to follow Cajetan and Suarez, among others, in positing a
subsistentia absoluta [then]..., only one course is open to us: to maintain that the concrete Absolute
(hie Deus) known by natural theology is precisely the Father.483
Rahner's argument that the Biblical usage of o 0eoc as a name of the naturally
knowable Creator does not necessarily falsify his claim that o 0eog refers always to
the Father, then, amounts to the following instance of modus tollendo ponens.
1. Natural theology knows a God who subsists as unoriginate: either the Father who
subsists relatively or the divine essence, which subsists absolutely.
2. The divine essence, however, possesses no absolute subsistence.
3. Natural theology, therefore, knows the God who subsists relatively as unoriginate,
i.e. the Father.
If deprived of its second premise, this argument manifestly loses all validity.
Now, Rahner's identification of o 0eog with the Father greatly bolsters the Biblical
basis for his claim that human beings can have distinct, non-appropriated relations to
each of the divine persons, and this claim, in turn, constitutes an indispensable
presupposition of Rahner's Grundaxiom. One can, therefore, reasonably claim that
Rahner's virtual endorsement of the minor premise of syllogism 1, insofar as it
482 Ibid., 132; ebd., 390.
483 Ibid., 132-3; ebd., 390-1.
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implies that God possesses an absolute subsistence and thus undermines Rahner's
case for the identity of o 0eoc with the Father, deviates from the main stream of
Rahner's thought.
b. Difficulties for Rahner's position. One who wished to dispute the thesis, "in
God the relation is real only through its identity with the real divine essence,"484
however, would face a daunting task for at least two reasons. First, the statement's
most controversial implication, viz. that God possesses an absolute subsistence,
appears to face no formidable difficulties. To the charge that an absolute subsistence
in God would constitute a fourth, divine person, for instance, one can respond that no
opposition of relation would distinguish such a subsistence from any of the three,
divine persons, and "in God, all things are one, where no opposition of relation
intervenes." 485 To the complaint that the divine essence lacks the note of
incommunicability and, therefore, lacks the proper ratio of subsistence, one can
respond with David Coffey that the divine essence does possess the note of
incommunicability in "that this essence cannot be communicated outside itself, that
there cannot be more than one God."486
Coffey's response to this criticism, incidentally, strikes us as superior to the
traditional strategy of distinguishing between: 1) an incomplete subsistence that
consists solely in individuality, independence and the capacity for action, which one
attributes to the divine essence; and 2) a complete subsistence that comprises these
perfections as well as incommunicability to multiple supposita, which one ascribes to
the divine persons.487 For, first, Coffey's solution in no way implicitly degrades the
divine essence by hinting that the persons possess some perfection, viz., complete
subsistence, which the divine essence lacks. Such a division of perfections between
persons and essence, if made explicit, would reduce both the persons and the essence
to imperfect parts of a greater whole which itself would lack the divine perfection of
simplicity.
Coffey's response strikes us as the superior one, second, because it does not
furtively suggest that the divine nature would grow in perfection, that it would attain
484 Trinity, 71; "Der dreifaltige Gott," MS ii, 363.
485 DH 1330.
486 Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine ofthe Triune God [Deus Trinitas] (Oxford: OUP, 1999), 71.
487 Cf. Billuart, Cursus Theologiae 2, 101b.
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"complete" subsistence, if only the three, eternal persons did not share this nature
among themselves. No small part of the divine glory,488 in fact, consists precisely in
the selfless sharing of the divine essence among the divine persons. In the words of
Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange:
The intimate life ofGod...is the supreme type of the life of charity. It consists of three totally
spiritual persons who live by the same truth, by one and the same act of the mind; three persons who
live by the same good, by one and the same act of love. Where do we find here the least trace of
egotism? The ego is no more than a subsistent relation in respect of the one loved; He appropriates
nothing more to Himself. The Father gives the whole of His nature to His Son, and the Father and the
Son communicate the same to the Holy Spirit....Apart from the mutual relations of opposition
between the persons, everything else is common and indivisible between them.489
Coffey's perspective on the nature of subsistence, then, enables one to see that the
self-sharing of the divine essence does not abrogate its absolute subsistence; it rather
adorns it with the perfection of generosity.
Indeed, Coffey's perspective also allows one to recognize the perfection of
personality in the divine essence as such. In Coffey's words, "as with subsistence...,
so with person: in God there are one absolute person and three relative persons."490
To the objection, moreover, that the divine essence lacks the capacity for action,
another prerogative of subsistents, on the grounds that it is an abstract id quo, and
actiones sunt suppositorum, one can answer with Aquinas:
Because in divinis the same thing is that by which and that which is, if any one of those things which
are attributed to God in the abstract is considered in itself, other things being set aside, it will be
something subsisting and, consequently, a person, since it is in an intellectual nature. As, therefore,
personal properties having been posited in God, we now say three persons; thus, personal properties
having been excluded by thought, the divine nature will remain in our consideration as subsisting and
as a person [S77; III, 3, 3 ad 1],
The divine simplicity will not allow one, therefore, to deprive the divine essence
of a signal perfection like subsistence as long as one does not insist on
incommunicability to distinct supposita as a sine qua non of subsistence. Even
opponents of the idea of an absolute subsistence, therefore, ordinarily admit its
488 By "divine glory" in this context, we mean not the divine attribute, which, of course, has no parts,
but the sum total of considerations that prove God to be intrinsically glorious and worthy of glory.
489 God: His Existence and His Nature: Vol. II (Bede Rose, tr.; St. Louis and London: Herder, 1946),
182-3.
490 Deus Trinitas, 72.
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material correctness and dispute it on purely terminological grounds. Hence
Christian Pesch, for instance, a prominent opponent of the doctrine whose
Praelectiones Dogmaticae Rahner studied as a seminarian,491 admits that "this
doctrine quoad rem is entirely true" 492 and objects merely to "a twofold
inconvenience quoad loquendi modum."493
Rahner, however, specifically professes to "disregard questions of
terminology"494 in his polemic against the doctrine of absolute subsistence in "Theos
in the New Testament." He seems, therefore, to criticize the view that God possesses
a subsistentia absoluta as not merely terminologically inapt, but substantially false.
By assuming this radical stance, Rahner, of course, lends weight to arguments that
the statement, "in God the relation is real only through its identity with the real
divine essence,"495 diverges from the general thrust of Rahner's thought. Rahner
also, however, places himself in the inconvenient position of having to reconcile the
absence of an absolute subsistence in God with God's absolute infinity and unity.
As the Rahner ofMysterium Salutis recognizes:
Father, Son, and Spirit are only 'relatively' distinct; that is, in their distinction they should not be
conceived as constituted by something which would mean a distinction previous to their mutual
relations and serving as their foundation. For such a distinction, previous to the relations as such,
would add something to the one divinity and thus do away with its absolute infinity and unity.496
In other words, the absolute infinity of the divine essence dictates that no entity in
any way distinct from it can add to its already infinite being. It "follows...from the
infinity of God," writes Heinrich Hurter, "that he is incapable of increment."497 The
absolute unity of the divine essence, likewise, excludes the possibility of composition
in God between a non-subsistent, divine substrate and a divine supposition that
491 In one of his later essays, Rahner reflects on the intellectual climate that prevailed "when I began
my theological studies forty years ago" and refers to "Christian Pesch, whose manual of theology I
followed" ("The Foundation of Belief Today," 77 xvi, 6, 7; "Glaubensbegriindung heute," SzTh xii,
21). Fie identifies this manual in a footnote as the Praelectiones Dogmaticae (ibid., 7, n. 10; ebd., 21,
Anm. 10).
492 Praelectiones Dogmaticae: Tomus II: Dc Deo Uno Secundum Naturam: De Deo Trino Secundum
Personas (Fribourg: Herder, 19063), §610, p. 325.
493 Ibid..
494 "jheos in the New Testament," 77 i, 133; "Theos im Neuen Testament," SmtWk iv, 391.
495 Trinity, 71; "Der dreifaltige Gott," MS ii, 363.
496 Ibid., 68-9; ebd., 361.
497 Theologia Specialis: Pars Prior: De Deo Uno ct Trino, Dc Deo Crcatore, et Dc Verba Incarnato
(Innsbruck: Libraria Academica Wagneriana, 1885s), §41, p. 27.
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bestows subsistence upon it: i.e. between divinity and God. As the Council of
Rheims decreed against Gilbert de la Porree: "We believe and confess that God is the
simple nature of divinity, and that it cannot be denied in any Catholic sense that God
is divinity, and divinity is God. Moreover, if it is said that God is...God by
divinity,.. .we believe.. .that He is God only by that divinity which he is himself."498
In "Theos in the New Testament," however, Rahner seems to suggest that the
divine essence, considered in abstraction from the divine persons, lacks the
perfection of subsistence, and that the divine essence and persons, therefore, relate to
each other as really distinct quo and quod. When Rahner, for instance, states that
"natural theology.. .ascends not just to a divinity but to a God"499 and takes this as
evidence that natural theology knows not only the divine essence but also the person
of the Father, his words seem unintelligible on any other premise.
One could, of course, surmise that Rahner identifies the God of natural theology
precisely with the Father, because only the Father subsists as absolutely unoriginate.
Rahner's statements concerning "the necessity of an apXh which is purely
avapxoc,"500 and "an Unoriginate not just as set over against an origination by
creation, but as opposed to every conceivable real and hypothetical origination,"501
moreover, seem to lend credit to such an interpretation. Such an argument would
seem to presuppose, however, that the divine essence in some way originates from
the person of the Father; a conception expressly condemned by the IV Lateran
Council in the words, "[the] divine nature...is neither generating, nor generated, nor
proceeding."502 Unless Rahner wishes to defy the authority of a general council, then,
he must mean that natural theology traces all things back to the Father not because he
alone is unoriginate, but because he alone subsists a se as unoriginate. Rahner seems
to claim, then, that the divine essence lacks subsistence of itself and derives it from
the Father as an id quo from an id quod.
498 PL 185, 617B-18A.
499 "jheos in the New Testament," T1 i, 133; "Theos im Neuen Testament," SmtWk iv, 390-1.
500 Ibid.; ebd., 391.
501 Ibid.; ebd..
502 DH 804.
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c. Rahner's response.
i. Mystici Corporis. To the charge that he thereby contradicts the principle that
God's infinite essence can receive no increment, Rahner seems to present no
particular reply. To the charge that his teaching in this particular and others
undermines the doctrine of divine simplicity, however, Rahner presents, in a
different context, a sweeping answer. He takes his point of departure from a single
line of Pius XII's encyclical, Mystici Corporis. In the section of this document that
concerns the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, Pius XII, affirms that "the conflict of
various opinions and the clash of ideas"503 in this area of theology can serve the
cause of truth and declares, "we do not censure those who enter upon diverse ways
and methods of reasoning to understand...and to clarify the mystery."504 He, then,
however, utters a stern warning to those engaged in controversy over the divine
indwelling:
Let this be a general and unshaken truth, if they do not wish to wander from sound doctrine and the
correct teaching of the Church: namely, that every kind of mystic union, by which the faithful in
Christ in any way pass beyond the order of created things and wrongly enter among the divine, so that
even a single attribute of the eternal Godhead can be predicated of these as their own, is to be entirely
rejected. And, besides, let them hold this with a firm mind as most certain, that all activities in these
matters are to be held as common to the Most Holy Trinity, quatenus they pertain to the same God as
the supreme efficient cause.505
We have intentionally left the word "quatenus" untranslated, because, as Heribert
Miihlen observes,506 it can bear both an explicative and a restrictive sense. If one
interpreted quatenus here in its explicative sense, Miihlen explains,507 one would
translate it with the word, "because," and understand Pius to identify the bestowal of
grace with an act common to the three, divine persons, because God bestows grace
through efficient causality alone. If one interpreted "quatenus" in its restrictive sense,
503 DB27 2290. Hunermann follows the post-Vatican II editions of Denzinger in omitting these words,
along with those in the quote that follows, from DH.
504 Ibid..
505 Ibid.; DH 3814. Hunermann includes this text in DH with the exception of its first word,
Verumtamen.
506 "Person und Appropriation: Zum Verstandnis des Axioms: In Deo omnia sunt unum, ubi non
obviat relationis oppositio," MThZ 16 (1965), 37-57at 38. Cf. Miihlen's Der Heilige Geist als Person:
In der Trinitat, bei der Inkarnation, und im Gnadenbund: Ich—Du—Wir (MBTh 26; Munster:
Aschendorff, 19885), §8.04, p. 243.
507 Ibid..
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however, one would translate it "to the extent that" and understand Pius' statement as
allowing for personally distinguished causality in grace to the extent that this
involves something other than efficient causality.
Each interpretation has its merits. In defense of the first, one could note that, if
Pius sincerely intended to allow for personally distinguished causality where
efficient causality does not come into play, "in tantum," or simply "tantum" would
express his meaning much more clearly than "quatenusT A partisan of the second
interpretation, however, could rejoin that, if Pius desired to condemn the idea of
personally distinguished causality in grace, "quia" or "quoniam," and not
"quatenuswould seem the appropriate choice.
Likewise, a defender of the first interpretation could plausibly claim that it
coheres better than the second with Pius' warning against encroachments upon divine
transcendence. If Pius intends "quatenus''' in its explicative sense, he means to say
that God influences human beings always through efficient causality and never
through formal causality of any sort. This idea of divine causality, in keeping with
Pius' desire to uphold divine transcendence, erects a high barrier against excessively
intimate understandings of God's union with the justified in grace. If Pius intends
"quatenus" in its restrictive sense, however, one could argue that he counteracts his
own admonition by allowing that God could exercise formal causality on human
beings in bestowing grace.
A partisan of the second interpretation could respond, nonetheless, that if Pius
does intend "quatenus''' in its explicative and not its restrictive sense, then he
effectively nullifies his earlier expressions of tolerance for differing opinions on the
subject of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. The debates that raged at the time of the
encyclical's composition, such a person might argue, focused precisely on whether
the divine persons always influence human beings through a strictly undivided,
efficient causality or whether they might also exert some more intimate, personally
distinguished causality in the order of grace. Pius XII's explicit refusal to end
controversy over these subjects thus makes it difficult to understand why he would
condemn the very hypotheses that gave rise to the then current debates.
The evidence for the two perspectives on the meaning of quatenus, therefore,
seems evenly balanced. Regardless of what Pius actually means, however, Rahner
adheres very much to the second perspective. In fact, he seems to regard Pius'
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statement as adequate warrant for qualifying radically the axiom, "the works of the
Trinity are inseparable."508 For, invoking no more than a single Denzinger reference
to the relevant text of Mystici Corporis, Rahner writes in Mysterium Salutis, "The
axiom is absolutely valid only where the 'supreme efficient cause' is concerned (DS
3814). Not-appropriated relations of a single person are possible when we have to do,
not with an efficient causality, but with a quasi-formal self-communication of
God."509
A sentence, or, more accurately, a clause within a sentence, in an encyclical of
Pius XII, in any event, hardly justifies Rahner's conclusion that these axioms are
"absolutely valid only where the 'supreme efficient cause' is concerned."510 Neither,
then, can Rahner's interpretation of Pius' words aid in the effort to reconcile
Rahner's denial that God possesses an absolute subsistence with the doctrine of
divine simplicity. As we noted earlier, Rahner does not defend himself against the
charge that his views on this subject conflict with the doctrine of divine infinity.
Two doctrines, then, those of divine simplicity and divine infinity, seem to falsify the
thesis that the divine essence lacks subsistence of itself and derives its subsistence
entirely from the divine persons.
Yet this thesis constitutes the sole argument in Rahner's corpus, so far as we are
aware, that directly contradicts our first syllogism's minor premise: "the divine
persons possess reality only through their identity with the divine substance." It
seems, then, that Rahner presents no sound argument against the first syllogism's
minor premise itself.
ii. Three alleged counterexamples.
a. Introduction. He does, however, offer three alleged counterexamples to the
principle of the absolute inseparability of the divine acts ad extra, a central
implication of the premise in question. If he established that exceptions really do
exist to the principle that "inseparabilia sunt opera Trinitatis,"5U it seems that
508 DH 491,535.
509 Trinity, 77; "Der dreifaltige Gott," MS ii, 367.
510 Ibid.; ebd..
511 DH 491,535.
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Rahner would possess at least the beginnings of a sound argument against the minor
premise of our first syllogism. If Rahner mounted such a case, then, it seems that it
would take the form of the following two arguments, the first in modus ponens and
the second in modus tollens:
1. If individual persons of the Trinity exert distinct influences in the world, then they
must possess some capacity for action insofar as they are distinct from the divine
substance;
2. Individual persons of the Trinity do exert distinct influences in the world;
therefore
3. Individual persons of the Trinity possess some capacity for action insofar as they
are distinct from the divine substance.
1. If the divine persons possess reality only through their identity with the divine
substance, then they possess no capacity for action insofar as they are distinct from
the divine substance; yet
2. The divine persons do possess some capacity for action insofar as they are distinct
from the divine substance; therefore
3. The divine persons do not possess reality only through their identity with the
divine substance.
Neither of these syllogisms is invalid; the first premise of each seems self-evident;
and the second premise of the second syllogism is identical to the conclusion of the
first. One can cast reasonable doubt on Rahner's conclusion, therefore, only by
challenging the second premise of his first syllogism: i.e. the claim that "individual
persons of the Trinity do exert distinct influences in the world." As evidence for this
claim, Rahner offers three alleged examples of a Trinitarian person's exercising such
an influence: viz., the Incarnation, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the souls of
the justified, and the beatific vision. We intend in the following, accordingly, to
show that in none of these cases can one conclude with certainty that the exercise of
such a distinct influence actually occurs.
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/3. The Incarnation. Of his first example, the Incarnation, Rahner writes:
Jesus is not simply God in general, but the Son. The second divine person, God's Logos, is man, and
only he is man. Hence there is at least one "mission," one presence in the world, one reality of
salvation history which is not merely appropriated to some divine person, but which is proper to
him....This one case shows up as false the statement that there is nothing in salvation history, in the
economy of salvation, which cannot equally be said of the triune God as a whole and of each person in
particular. On the other hand, the following statement too is false: that a doctrine of the Trinity...can
speak only of that which occurs within the Trinity itself.512
In one sense, all of this is true; Scripture unquestionably requires one to hold that
the Son alone, and neither the Father nor the Spirit, was born of the virgin Mary,
suffered under Pontius Pilate, etc.. It seems, however, that one can reconcile to a
certain extent the doctrine that the Logos alone constitutes the ontological subject
who acts in Christ's human nature with the doctrine of the absolute inseparability of
the divine acts ad extra.
The possibility of such a partial reconciliation appears from the following
argument, which we derive principally from Aquinas. One may legitimately
distinguish, Thomas reasons, between a human person and an individual, human
nature. In his words, "not every individual in the genus of substance, even in a
rational nature, has the rationem personae, but only that which exists per se: not,
however, that which exists in another, more perfect thing. Hence a hand of Socrates,
however much it is a kind of individual, yet it is not a person, because it does not
exist per se, but in a certain more perfect thing, sc. in its whole"(.S77z III, 2, 2 ad 3).
Because Scripture ascribes works performed through both of Christ's natures to the
hypostasis of the Logos, moreover, one can reasonably assume that this hypostasis
constitutes, in a certain sense at least, that "more perfect thing" in which Christ's
human nature exists.513 Expressions like "they... crucified the Lord of glory" (1 Cor
512 Trinity, 23; "Der dreifaltige Gott," MS ii, 329.
513 The relation of Christ's human nature to the hypostasis of the Logos differs from the relation of a
hand to a human being, of course, in that: a) the hand constitutes a part of a larger individual nature,
whereas Christ's human nature is an individual nature in its own right; and b) the hand, as long as it is
attached to a larger human body, never attains the perfection of subsistence, properly speaking,
whereas Christ's human nature, as united to the Logos does. Christ's human nature, that is to say,
becomes an integral, subsistent being, and not merely a part of a subsistent being, by virtue of its
relation to the Logos, as we shall see in the coming paragraphs.
The impossibility of a non-verbal revelation of the doctrine of the Trinity 155
2:8) and "you killed the Author of life" (Acts 3:15) seem scarcely intelligible on any
other premise.
The idea that Christ's humanity "exists in," and is therefore incomplete without,
the hypostasis of the Logos, however, generates something of an antinomy. For the
datum of the incompleteness of Christ's human nature without the Logos seems to
imply that this nature, of itself, lacks at least one natural characteristic of humanity,
viz. that of existing in oneself and not in some greater being. One cannot reasonably
claim, however, that the "man Christ Jesus" (1 Tim 2:5)514 who "had to become like
his brothers and sisters in every respect" (Heb 2:17) lacks any natural aspect of
humanity. The revealed data, then, seem to require one both to affirm and to deny
that Christ's human nature subsists in itself.
The idea that Christ's human nature is anhypostatic, or non-subsistent, in itself
and yet enhypostatic, or subsistent, in the person of the Logos, however, seems to
offer a solution to this dilemma. As John ofDamascus explains:
Although there is neither an anhypostatic nature nor an impersonal essence...there is no necessity for
natures united to each other in hypostasis to possess each a distinct hypostasis. For they can join in
one hypostasis [so as] neither to be anhypostatic nor to have each a distinguishing hypostasis, but to
have one and the same hypostasis. For the same hypostasis of the Logos, the hypostasis of both
natures, a most singular hypostasis, neither allows one of them to be anhypostatic, nor, surely, allows
them to have different hypostases from each other, nor at one time to have one and at another time
another, but is always of both undividedly and inseparably the hypostasis, being neither distributed
nor cloven, nor part of it allotted to one, part of it allotted to the other, but entirely of this and entirely
of that indivisibly and integrally.515
Divine revelation need not contradict itself, therefore, when it implies both that
Christ's human nature is incomplete without the Logos and that this nature possesses
that subsistence, which naturally accrues to every individual, human nature. The two
implications cohere if, and only if, the perfection of subsistence, a perfection that
accrues to ordinary, individual, human natures simply on account of their humanity,
accrues to Christ's human nature by virtue of the hypostatic union alone.
A critic, of course, might object that the failure of Christ's humanity to attain
subsistence purely of itself seems to betoken some deficiency on its part. It seems,
514 The NRSV rendering of av0pcoTroc XpiaTOC ' Ipaoue as "Christ Jesus, himself human" does not
convey the salient point of this passage for our investigation: viz. that Jesus Christ does not merely
possess a human nature, but is himself a subsistent human being.
515 Expositio Fidei 53 in Kotter 2, 128.
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nonetheless, that one could obviate this difficulty by postulating: 1) that God, by
some supernatural intervention, inhibits Christ's human nature from attaining
subsistence of itself; and 2) that Christ's human nature, in the absence of such
inhibition, would develop subsistence without the aid of a hypostatic union.
The critic, however, could reply that since such a divine "inhibition" would be
superfluous, one lacks sufficient grounds for postulating its occurrence. To this
argument, it seems, one could respond by conceding that such inhibition would be
superfluous if it were not necessary to the effecting of the hypostatic union. Christ's
individual, human nature could hardly come to share in the hypostasis of the Logos,
however, if it possessed its own, independent subsistence. Since Christ's human
nature, as fully and perfectly human, would come to subsist in itself, just as any other
particular, human nature, in the absence of some supernatural inhibition, then, such
an inhibition does seem necessary to the accomplishment of the hypostatic union.516
The Biblical account ofChrist's ontological constitution, albeit frequently indirect,
thus seems to dictate: a) that Christ's human nature does not subsist of itself, because
God supernaturally inhibits it from subsisting in its own right, and; b) that Christ's
human nature possesses that subsistence, which characterizes all individual, human
natures, only through its union with the divine Logos. It follows, then, that one can
determine at least one aspect of what union with the divine Logos adds to Christ's
individual, human nature by determining what the perfection of subsistence adds to
an individual nature as such. What differentiates a subsistent from a non-subsistent,
individual nature, as we have seen, is that the first exists per se while the second
exists in a greater whole. The rearward half of a worm, for example, does not subsist
as long as the worm remains intact. Once one slices the worm in half, however, the
rearward half begins to subsist.
Subsistence, then, seems to constitute nothing more than a terminus that
distinguishes an individual nature from other beings of the same sort. Now, it seems
that one could correctly, albeit analogically, describe the eternal Logos, insofar as he
516 Commenting on a decretal according to which "the person of God consumed the person ofman,"
Aquinas explains:
Consumption here does not import the destruction of anything that was before, but the impeding of
that which otherwise would have been. For if the human nature had not been assumed by a divine
person, the human nature would have had its proper personality; and to this extent the person is said to
have consumed a person, admittedly improperly, because the divine person by his union impeded, that
the human nature might not have a proper personality [STh III, 4, 2 ad 3].
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is diverse from the Father and the Floly Spirit, as just such a terminus on the level of
divine being. For, qua distinct, the Logos consists precisely in the relation of
opposition that distinguishes him from the other divine persons.
It is, admittedly, impossible to demonstrate a priori that God can cause an
individual human nature to terminate in a particular divine person in such a way as to
subsist in this person without either disrupting the simplicity of the divine essence or
so modifying the assumed nature as to render it inhuman. The inconceivability of
such a proof, however, derives not from the intrinsic absurdity of the idea that God
thus unites an individual human nature to the person of the Logos, but from the
entitatively, and not merely modally, supernatural character of the hypostatic union.
Christ's grace of union, that is to say, "exceeds the exigencies and powers of all
created and creatible natures"517 so that one cannot infer the possibility of God's
bestowing such a grace a maiori ad minorum from his prior creative activity:
whereas as one can, for instance, infer from God's creation of human bodies the
possibility of his reconstituting those bodies in the general resurrection. 518
Nevertheless, one can reasonably infer the possibility of the hypostatic union from its
actual, supernatural accomplishment. One can, therefore, rationally entertain the
possibility of God's supernaturally inhibiting a particular human nature from
terminating in a merely human subsistence and causing it, instead, to terminate in the
divine subsistence of the eternal Logos.
If one can reasonably suspect that God might have accomplished the hypostatic
union in this way, however, then, one can also reasonably suspect that "the coming
of the Son into his flesh...presupposes neither on his part nor on the part of the
Father nor the Holy Spirit any action or influence that pertains to him alone."519 For,
if the divine essence united Christ's particular, human nature to the Logos as to its
term, then the Logos, insofar as it differs from the Father and the Holy Spirit, could
constitute the ontological subject of that human nature without acting qua Logos at
all.520 Christ's individual, human nature, in this event, would relate to the eternal
517 Adolphe Tanquerey, Synopsis Theologiae Dogmaticae Specialis 1 (Paris: Desclee, 191314),
§863(b), p. 523.
518 We derive our argument for the impossibility of proving a priori that God can bestow entitatively
supernatural graces such as Christ's grace of union from Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange's The One God,
336.
519 Galtier, L 'Habitation, 40.
520 As Aquinas explains, "assumption imports two things, sc. an act of assuming and a term of the
assumption. The act of assuming...proceeds from the divine power that is common to the three
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Logos as a line relates to its utmost extremity. It would terminate in the Logos, that
is, and find in the Logos alone the completeness of a subsistent while suffering no
more action from the Logos qua Logos than a line suffers from its terminal point.
It seems at least minimally plausible, then, that the divine persons, while
exercising no personally distinguished causality whatsoever, could unite Christ's
human nature to the Logos as to its term in such a way that the Logos becomes the
ontological subject of that particular nature. As long as they maintained Christ's
particular, human nature in this relationship to the Logos, in such a case, the Logos
alone, as distinct from the Father and the Holy Spirit, would constitute the
ontological subject of that nature. One can, therefore, conceive of a not evidently
impossible scenario in which: a) one could truly affirm, for instance, that the Logos
died on the cross; b) one could not truly affirm this, however, of the Father or of the
Holy Spirit; and yet c) one could not truly deny that the divine persons always act
inseparably. Pace Rahner, then, one can hold to the absolute inseparability of the
divine acts ad extra without implicitly denying that the Son and the Son alone was
born of Mary, suffered, died, and rose again in a particular, human nature. One can
reasonably believe, although one cannot demonstrate, that the doctrines of the
Incarnation and the inseparability of all divine acts ad extra do not necessarily
conflict.
y. The indwelling of the Holy Spirit. Rahner attempts to falsify the inseparability
axiom, nonetheless, by offering a second, alleged counterexample: the indwelling of
the Holy Spirit. "The Spirit," Rahner writes, "dwells in us in a particular and proper
way."521 In a footnote, Rahner explains his position more precisely.
By this it is not of course meant that the Spirit alone makes his dwelling in us. Each person
communicates himself and dwells in us in a way proper to him. And because the indwelling ascribed
to the Holy Spirit in Scripture (as a power who sanctifies, consecrates, moves, etc.) corresponds
precisely to the personal particularity of the Spirit and of his going forth from the Father and the Son,
there is absolutely no objection to saying that in this way only the Spirit dwells in man.522
persons: but the term of assumption is a person... .Therefore, that which is of action in assumption, is
common to the three persons, but that which pertains to the rationem termini convenes precisely to
one person,...[and] not to another" (STh III 3, 4 corp.).
521 "Uncreated Grace," 77 i, 345; "Ungeschaffene Gnade," SzTh i, 374.
522 Ibid., n. 2; ebd., Anm. 2.
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Neither here nor anywhere else in his corpus does Rahner supply specific,
Biblical evidence for this thesis or refer his readers to the work of some exegete who
does. While this may seem presumptuous on Rahner's part, it is also understandable;
for little, if any, Biblical evidence exists for the view that the Holy Spirit performs
any work ad extra without the aid of, or even in a different way than, the other
Trinitarian persons.
The Holy Spirit, for instance, does unquestionably dwell in the justified (Num
27:18; Pr 1:23; Isa 44:3; Ezek 36:27; 37:14; 39:29; Joel 2:28-9; Hag 2:5; Zech 12:10;
John 14:17; Acts 2:17-18; Rom 8:9, 11, 23; 1 Cor 3:16; 6:19; 2 Cor 1:22; 5:5; Gal
4:6; Eph 1:13-14; 5:18; 1 Pet 4:14); but so do the Father (John 14:23; 2 Cor 6:16;
Eph 2:22; 1 John 4:12-13, 15-16) and the Son (John 6:56; 14:20, 23; 15:4; Rom 8:10;
2 Cor 13:5; Gal 2:20; 4:19; Eph 3:17; Col 1:27; Heb 3:6; 1 John 3:23-4; 2 John 2;
Rev 3:20).
Scripture, then, plainly refers to the divine indwelling most often as the work of
the Holy Spirit. It is not obvious, however, that Scripture regards the effects of the
Spirit's actions in this regard as differing in the slightest from the effects wrought by
the indwelling Father and Son. Rahner could, of course, point to other activities that
one might wish to attribute in some distinctive way to the Holy Spirit. The Bible, for
instance, states in the most emphatic terms that the Holy Spirit sanctifies the justified
(Rom 5:5; 1 Cor 6:11; Gal 5:22-3; Eph 2:22; 3:16; 5:9; 2 Thes 2:13; 1 Pet 1:2, 22).
Yet it ascribes this function also to the Father (Lev 20:8; Ezek 37:28; John 17:17;
Acts 15:9; 1 Thes 5:23; Jude 1, 24-5) and to the Son (Eph 5:26-7; 1 Thes 3:12-13;
Heb 2:11; 10:14; 13:12) and differentiates the modes by which the persons
accomplish the sanctification of believers only by, correctly, attributing the
atonement to Christ alone. Suffice it to say that one can easily manifest the absence
of differentiation between the divine persons' roles also in the raising of the dead and
the inspiration of Scripture: the only other functions commonly proposed as in some
sense "special" to the Holy Spirit.
Eduard Schweizer seems entirely justified, then, in concluding that, in the view of
Paul, "Insofar as Christ is regarded in his significance for the community, in His
powerful action upon it, he can be identified with the Trveupa."523 Prescinding from
the Incarnation, moreover, the data adduced above also seem to favor Ulrich
523 "TTVEUna, TTveuriariKoc" III. 1 .d in TDNT6, 422-4 at 423.
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Mauser's judgment that "descriptions of the act of God and the act of Christ are, in
Pauline theology, [so] often identical...that the conclusion is warranted that Paul
considers them one single act."524 To the extent, then, that Paul's teaching on the
salvation-historical functions of the divine persons mirrors that of Scripture as a
whole, then, one can reasonably conclude that Scripture as such, prescinding from
the Incarnation, seems to depict the acts in history of the Son as identical to those of
the Spirit and the acts of the Father as identical to the acts of Christ.
Now, the principle of the transitivity of identity525 dictates that if the acts of the
Holy Spirit are the same as those of the Son, prescinding from the Incarnation, and
that the acts of Christ, prescinding from the Incarnation, are the same as those of the
Father, then the acts of the Holy Spirit are the same as those of the Father. The
conclusions reached above, when combined, thus amount to an exegetical warrant for
the principle of the inseparability of all divine acts ad extra. The Bible, then, seems
to teach not only that the Holy Spirit exerts no distinct effects in creation, but that
none of the divine persons influences creation in his own, distinctive way. "There
are varieties of gifts," writes Paul, "but the same Spirit; and there are varieties of
services, but the same Lord; and there are varieties of activities, but it is the same
God who activates all of them in everyone" (1 Cor 12:4-6). The glorious diversity of
God's works notwithstanding, Scripture at least seems to suggest that they all
proceed from one simple and indivisible principle of divine causality.
5. The beatific vision. Nevertheless, Rahner offers a third and final alleged
counterexample to the principle of the inseparability of all divine acts ad extra: the
beatific vision. "If one supposes," Rahner writes:
that the immediate vision of God can only be based on a quasi-formal self-communication of God in
vision, and not (adequately) on a created quality in the spirit of man; and if one recalls the obvious
truth, that each of the divine persons is the object of immediate intuition in his personal propriety:
then that entitative (ontic) quasi-formal self-communication ofGod, which takes the place of a species
impressa as the ontological foundation ofman's possession ofGod in knowledge, must include a non¬
appropriated relationship of each of the three divine persons to man.526
524 "One God and Trinitarian Language in the Letters of Paul," HBT 20 (1998), 99-108 at 106.
525 This principle, which is also sometimes referred to as "the principle of comparative identity,"
consists in the truism: if a=b and b=c, then a=c. We shall argue in chapter 4 of this work that
Scripture itself confirms this principle's validity.
526 "Nature and Grace," TI iv, 175; "Natur und Gnade," SzTh iv, 221.
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In other words, Rahner argues:
1. If the divine persons do not communicate themselves to human beings quasi-
formally, immediately, and distinctly, then human beings cannot know them
immediately and distinctly; yet
2. Human beings do know the divine persons immediately and distinctly; therefore
3. The divine persons do communicate themselves quasi-formally, immediately, and
distinctly.
In defense of this argument, one can justly observe that Rahner does not
equivocate in his usage of terms, that his conclusion unquestionably follows from his
premises, and that the minor premise of his argument is warranted by 1 John 3:2.
The major premise of Rahner's argument, however, appears vulnerable to critique
insofar as it presupposes an at least relative identity between human being and
knowing. As we observed in the preceding chapter, Rahner's views on this subject
seem contestable at best and, therefore, inadequate for the purpose of warranting
further conclusions.
e. Conclusion. It seems, then, that none ofRahner's three alleged
counterexamples actually constitutes a certain exception to the axiom, "the works of
the Trinity are inseparable."527 One cannot plausibly argue, therefore, from the
falsehood of this axiom to the falsehood of the statement, "The divine persons
possess reality only through their identity with the divine substance:" a statement that,
if true, entails that the axiom in question admits of no exceptions. Rahner does not
succeed, consequently, in blunting the force of the evidence adduced above in favor
of the just quoted statement, which forms the minor premise in the first syllogism of
our argument that Rahner's understanding of the divine persons' ontological
constitution precludes the possibility of their revealing themselves in the manner he
envisions.
527 DH 491, 535.
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3. Rahner's case against the major premise ofsyllogism 4. The only other
significantly vulnerable aspect of this argument, as we have already shown, is its
fourth syllogism's major premise: "Those beings the existence ofwhich cannot be
inferred from non-verbal and non-conceptual aspects of that which is other than they
can be known to exist by other beings, if other beings can know that they exist at all,
only through verbal, or at least conceptual, forms of communication or through direct
intuition." A proponent of Rahner's theology would presumably protest that such a
statement gratuitously excludes the possibility that one might come to know of the
divine persons by becoming one with them. The formulator of this premise, such a
person would presumably argue, unwarrantably presupposes that a duality of subject
and object necessarily characterizes the divine-human encounter: precisely the sort of
duality that, in Rahner's view, divine self-communication always and everywhere
overcomes.
Such a rebuttal would suffice to refute the major premise of syllogism 4, it seems,
if it were certain that "being is knowing."528 For in that case, it would also seem
reasonably certain that any radical, ontic, divine self-communication would
necessarily manifest itself in its recipient's consciousness. In the preceding chapter,
however, we established that Rahner's understanding of created being as relatively
identical to created knowing is significantly problematic. The idea that divine self-
communication is onto-logical thus appears insufficiently warranted to ground a
compelling refutation of the major premise of syllogism 4.
4. Conclusion. Before concluding the dialogue with Rahner which we began in
section II. 1 over the possibility of a Trinitarian self-revelation through salvation
history and/or transcendental experience, we would like to emphasize that we intend
for the argument laid out in four syllogisms in the just-mentioned section to function
as a strictly immanent criticism of Rahner's views on the revelation of the Trinity.
As we have seen, Rahner admits that "in God the relation is real only through its
identity with the real divine essence,"529 and characterizes this as the unanimous
opinion of his communion's theologians. We have sought to prove, then, on the
basis of a thesis which Rahner endorses without qualification, that God cannot reveal
the doctrine of the Trinity to human beings in the way in which Rahner envisions and
528 HW, 35; Horer, SmtWk iv, 70.
529 Trinity, 71; "Der dreifaltige Gott," MS ii, 363.
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that Rahner's system, accordingly, to the extent that one can reasonably qualify
Rahner's thought as systematic, is, in this area at least, self-refuting.
III. Christ's Anointing with the Holy Spirit as a Test Case for the Grundaxiom
1. Introduction. Heretofore in this chapter, we have argued that God cannot
reveal the doctrine of the Trinity in the manner Rahner envisions. In our last
argument against Rahner's Grundaxiom, however, we intend to grant, solely for the
purpose of argument, this possibility. We intend to grant in hypothesi, that is,
Rahner's contention that the salvation-historical functions associated with the Father,
the Son, and the Holy Spirit in Scripture are proper, rather than merely appropriated,
to these persons. Acting in accord with this supposition, then, we hope to discern the
pattern of inner-Trinitarian relations manifested in a significant episode within the
economy of salvation: viz. Christ's anointing with the Holy Spirit.
The pattern of relations among the persons in this episode of salvation history, we
shall argue, diverges radically from the taxis among the Trinitarian persons as
ordinarily understood by orthodox, Western Trinitarians, including Rahner himself.
We intend to show, consequently, that if one consistently interprets the economy of
salvation in accord with Rahner's principles and attempts to infer the doctrine of the
Trinity purely therefrom, one will either: a) conclude to what Rahner correctly rejects
as an unorthodox doctrine of the Trinity: or b) so modify one's understanding of the
correspondence between economy and theology prescribed by the Grundaxiom as to
render it impotent to warrant inferences from a non-verbal, non-intuitive revelation
to conclusions about the immanent Trinity. This section, therefore, constitutes an
attempt to refute per reductionem ad absurdum Rahner's thesis that the economic
Trinity must correspond to the immanent Trinity in such a way as to warrant
inferences from God's economic self-manifestation to the doctrine of the Trinity.
2. Methodological considerations. In keeping with our desire to mount an
exclusively immanent critique ofRahner's position, it seems advisable, before
proceeding to this final argument of our critique itself, to consider whether Rahner
himself would find its presuppositions acceptable. We hope, therefore, to answer the
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following three questions before proceeding to our main argument: viz. 1) Does
Rahner consider Scripture a legitimate measure of the truth or falsehood of
theological statements? 2) Does Scripture constitute an appropriate norm for the
Grundaxiom of Rahner's theology of the Trinity? and 3. Does Christ's anointing with
the Holy Spirit constitute an appropriate matrix in which to test this axiom?
a. Does Rahner consider Scripture a legitimate measure of the truth or falsehood
of theological statements? The appropriate answer to this first question will vary in
accordance with the sense one attaches to the idea of a "legitimate measure" in
theological questions. Rahner emphatically denies, in any event, that Scripture
constitutes a "legitimate measure" for theological statements if by this one means
that Scripture consists in a body of divinely revealed and, therefore, normative
propositions. "It is apparent," Rahner writes, "that God does not effect revelation by
simply adding new 'propositions' 'from outside' to the basic substance of the
Christian faith....Revelation is not revelation of concepts, not the creation of new
fundamental axioms [Grundaxiome], introduced in a final and fixed form into man's
consciousness 'from outside' by some supra-historical transcendent cause."530 For
Rahner the idea that "the transcendent God inseminates [indoctriniere] fixed and
final propositions into the consciousness of the bearer of revelation"531 constitutes
matter for scorn, a thesis unworthy of serious consideration.
Rahner understands revelation in its most fundamental sense, rather, to consist in
"a transcendental determination of man, constituted by that which we call grace and
self-bestowal on God's part—in other words, his Pneuma." 532 This universal
revelation constitutes, in Rahner's view, not a mere preamble to faith, but the deepest
reality of the Christian faith. "The original one and unitive event of the definitive
eschatological revelation in Christianity," Rahner writes, "is the one event of God's
most authentic [eigentlichsten] self-communication, occurring everywhere in the
world and in history in the Holy Spirit offered to every human being."533 This "one
and unitive event," moreover, constitutes not an aspect, not even the most
fundamental aspect, but the whole of Christian revelation. In his words, "the totality
530 "Historicity of Theology," 77 ix, 67-8; "Geschichtlichkeit der Theologie," SzTh viii, 92-3.
531 Ibid., 68; ebd., 93.
532 "On the Current Relationship between Philosophy and Theology," TI xiii, 61-79 at 62; "Zum
heutigen Verhaltnis von Philosophic und Theologie," SzTh x, 70-88 at 71.
533 "History of Dogma," TI xviii, 17; "Dogmengeschicte," SzTh xiii, 27.
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of the Christian faith is in a real sense [eigentlich] already given in...transcendental
experience."534
In Rahner's view, then, the Christian revelation constitutes a transcendental,
universal, non-objective existential of concrete, human nature of which "the material
contents of historical revelation"535 are mere "verbalized objectifications."536 They
are, however, at least objectifications. Rahner treats such objectifications, moreover,
as indispensable means to the self-realization of God's transcendental revelation, his
"inner word of grace."537 In Rahner's words:
The external historical word expounds the inner one, brings it to the light of consciousness in the
categories of human understanding, compels man definitely to take a decision with regard to the inner
word, transposes the inner grace of man into the dimension of the community and renders it present
there, makes possible the insertion of grace into the external, historical field of human life.538
In order for God's self-bestowal to reach beyond the transcendental sphere,
beyond what Rahner calls the "fine point" (Fiinklein)539 of the soul, then, verbal-
historical objectifications, in Rahner's view, must explicitate it in the realm of the
concrete and palpable.
The statements of Scripture, moreover, occupy, according to Rahner, a privileged
place within the universe of objectifications, both religious and secular, in which
human beings encounter divine revelation. For in Scripture, Rahner believes,
Christians possess "the pure objectification of the divine, humanly incarnated
truth."540 Rahner is even willing to say that "being a work of God it is absolutely
[,schlechthin] inerrant."541
One would misunderstand this statement profoundly, of course, if one thought
that Rahner meant thereby to affirm a traditional doctrine of Scripture. As we have
534 "Methodology," 77 xi, 109; "Methode," SzTh ix, 122.
535 "The Act of Faith and the Content of Faith," 77 xxi, 158; "Glaubensakt und Glaubensinhalt," SzTh
xv, 158.
536 Ibid.; ebd..
537 "The Word and the Eucharist," 77 iv, 253-86 at 259; "Wort und Eucharistie," SzTh iv, 313-55 at
319.
538 Ibid.; ebd., 320.
539 Ibid., 258; ebd., 319.
540 "Scripture and Theology," 77 vi, 89-97 at 95; "Heilige Schrift und Theologie," SzTh vi, 111-120 at
118.
541 Ibid., 90; ebd., 112. Cf. Rahner's similar remarks in "Heilige Schrift," LThK2 in SmtWk xvii/i,
284-8 at 285 and his more tepid endorsement of Scriptural inerrancy in Foundations, 375-7
(Grundkurs, SmtWk xxvi, 355-6).
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seen, Rahner considers "the history of revelation...co-extensive with the spiritual
history of mankind as such"542 and insists that the idea of inspiration be understood
in such a way that it does not "einen miraculdsen Beigeschmack haben,"543 On
certain occasions, moreover, Rahner does not shrink from frankly disagreeing with
Scripture's literal sense.544 According to Rahner's own standards, then, a few
citations of Scripture can hardly suffice to undermine or to confirm a theological
thesis: especially one of architectonic and hermeneutical significance such as the
Grundaxiom of Rahner's theology of the Trinity.
Rahner does, nonetheless, identify Scripture repeatedly as "the norma non
normata for theology and for the Church."545 It seems, therefore, that he could not
reasonably object if one sought to evaluate elements of his thought in the light of
Scripture, which he himself describes as "the inexhaustible source of all Christian
theology, without which theology must become sterile"546 and "as it were, the soul of
all theology."547
b. Is Scripture an appropriate norm for the Grundaxiom ofRahner's theology of
the Trinity? One could argue, of course, that, although a Scripturally oriented,
542 "Observations on the Concept of Revelation" in Karl Rahner and Joseph Ratzinger, Revelation
and Tradition (W. J. O'Hara, trans.; London: Burns & Oates, 1966), 9-25 at 16; "Bemerkungen zum
Begriff der Offenbarung" in idem, Offenbarung und Uberlieferung (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder,
1965), 11-24 at 16. Unlike O'Hara, we italicize the words "spiritual history ofmankind as such,"
because Rahner himself italicizes the words, "geistigen Geschichte der Menschheit uberhaupt."
543 "Buch Gottes," SzTh xvi, 284. Joseph Donceel's translation, "without recourse to the miraculous"
("Book of God," TI xxii, 219), accurately conveys Rahner's overall position, but misses the sense of
this particular passage.
544 For instance, Rahner recognizes that Paul explicitly teaches monogenism in Acts 17:26 ("Mary's
Virginity," 77 xix, 218-31 at 225; "Jungfraulichkeit Marias," SzTh xiii, 361-77 at 370) and yet rejects
it. Likewise, Rahner refuses to consider Enoch and Elijah exceptions to the principle of the
universality of death, Gen 5:24 and 2 Kings 2:11 notwithstanding ("Christian Dying," TI xviii, 238;
"Das christliche Sterben," SzTh xiii, 283).
545 "Scripture and Theology," TI vi, 89-91, 95; "Heilige Schrift und Theologie," SzTh vi, 118. Cf.
also, e.g., "Dogmatic Statement," TI v, 62 ("Dogmatische Aussage," SzTh v, 77); "Schrift, Heilige
Schrift," SM iv in SmtWk xvii/ii, 1264-74 at 1266; and "Replik: Bemerkungen zu: Hans Kiing, 'Im
Interesse der Sache,"' StZ 187 (1971), 145-60 at 159.
546 "Schriftbeweis," KThW\ SmtWk 17/1, 800.
547 KTh\y™, 376. Here Rahner quotes the II Vatican Council's decree Optatam Totius 16 (Norman
Tanner, ed., Decrees ofthe Ecumenical Councils: Vol. II [London: Sheed & Ward, 1990], 955).
Rahner writes elsewhere, "It has often and rightly been said today that the study of scripture is the
'soul of theology' ("Reflections on the Contemporary Intellectual Formation of Future Priests," TI vi,
113-38 at 133; "Uber die theoretische Ausbildung kiinftiger Priester heute," SzTh vi, 139-67 at 161).
Again, remarking on "theology in general," Rahner writes, "its 'soul' must be scripture, as Vatican II
rightly says" ("Philosophising," TI ix, 50; "Philosophieren," SzTh viii, 75).
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immanent critique may be feasible for other aspects of Rahner's theology, two
factors render a simultaneously Scriptural and immanent critique of the Grundaxiom
inconceivable. First, Rahner states that he formulates his theology of the Trinity, at
least partially, in order to quell embarrassment over "the simple fact that in reality
the Scriptures do not explicitly present a doctrine of the 'immanent Trinity' (even St.
John's prologue is no such doctrine)."548 It might seem, therefore, that Rahner
constructs his Grundaxiom with a view to liberating the theology of the Trinity from
the Bible and setting it on a new foundation: in which case the idea of an immanent
critique of this axiom that takes its departure precisely from the Bible would be
unthinkable.
Second, one could argue that the critic who marshals Biblical texts in opposition
to Rahner's Grundaxiom commits a category mistake. For such a person might seem
to confuse the Grundaxiom, a principle that concerns how one ought to interpret
Scripture, with a first-order assertion concerning a state of affairs with which similar
assertions of Scripture may conflict. This sort of critique, of course, would manifest
only the confusion of the critic, not any inadequacies of Rahner's Grundaxiom.
Serious grounds do exist, therefore, for denying the possibility of a
simultaneously Scriptural and immanent critique of the Grundaxiom of Rahner's
theology of the Trinity. To the immanent and Scriptural critique of Rahner's
Grundaxiom attempted here, however, these considerations appear to pose no
significant obstacle.
i. The relevance of the Bible to the theology of the Trinity. For, first, Rahner's
belief that the Bible lacks an explicit doctrine of the immanent Trinity does not move
him to unleash the doctrine of the Trinity entirely from its Biblical moorings. He
seeks, instead, to anchor the doctrine of the immanent Trinity in the economy of
salvation whose structure, in his view, appears pre-eminently within the narrative of
Scripture.
Accordingly, Rahner states as one of the three principal goals of his theology of
the Trinity, whose centerpiece is the Grundaxiom, that it "do justice [unbefangener
wiirdigen] to the biblical statements concerning the economy of salvation and its
threefold structure, and to the explicit biblical statements concerning the Father, the
548 Trinity, 22; "Der dreifaltige Gott," MS ii, 328.
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Son, and the Spirit."549 Rahner, in fact, describes "salvation history, our experience
of it, [and] its biblical expression"550 as "the foundation and the inexhaustible, ever
richer starting point"551 of human knowledge of the economic Trinity.
Though Rahner rarely treats exegetical questions, moreover, he does attempt in at
least two instances to supply some exegetical basis for the idea that the Trinitarian
persons perform distinct functions in salvation history, one of the essential
presuppositions of the Grundaxiom. Specifically, he argues that "in Scripture the
interior Trinity and the Trinity of the economy of salvation are seen and spoken of in
themselves with such simultaneity \zu sehr in einem] that there would be no
justification in itself (logically) for taking the expressions literally and substantially
in the first case and only in an 'appropriated' way in the second."552 Likewise,
Rahner devotes more than a third of his long essay, "Theos in the New Testament"553
to proving that in the New Testament the term o 0eoc does not merely stand for often,
but properly signifies, the intra-Trinitarian Father: a thesis by which Rahner seeks to
bolster his case for ascribing distinctive influences in the economy of salvation to the
Trinitarian persons. One cannot reasonably claim, therefore, that Rahner considers
exegetical considerations simply irrelevant to arguments concerning the soundness
and legitimacy of the Grundaxiom.
ii. The hermeneutical character of the Grundaxiom. Neither, it seems, does the
hermeneutical character of the Grundaxiom render it insusceptible to every variety of
Scriptural critique. For, although the Grundaxiom undoubtedly lies on a different
plane than the statements of Scripture, it nonetheless admits of an indirect Scriptural
trial. Even if one cannot, in the nature of the case, discover a straightforward
correspondence or disparity between the statements of Scripture and the Grundaxiom,
that is to say, one can test Rahner's claim that the relations among the persons in the
history of salvation mirror those described in the classical, Western doctrine of the
immanent Trinity. To do so, one need merely to select a scene from Scripture in
which the three persons appear in a salvation-historical context, discern the pattern of
relations between them in this context, and measure this pattern against what one
549 Ibid.; ebd..
550 Ibid., 82; ebd., 371.
551 Ibid.; ebd..
552 "Uncreated Grace," 77 i, 346; "Ungeschaffene Gnade," SzTh i, 375.
553 77 i, 79-148; SmtWk iv, 346-403.
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knows of the immanent Trinity. If the two patterns correspond, this does not prove
Rahner's axiom true, but it does lend it a degree of credibility. If the two patterns
diverge, however, this indicates that Rahner's claims require qualification.
Someone might object, of course, that a disparity between the pattern of relations
within the economy and the pattern depicted in the Western doctrine of the Trinity
would not necessarily prove that oikonomia and theologia diverge. One could also
take such a disparity as evidence of flaws within the Western doctrine. Since Rahner
regards the doctrine of the Trinity taught by the IV Lateran Council and the Council
of Florence, however, as a donnee, a disparity between the economic Trinity and the
Western doctrine would, from his perspective at least, suffice to falsify the
Grundaxiom. Even if the critique undertaken in this section, therefore, cannot, in and
of itself, falsify the Grundaxiom in all of its possible acceptations, it can show that
the Grundaxiom entails consequences that Rahner finds unacceptable.
A genuinely immanent critique of Rahner's Grundaxiom, which both respects its
hermeneutical character and takes account of Scriptural data, consequently, is quite
conceivable. One could reasonably challenge the legitimacy of the sort of critique
attempted here, it seems, only on the grounds that it bases itself on inappropriate
Biblical texts.
c. Is Christ's anointing with the Holy Spirit an appropriate matrix within which to
test Rahner's Grundaxiom? The texts on which our critique is based, viz. Matt 3:16-
17; Mark 1:10-11; Luke 3:22; and John 1:32, moreover, do contain elements that
might seem objectionable to Rahner. For God appears in these verses "at work
palpably [handgreiflich] as an object (Sache) and not merely as a transcendent First
Cause (Ursache):"554 as one who "operates and functions as an individual existent
alongside of other existents.. .[as] a member as it were of the larger household of all
reality."555 The Scriptural accounts of Christ's anointing with the Holy Spirit, that is,
seem to portray precisely the God of whom Rahner says: "that God really does not
exist,"556 and "anyone in search of such a God is searching for a false God."557
Insofar as these texts contain a supernaturalistic narrative of the sort that Rahner
554 "Science as a 'Confession'?" TI iii, 385-400 at 389; "Wissenschaft als 'Konfession'?" SmtWk xv,
171-83 at 174.
555 Foundations, 63; Grundkurs, SmtWk xxvi, 66.
556 Ibid.; ebd..
557 Ibid.; ebd..
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specifically rejects as incredible, then, one could plausibly argue that Rahner would
reject their normativity for the theology of the Trinity.
It would seem difficult to reconcile such an attitude, however, with Rahner's
repeated and emphatic statements concerning Scripture's status as norma non
normata for Christian theology. Rahner explicitly grants, moreover, that the
expressions of Scripture "wholly retain their meaning even though the worldview on
the basis and with the help of which they were once made has become obsolete."558
By declaring the idea of divine intervention at particular points in space and time
incompatible with "our modern experience and interpretation of the world,"559
therefore, Rahner does not absolve himself from the responsibility to discern some
meaning in each text of Scripture and to respect it as "the pure objectification of the
divine, humanly incarnated truth."560
When Rahner states that he desires, in his theology of the Trinity, to "do justice
[;unbefangener wurdigen] to the biblical statements concerning the economy of
salvation and its threefold structure, and to the explicit biblical statements concerning
the Father, the Son, and the Spirit,"561 furthermore, he seems to commit himself to
taking seriously the Biblical narratives of Christ's anointing with the Holy Spirit.
The thrust of Rahner's thought on these questions, therefore, suggests that these
narratives, their supernaturalistic elements notwithstanding, ought to be treated as
authentic witnesses to God's Trinitarian self-manifestation. These elements,
consequently, do not pose an insurmountable obstacle to the simultaneously
Scriptural and immanent critique proposed here.
3. Reconciling the anointing accounts, when interpreted in accordance with the
Grundaxiom, with Rahner's filioquism. Those who: a) identify the Holy Spirit of the
anointing accounts with the third person of the eternal Trinity; b) believe that the
Holy Spirit eternally proceeds from the Father and the Son as from a single principle;
c) accept that the divine persons can effect distinct influences in the world; and d)
accept the Grundaxiom of Rahner's theology of the Trinity; can account for the
558 "Science as a 'Confession'? 77 iii, 396; "Wissenschaft als 'Konfession'?" SmtWk xv, 180.
559 Foundations, 259; Grundkurs, SmtWk xxvi, 248.
560 "Scripture and Theology," 7/ vi, 95; "Heilige Schrift und Theologie," SzTh vi, 118.
561 Trinity, 22; "Der dreifaltige Gott," MS ii, 328.
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events portrayed in Matt 3:16-17; Mark 1:10-11; Luke 3:22; and John 1:32 in at least
three ways. Such persons can:
1. claim that the Spirit is in some way involved in the begetting of the Son;
2. argue that the anointing accounts manifest a prior occurrence in which the
missions and the processions correspond; or
3. conclude that the Spirit constitutes the Father's intra-Trinitarian gift to the Son.
In the following, we shall examine each of these interpretations with an eye to
determining the extent to which they resolve the difficulty for Rahner's Grundaxiom
posed by the anointing of the Son with the Holy Spirit.
a. Involvement ofthe Spirit in the begetting of the Son. "In the Biblical accounts
ofChrist's anointing with the Holy Spirit," claims Thomas Weinandy:
a trinitarian pattern is clearly discernible. God's creative and prophetic word is always spoken in the
power of the Spirit, and, as such, in light of the New Testament revelation, we have a clue to the inner
life of the Trinity. The breath/spirit by which God speaks...his prophetic word throughout history is
the same breath/Spirit by which he eternally breaths forth his Word/Son. As the Father commissioned
Jesus by the power of his Spirit to recreate the world so, in the same Spirit, God eternally empowered
him to be his Word.562
In Weinandy's view, then, "the...roles played by the Father, the Son, and the
Holy Spirit [here and elsewhere] in the economy of salvation,... illustrate the...roles
they play within the immanent Trinity, namely that the Father begets the Son in or by
the Holy Spirit."563
This view, whose supporters, alongside Weinandy, include Leonardo Boff,564
Fran^ois-Xavier Durrwell, 565 Edward Yarnold,566 and Gerard Remy,567 seems to
562 The Father's Spirit ofSonship: Reconceiving the Trinity (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995), 27.
563 Ibid., 52.
564 Trinity and Society (Paul Burns, tr.; Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1988), 205, 207.
565 Holy Spirit ofGod: An Essay in Biblical Theology (Benedict Davies, trans.; London: Geoffrey
Chapman, 1986), esp. 141; L 'Esprit Saint de Dieu (Paris: Cerf, 19852), esp. 155. Cf. also Durrwell's
"Pour une christologie selon TEsprit Saint," NRT 114 (1992), 653-77, esp. 661-5.
566 "The Trinitarian Implications of Luke and Acts," HeyJ 7 (1966), 18-32, esp. 19.
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chaw gicalei slieiiglh hum Scripture's narratives of the viiginal conception than from
the accounts under consideration here. Each of these authors, however, appeals not
only to the virginal conception, but also to the anointing accounts, to bolster his view.
i. Patristic precedents. Although the contemporary advocates of this position
uniformly appeal to Rahner's Grundaxiom and thus present it in a distinctively
modern cast, moreover, this view does not lack precursors in the earliest ages of the
church. The idea of the Spirit as the breath that accompanies the Father's Word, for
instance, appears explicitly in the writings of Gregory of Nyssa,568 Maximus the
Confessor,569 and John of Damascus.570 One finds imagery patently suggestive of
this view in the comparison of the Father, Spirit, and Son to Adam, Eve, and Seth: an
analogy employed by Gregory of Nazianzus.571 At least one orthodox Father,
furthermore, explicitly endorses the idea that the Father begets the Son "in or by" the
Spirit. Marius Victorinus, the Christian rhetor memorialized in Augustine's
Confessions,512 states in his Adversus Arium 1.58 that "He is not mistaken.. .who
imagines that the Holy Spirit is the mother of Jesus, as well on high as here
below."573
The idea that Christ derives from the Holy Spirit in some sense, furthermore,
finds considerable support among various marginal groups of the first Christian
centuries. The author of the Gospel of the Hebrews, for instance, seems to ascribe
Christ's generation at least partially to the Holy Spirit. In a fragment preserved by
Jerome, this author writes, "It came to pass now, when the Lord had ascended from
the water, that the source of all holy Spirit both rested on him and said to him: my
Son, in all prophets I was awaiting you, as coming, and I have rested on you. For are
567 "Une theologie pascale de l'Esprit Saint: A propos d'un ouvrage recent," NRT 112 (1990), 731-41,
esp. 732-5.
568 Qfatio catechetica 2; Opera dogmatica minora, Pars IV (Ekkehard Muhlenberg, ed.; GNO 3-IV;
Leiden, New York, and Koln: Brill, 1996), 12.
569 Quaestiones et Dubia 34; PG 90, 814B. Ironically, in this context at least, Maximus uses the
logical precedence of the verbum cordis over speech to explain why one cannot reasonably
characterize Christ as the Son of the Holy Spirit.
570 Expositio fidei 7; Kotter 2, 16.
571 Or. 31.11; SC 250, 294-296; cf. John ofDamascus' employment of this analogy in Expositio Fidei
8; Kotter 2, 23. Both Gregory and John, of course, employ this analogy in order to illustrate how the
Holy Spirit can be consubstantial with the Father without either being begotten by him or being
identical with him.
572 8.2.3-5.10; CCL 27, 114-19.
573 CSEL 83:1, 157.
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my rest; you are my first-born son, who reigns everlastingly."574 The author of the
Epistula Jacobi acpocrypha (6.20),575 likewise, depicts Christ identifying himself as
"the son of the Holy Spirit;" and the author of the Odes ofSolomon, portrays Christ
as testifying that the Holy Spirit has "brought me forth [= begotten?] before the
Lord's face,"576 and that "according to the greatness of the Most High, so She [i.e.
the Holy Spirit] made me."577
ii. Difficulties. Motifs suggestive of the view that the Father begets the Son in or
by the Holy Spirit, sc. that Christ proceeds eternally a Patre Spirituque, then, appear
repeatedly, if not frequently, in the writings of the patristic period. The orthodox
Fathers, nonetheless, almost universally reject this proposal for a rather obvious
reason. The idea that Christ qua divine derives his being from the Holy Spirit seems
to reverse the taxis of the Trinitarian persons revealed in the baptismal formula. As
Basil explains, in the formula of orthodoxy he composed for Eustathius of Sebaste:
One must avoid those who confuse the order the Lord imparted to us, as men openly fighting against
piety, who place the Son ahead of the Father and set the Holy Spirit before the Son. For it is one's
duty to maintain unchanged and unharmed the order that we received from the same discourse of the
Lord, saying, "Go, teach all nations, baptizing in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the
Holy Spirit" [Matt 28:19].578
Such reasoning, of course, seems unpersuasive from Rahner's perspective,
because Rahner: a) expresses doubts as to whether the baptismal formula actually
derives from Jesus' lips;579 and b) considers the Scriptural writers' words mere
objectifications of transcendental experience as mediated by salvation history. A
second reason for rejecting a procession of Christ a Patre Spirituque, however,
seems quite weighty given Rahner's assumptions about the theology of the Trinity.
574 Apud Jerome, Commentarius in Esaiam; Liber IVat 11:1-3; CCL 73, 148.
575 Epistula Jacobi apocrypha: Die zweite Schrift aus Nag-Hammadi-Codex I (Dankwart Kirchner,
ed., trans., and comm.; TU 136; Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1989), 16.
576 36:3; The Odes ofSolomon (James H. Charlesworth, ed. and trans.; Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1973), 126-7.
577 36:5; ibid..
578 Basil, Ep. 125; Saint Basile: Lettres: Tome II (Yves Courtonne, ed. and tr.; CUFr; Paris: Les belles
lettres, 1961), 34.
579 "New Testament," 77 v, 35; "Neues Testament," SzTh v, 46.
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This second reason consists simply in the datum that the Roman Catholic Church,
in three councils which she considers ecumenical,580 has declared that the Holy Spirit
derives his personal being from both the Father and the Son so that the Holy Spirit's
very existence presupposes the personal constitution of the Son. In view of these
decrees, which Rahner considers irreformable and infallibly true, then, it seems that
Rahner cannot consistently affirm that the Son derives in any way from the Holy
Spirit. If the anointing accounts, accordingly, when interpreted in accord with
Rahner's Grundaxiom, imply an eternal origin of the Son from the Holy Spirit, then
this Grundaxiom seems ultimately to undermine what Rahner considers orthodox,
Western Trinitarianism.
b. The anointing accounts manifest a prior occurrence in which the missions and
the processions correspond. A number of theologians, however, believe that they
can transpose the pattern of interpersonal relations manifested in the Scriptural
narratives of Christ's anointing into the immanent Trinity, as the Grundaxiom
requires, without in any way contravening a thoroughgoing filioquism. Heribert
Miihlen, for instance, attempts to resolve the dilemma posed by the anointing
accounts by distinguishing sharply between Scripture's view of Christ's anointing
and what he calls a "dogmatic understanding"581 of this event.
i. Miihlen's dogmatic understanding of the anointing. "According to the
statements ofHoly Scripture," Miihlen writes:
the anointing of Jesus with the Holy Spirit occurs at his baptism....For a dogmatic understanding
[however],...one must say: Jesus possessed the fullness of the Spirit already from the first temporal
moment of his existence. He is himself (together with the Father) the eternal origin of the Holy Spirit.
He [thus] remains this origin of the Holy Spirit also as the Incarnate, so that also the Incarnate Son is
582
never without the Holy Spirit.
Miihlen follows Matthias Scheeben, then, in regarding the actual anointing of
Christ with the Holy Spirit, as opposed to its subsequent manifestation after Christ's
580 refer to the iy Lateran Council (DH 800), II Lyons (DB27 460), and the Council of Florence
(DH 1300, 1313).
581 Der Heilige Geist als Person, § 7.12, p. 206.
582 Ibid..
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baptism, as at least temporally concurrent with the uniting of Christ's human nature
with the Logos at the first moment of that nature's existence in Mary's womb. He
does not, however, follow Scheeben in equating the unction, with which Christ's
zygotic human nature was invisibly anointed, with "nothing less than the fullness of
the divinity of the Logos, which is substantially joined to the humanity and dwells in
it incarnate."583 Over against Scheeben, rather, Miihlen insists that:
in Scripture, in any event, a distinction is made between the man Jesus and the anointing that comes to
him. In a mode similar to that by which the anointing comes to Jesus, in the early apostolic
proclamation also the title "the Christ" [i.e. the anointed one] must be added to the proper name Jesus.
The twelve proclaim Jesus as the Christ (Acts 5:42), for God has made the self-same Jesus, whom the
Jews have crucified, Christ (xpiorov STto!r|OEU, Acts 2:36).584
The Incarnation and the anointing differ, Miihlen explains, in that: a) the first
effects the grace of union and the second the habitual grace of Christ; and b) the first
is identical with the salvation-historical mission of the Son, while the second
constitutes the mission ad extra of the Spirit. Now, Miihlen defines "mission,"
following Aquinas (STh la, 43, 2 ad 3), as an eternal procession with a temporal
effect, or terminus ad quem, of the procession.585
Since the missions are not really distinct from the intra-Trinitarian processions,
they naturally conform to these processions' order of origins: "the relation of the
sender to the sent," Muhlen writes, "includes the inner-Trinitarian order of
origins."586 By defining the anointing as the mission of the Holy Spirit, therefore,
Muhlen supplies himself with a sure argument for the conformity of the persons'
order of operations in the anointing with their order of procession in the immanent
Trinity. Quoting Aquinas (STh Ilia, 7, 13 corp.), he writes, "The mission of the
Son..., according to the order of nature, is prior to the mission of the Holy Spirit: as
in the order of nature the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son."587
ii. Grace and the person. Muhlen does not confine himself, however, to this
stipulative mode of argumentation. For he recognizes that, by identifying the
583 The Mysteries ofChristianity (Cyril Vollert, tr.; St. Louis and London: Herder, 1946), 332.
584 Der Heilige Geist als Person, § 6.17.1, p. 184.
585 Ibid., §7.10, p. 203.
586 Ibid., §7.06, p. 201.
587 Ibid., §7.13, p. 207.
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temporal effects of the missions of the Son and Spirit, respectively, with the grace of
union and habitual grace, he implies that Christ's grace of union logically precedes
his human nature's habitual grace. If one could prove that Christ's habitual grace
logically precedes the grace of union, therefore, one could falsify Miihlen's proof of
the correspondence of the economic with the immanent Trinity in the event of
Christ's anointing. If Mtihlen could establish that the grace of union logically
precedes the endowment of Christ's human nature with habitual grace, and could
accomplish this without appealing to the definition of the persons' missions as "the
free continuation of...[the intra-Trinitarian] processions ad extra,"58S however, he
could at least corroborate his interpretation of Christ's anointing with the Holy Spirit.
Such corroboration lies ready to hand, Mtihlen believes, in the following remark
of Thomas:
A third reason for this order [i.e. for the precedence of the hypostatic union over Christ's endowment
with habitual, sc. created, grace] can be derived from the end of grace. For it is ordained to acting
well. Actions, however, are of supposita and individuals. Hence action, and consequently the grace
that is ordained to it, presupposes an operating hypostasis. A hypostasis, however, is not presupposed
in the human nature before the union.. .Therefore, the grace of union logically [secundum intellectum]
precedes habitual grace [STh Ilia. 7, 13 corp.].589
Mtihlen glosses:
According to...St. Thomas, the nature is that by which the agent acts (principium quo), whereas by
the hypostasis or the suppositum the agent itself is meant (principium quod agit). The action is not
possible without the suppositum which 'has' or 'bears' the nature. Insofar, now, as grace is ordained
to acting well [bene agere], it presupposes the operating hypostasis. One can derive from this finding
the universal principle: GRACE PRESUPPOSES THE PERSON.500
This principle, accordingly, dictates that the grace of union which personalizes
Christ's human nature must enjoy at least a logical precedence over the endowment
of that nature with habitual grace. Mtihlen appears capable, therefore, of
corroborating his interpretation of the anointing by means other than a stipulative and
aprioristic appeal to the definition of "mission."
588 Ibid., §7.10, p. 203.
589 Muhlen cites the passage in ibid., § 7.22, pp. 212-13.
590 Ibid., p. 213. The capitalization is Mtihlen's.
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It seems, in fact, that, at least for those who identify Christ's anointing with the
Holy Spirit with the bestowal of habitual grace on his human nature, Miihlen
constructs quite a persuasive case for the correspondence of the immanent and the
economic Trinity even in the difficult case of the anointing. Mtihlen correlates the
processions and the missions of the divine persons, moreover, in a way that resonates
profoundly with certain patristic interpretations of Christ's anointing with the Holy
Spirit.
Hi. Patristic precedents. Athanasius, for instance, insists that Christ anoints his
own human nature and that the Logos, as the second person of the divine Trinity,
remains permanently the dispenser, and not the recipient, of the Holy Spirit. In
Athanasius' words:
If, as our Lord declares, the Holy Spirit is his, if it receives of him and is sent by him, it cannot be
conceived that the Word and Wisdom of God, as such, should receive an unction from that Spirit
which he himself bestows. It was his flesh which was thus anointed, and he himself thus anointed it,
and for this purpose, that the sanctification, which by this unction he conveyed to himself as man,
might come to all men by him.591
Cyril of Alexandria, likewise, speaks of how "the Son anointed his own
temple"592 and maintains that although "the Son is supplier of the Holy Spirit: for all
things of the Father's are naturally in his power593,...he humanly received the Spirit
among us...when he came down to us, not adding anything to himself insofar as he is
understood to be God and Logos, but in himself principally as the chief of human
nature introducing the Spirit of abounding joy."594
Like Miihlen, then, Athanasius and Cyril construe the anointing accounts in such
a way that they reflect the order of persons revealed in the baptismal formula. In at
least one respect, however, Miihlen's interpretation of Christ's anointing seems to
excel these explanations of Athanasius and Cyril in clarity and accuracy. Cyril and
591 Contra Arianos 3.47; PG 26, 109C.
592 In Joannis Evangelium. Liber XI at John 17:19; PG 74, 549D. In John 17:19, of course, Jesus
says: "And for their sakes I sanctify myself, so that they also may be sanctified in truth."
593 Cyril presumably alludes to Christ's words in John 16:15a: "All that the Father has is mine."
594 In Ps. 44[45]:8; PG 69, 1040A. Cyril frequently emphasizes that Christ receives the Holy Spirit as
man, not as God. Cf., e.g., In Lucam 3:22; PG 72:524D, In Isaiam. Liber III. Tomus V; PG 70, 849D
and 852A, De recte fide ad reginas, XIII; PG 76, 1220D-1221A, and Comm. In Joelem Prophetam
XXXV; PG 71, 377D and 380A.
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Athanasius, in the passages just quoted, tend to downplay, if not entirely to ignore,
the personal character of Christ's human nature insofar as it subsists in the eternal
Logos. Miihlen, by contrast, admits and even accentuates this aspect of the mystery
of Christ's anointing. "The Holy Spirit," Miihlen writes, "is sent to the already, in
the sense of logical priority, personalized human nature of Jesus! From this point of
view the sending of the Holy Spirit ad extra includes not a relation of person to
nature as the sending of the Son does, but a relation ofperson to person."595
iv. Difficulties. Miihlen correctly notes, that is to say, that, by virtue of the grace
of union, Christ's human nature subsists as personal in the Logos before, in the sense
of logical priority, the Holy Spirit endows it with habitual grace so that, when the
Holy Spirit does so endow this nature, he acts not merely on a created nature, but on
the person of the eternal Word. Now, although Miihlen himself underlines this
aspect of the mystery, it constitutes a considerable difficulty for Miihlen's attempt to
harmonize the anointing accounts with Rahner's ideas about the immanent and the
economic Trinity.
For, according to Rahner's filioquist theology of the immanent Trinity, the Holy
Spirit receives his personal being from the Father and the Son and is identical with
his receptive relation to these two persons: a relation customarily termed "passive
spiration." The Father and the Son, correspondingly are identical, albeit each in his
own way, with the relation of active spiration: a relation that does not constitute a
person of itself, because it involves no opposition of relation between the two already,
in the logical sense, existing spiratores. The Father and the Son, as relative to the
Spirit, therefore, are pure activity; and the Holy Spirit, as relative to them, is pure
reception.
Now, the idea that the anointing of Christ with the Holy Spirit consists in the
bestowal of habitual grace on the Logos suggests that, in the economy of salvation,
the Son and the Spirit invert their relations; the eternal giver receives, and the eternal
receiver gives. Miihlen ameliorates this problem, of course, by holding that the Son
anoints himself, but he does not eliminate it. For even in the event that the Son
anointed himself with the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit would still influence not an
impersonal nature, but, as Miihlen rightly insists, the very person of the eternal Word.
595 Miihlen, Der Heilige Geist, §7.13, p. 207.
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Muhlen's best efforts notwithstanding, then, the pattern of mutual relations the divine
persons manifest in the incident of the anointing still diverges from the pattern of the
immanent Trinity. Muhlen ultimately does not succeed in his attempt to reconcile
the Scriptural narratives of Christ's anointing, when interpreted in accordance with
the Grundaxiom, to Rahner's presuppositions concerning the theology of the Trinity.
c. The Spirit as intra-Trinitarian gift of the Father to the Son. The hypotheses
considered thus far, however, by no means exhaust the range of options available to
theologians desiring to resolve the dilemmas generated by the anointing accounts for
Rahner's theology of the Trinity. Francois Bourassa596 and Guy Vandevelde-
Dailliere,597 for instance, attempt to harmonize the accounts of Christ's anointing,
considered as a revelation of the intra-Trinitarian relations, with a filioquist
understanding of the immanent Trinity by conceiving of the Holy Spirit as the intra-
Trinitarian gift of the Father to the Son. Bourassa writes, accordingly:
"It is without measure that God gives the Spirit; the Father loves the Son and has given all to him"
(John 3:34-5). The principal meaning of this revelation is that of the baptismal theophany: the
constitution of Christ, of the man Jesus, in the dignity of the Son of God, object of the Father's
pleasure in the Spirit of sanctification (Rom 1:4). But theology is justly unanimous: the mission is the
procession of the person, the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity, the Incarnation in a global
sense, sc. the whole existence of the Son in the flesh, is the revelation of the "only begotten in the
bosom of the Father" (John 1:18). Thus the Spirit is, above all, in the interior of the Trinity, "the gift
of God," sc. the Gift of the Father to the Son "before the creation of the world," in whom the Father
has given him all, giving himself to him, by engendering him as his only Son, in the effusion of his
Love for him.598
According to Franfois Bourassa, then, "The Son himself is constituted eternally
Son of God 'in the bosom of the Father' in that the Father communicates to him his
plenitude in the gift of the Spirit;"599 and one can infer this from the anointing of
Christ with the Holy Spirit.
596 Cf. esp. Bourassa's essay "Le Don de Dieu," in his Questions de Theologie Trinitaire (Rome:
Universita Gregoriana Editrice, 1970), 191-238.
597 Cf. Vandevelde-Dailliere's "L'«inversion trinitaire» chez FLU. von Balthasar," NRT 120 (1998),
370-83.
598 "Le Don de Dieu," 212.
599 Ibid..
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i. The identity of active spiration and active filiation. This view appears, of
course, to conflict with filioquism, as Bourassa frankly admits. "If the Spirit is the
gift of the Father to the Son in generation," he writes, "it seems, then, that generation
takes place through the Spirit or in virtue of the Spirit. The Spirit is, therefore, the
principle of the generation of the Son, whereas, according to the most firm facts of
dogma, the generation of the Son is the principle of the procession of the Spirit."600
Bourassa, nevertheless, considers this conflict merely apparent. For, the principle,
"In God all things are one, where no opposition of relation intervenes,"601 implies
that the Father and the Son spirate the Spirit tamquam ab uno principio; and the unity
of the Father and Son as the single principle of the Spirit's procession, furthermore,
implies that the Father's eternal generation of the Son is not really distinct from his
eternal spiration of the Holy Spirit. Active filiation, in other words, is not really
distinct from active spiration.
The identity of both the Son and the Father with active spiration, moreover,
implies that the person-constituting relation of the Son, viz. passive filiation, which
the Father bestows on him by generating him, is also identical with active spiration.
Bourassa concludes, therefore, that "as in generating the Son..., the Father
communicates to him all of his substance,..., he communicates to him also to be with
him source jaillissante de 1'Esprit."602 This last datum entails, in Bourassa's view,
the central point of his argument: that just as the Holy Spirit appears as the gift of the
Father to Jesus in the economy of salvation, so for all eternity the Father pours out
the Holy Spirit on his immanent Word.
ii. The Holy Spirit as medius nexus of the Father and the Son. Bourassa
recognizes, of course, that some might find his inference less than obvious; to bestow
on the Son the capacity to share in active spiration is not at all to bestow on him
passive spiration, the person-constituting relation of the Holy Spirit, which active
spiration logically precedes. "Here," writes Bourassa, "the objection arises anew.
Must one not then suppose the Spirit to be anterior to the Son, or.. .possessed
anteriorly by the Father, or proceeding anteriorly from him in order to be given to the
600 Ibid., 229.
601 DH 1330
602 "Le Don de Dieu," 229.
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Son.. ,?"603 In answer to this criticism, Bourassa refers the reader to Aquinas' STh la.
37, 1 ad 3 in which Thomas writes:
The Holy Spirit is said to be the nexus of the Father and Son inasmuch as he is Love, because since
the Father loves himself and the Son in a single dilection and e converso, the habit of the Father to the
Son and e converso as lover to beloved is brought about [importatur] in the Holy Spirit as love. Yet
from this very thing, that the Father and the Son love each other mutually, it must be that the mutual
Love, who is the Holy Spirit, proceeds from both. According to origin, therefore, the Holy Spirit is
not a medium, but the third person in the Trinity; according to the aforementioned habit [however], he
is the medius nexus of the two, proceeding from both.
Now, Bourassa argues, one can draw a merely rational distinction between the
Father's active spiration and his notional love for the Son, just as one can distinguish
rationally between active filiation and active spiration. Yet, in the pristine simplicity
of the Godhead, the Father's notional act of loving the Son and his notional act of
generating the Son are really identical. Bourassa holds, accordingly, that if one
prescinds from the question of origin and attends rather to the "order of
circumincession," then one can reasonably say that the Father generates the Son
through the Holy Spirit just as one can say that the Father generates the Son through
his love for him.
Bourassa explicitly grants, then, that, according to the order of origin, the Father
does not generate the Son by bestowing upon him the Holy Spirit. "According to the
order of origin," Bourassa writes, "the Holy Spirit is the third person of the Trinity,
but according to the circum-incession of the Father and the Son, the Spirit, being
their communion of love (koinonia), is intermediary between the two."604 With the
aid of his distinction between the order of origin and the order of circumincession,
therefore, Bourassa might seem finally to succeed in transposing the divine persons'
relations in the anointing into the immanent Trinity, as Rahner's Grundaxiom
requires, without compromising the filioquist understanding of the immanent Trinity
which he and Rahner share.
Hi. Difficulties. Two difficulties, however, call Bourassa's solution into question.
First, it might seem that Rahner denies the possibility of mutual love among the
603 Ibid., 230.
604 Ibid., 231.
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persons of the Trinity. For, in his tractate on the Trinity in Mysterium Salutis,
Rahner explicitly states that "there is not actually a mutual (presupposing two acts)
love between the Father and the Son,"605 and, indeed, that "within the Trinity there is
no reciprocal 'Thou.'"606 Second, one could plausibly argue that the Holy Spirit as
such does not actually constitute a medius nexus between the Father and the Son.
For, as Aquinas explains in STh la, 37, 2 corp., the Father loves the Son "by" the
Holy Spirit not because the Holy Spirit constitutes the means whereby the Father
performs this notional act, but because the Father's notional act of loving the Son
effects the Holy Spirit's existence as a distinct, divine person. In Thomas' words:
Since things are commonly denominated from their forms, thus a white thing from whiteness and a
human being from humanity, everything from which something is named has to this extent the habit
of a form....Now, instances exist in which something is named through that which proceeds from
it,...[i.e.] even from the term of its action, which is the effect, when this effect is included in the
understanding of the action. We say, for instance,.. .that a tree flowers by its flowers, although the
flowers are not the form of the tree, but a certain effect proceeding from it... [Now] truly, as it is taken
notionally, to love is nothing other than to spirate love....As, therefore, a tree is said to flower by its
flowers, so...the Father and the Son are said to love each other and us by the Holy Spirit or Love
proceeding.
Aquinas, then, thinks that one can truthfully assert that the Father loves the Son
by the Holy Spirit only to the extent that the Holy Spirit constitutes the effect of his
notional love, i.e. active spiration. Now, since active spiration: a) is the means by
which the Father loves the Son; and b) is also the act in which the Father and Son
unite so as to form a single principle of the Holy Spirit; it might seem c) that active
spiration constitutes the bond that draws the Father and Son together, and not the
Holy Spirit, which appears rather as the effect of active spiration's unitive power.
iv. Responses. The adequacy of Bourassa's interpretation of the anointing
accounts, at least for the purpose of obviating the difficulties they pose for Rahner's
theology of the Trinity, thus appears somewhat doubtful. The first difficulty,
however, and, to a lesser degree, the second, appear quite surmountable. In order to
refute the first charge, specifically, one need only note that Rahner explicitly affirms
605 Trinity^ 106; "Der dreifaltige Gott," MS ii, 387. We modify Donceel's translation here
significantly. Rahner's German reads: "es nicht eigentlich eine gegenseitige (zwei Akte
voraussetzende) Liebe zwischen Vater und Sohn."
606 Ibid., 76, n. 30; ebd., 366, Anm. 29.
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that the Holy Spirit does constitute the mutual love of the Father and the Son. In
summarizing magisterial teaching on the subject, he affirms, without qualification,
that the Holy Spirit's "'procession' is only cautiously indicated, although as such it is
defined (bestimmt) as the procession of the mutual love of Father and Son."607
The two passages cited above as evidence for Rahner's opposition to this tenet,
moreover, prove nothing of the sort. For, in the first passage, in which Rahner writes,
"there is not actually a mutual (presupposing two acts) love between the Father and
the Son," Rahner expressly excludes only a mutual love that would require of the
Father and Son individually distinguished notional acts of love as opposed to their
common act of notional love, active spiration. Likewise, when he denies the
existence of a "mutual Thou" in the Trinity, Rahner seems to deny only the existence
of distinct subjectivities who know each other through their own exclusive
consciousnesses. For Rahner affirms in the same context that each Trinitarian person
constitutes a "distinct subject in a rational nature" 608 and approvingly quotes
Lonergan in the same work to the effect that "the three subjects are aware of each
other through one consciousness which is possessed in a different way by the three of
them."609 It seems, then, that instead of peremptorily excluding the doctrine that
identifies the Holy Spirit as the Father and Son's mutual love, Rahner explicitly
endorses both the doctrine and its ontological presuppositions.
The second difficulty, viz. the charge that active spiration, instead of the Holy
Spirit, constitutes the medius nexus of the first two Trinitarian persons, seems
somewhat more imposing. One can plausibly argue, however, that this objection
rests on a false dichotomy. Even if, that is to say, active spiration serves as a unitive
bond in a much stricter sense than the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit may still qualify as
the medius nexus of the Father and Son in some less rigorous acceptation of the term.
For, first, as Aquinas suggests, the Father and the Son do love each other "by" the
Holy Spirit in the same sense as a tree flowers "by" its flowers so that one can
reasonably characterize the Holy Spirit as the forma by which the Father and Son
love each other, albeit in a highly attenuated sense. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, the Holy Spirit does constitute the raison d'etre of active spiration so
that, in the order of intentions if not in the order of execution, it takes precedence
over active spiration as the more ultimate cause of the Father and Son's unity in their
607 Ibid., 67; ebd., 360.
608 Ibid., 75, n. 29; ebd., 366, Anm. 28.
609 Ibid., 107, n. 29; ebd., 387, Anm. 29.
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act of notional love. It seems, therefore, that one can do justice to the concerns of the
second objection without categorically rejecting Bourassa's identification of the Holy
Spirit with the medius nexus of Father and Son. Apparently, then, Bourassa succeeds
in proving that the economic Trinity corresponds to the immanent Trinity, as
understood in orthodox Latin Trinitarianism, even in the difficult case of Christ's
anointing with the Holy Spirit.
v. The order of circumincession and human knowledge of the Trinity. Bourassa
succeeds in interpreting the anointing in such a way that it undermines neither the
Grundaxiom nor Latin Trinitarianism, however, only at the expense of de-
functionalizing the Grundaxiom. If the economy of salvation, that is to say,
presupposes not one, but two intra-Trinitarian taxeis, then the Grundaxiom does not
suffice to warrant an inference from the economy of salvation, unaccompanied by a
verbal revelation, to any particular doctrine of the immanent Trinity. For if two
intra-Trinitarian taxeis co-existed, then human beings, possessing neither a verbal
revelation nor the beatific vision, would be incapable of determining which taxis a
particular economic manifestation of the immanent Trinity revealed.
If two intra-Trinitarian taxeis co-existed, moreover, the divine persons' roles in
the economy of salvation would convey no sure information about the Trinity's
eternal constitution. For if the economic Trinity corresponded to the immanent
Trinity even if the divine persons' operations occurred in the order, Father—Spirit—
Son, or, perhaps, Spirit-Son-Father,610 then the Grundaxiom would allow for a
sending of the Son by the Holy Spirit or, for that matter, an incarnation of the Holy
Spirit or even the Father. Now, given Rahner's presupposition that verbal revelation
simply does not occur, the very idea that such things could happen would, in
Rahner's words:
wreak havoc with theology. There would no longer be any connection between "mission" and the
intra-Trinitarian life. Our sonship in grace would in fact have absolutely nothing to do with the Son's
sonship, since it might equally well be brought about without any modification by another incarnate
610 Such would be the order if one considered the persons: a) insofar as they are constituted by the
processions; and b) according to the order of intention so that the Holy Spirit, as the xaAoc of the
processions, would appear first; the Son, as the mediate term of the processions, would appear second;
and the Father, as the ultimate origin of the processions, would appear last.
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person. That which God is for us would tell us absolutely nothing about that which he is in himself,
as triune.611
Yet, if an order of circumincession exists in the immanent Trinity alongside the
order of origin, and a correspondence of the persons' order of operations to either
order fulfills the requirements of the Grundaxiom, then an incarnation of the Holy
Spirit, a pouring out of the Son at Pentecost, etc. not only could occur, but could
occur without contravening the Grundaxiom. Bourassa's harmonization of Rahner's
Grundaxiom and the Biblical anointing accounts thus renders the axiom ineffectual
for the purpose of deriving the doctrine of the Trinity from an economy of salvation
unilluminated by verbal revelation.
d. Conclusion. The alternatives to Bourassa's harmonization which we have
surveyed, however, do not succeed in reconciling Christ's anointing, when
interpreted in accordance with the Grundaxiom, with Latin Trinitarianism. If, then,
a) one prescinds from the possibility that another, more palatable solution exists to
the difficulties the anointing poses for Rahner's views on the Trinity; and b) one
regards the central tenets of Latin Trinitarianism as donnees as, in the context of an
immanent critique of Rahner's position, one ought; then, it seems, one cannot but
conclude that the Grundaxiom is either useless, at least for the purposes to which
Rahner puts it, or false.
611 Ibid., 30; ebd.,333.
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IV. Outlook
In this, the final chapter of the first part of our work, we have argued: 1) that
certain of Rahner's presuppositions, and especially his belief that "in God the
relation is real only through its identity with the real divine essence,"612 imply that
God cannot reveal the doctrine of the Trinity to human beings in the manner that
Rahner proposes; and 2) that one can reconcile the Biblical accounts of Christ's
anointing with the Floly Spirit, when interpreted in accordance with the Grundaxiom,
with Latin Trinitarianism only if one posits the existence of multiple taxeis in the
inner-Trinitarian life and thereby strips the Grundaxiom of its power to warrant
inferences from the divine acts in the economy of salvation to the doctrine of the
immanent Trinity. These arguments, along with those advanced in the first two
chapters, suffice, in our view, to establish the improbability of Rahner's views as to
how God reveals the doctrine of the Trinity.
It remains, therefore, for us to present some more plausible alternative
understanding of the means whereby God endows at least certain human beings with
the prerequisites for warranted belief in the doctrine of the Trinity. In chapter 4, our
final chapter, accordingly, we shall seek to establish that the Bible at least implicitly
teaches the principal tenets of orthodox, Latin Trinitarianism by an argument whose
principal constituents include: 1) a discussion of the meaning of pop(j)f] in the context
of Phil 2:6-7 and; 2) a less directly exegetical derivation of the axiom, "In God all
things are one, where no opposition of relation intervenes." We do not, we should
like to emphasize, intend to conform our arguments to an unattainable, quasi-
mathematical standard of precision and certainty. It behooves us, however, after
discrediting Rahner's paradigm for the revelation of the Trinity, to supply some
reasonable alternative.
612 Ibid., 71; ebd., 363.
Part Two
An Evangelical Alternative
Chapter 4: Scriptural Foundations for the Doctrine of the Trinity
I. Introduction
"The Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and each individual of these is God,
and at the same time all are one God....The Father is neither the Son nor the Holy
Spirit; the Son is neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit; [and] the Holy Spirit is
neither the Father nor the Son."613 Thus Augustine summarizes the doctrine of the
Trinity in its most elementary form. In the following, we shall presuppose: a) the
plenary, verbal inspiration, the sufficiency, the perspicuity, and the inerrancy of all
66 books of the Protestant, Biblical canon and only those books; and b) seek to
warrant, on the basis of these books' teaching alone, the doctrines of Christ's deity
and of the Holy Spirit's distinct personality. Christ's distinct personality and the
Spirit's deity, we shall assume, are sufficiently manifest in Scripture as to require no
special justification. Presupposing these doctrines, then, we shall establish, again on
purely Biblical grounds, the veracity of: c) the axiom, "In God all things are one,
where no opposition of relation intervenes." Finally, we shall reflect briefly on the
implications of this chapter's findings and, in the epilogue, on the import of our
dissertation as a whole.
613 Augustine, Doctr. Chr. 1.5.5; CCL 32, 9.
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II. The Deity of Jesus Christ
1. Introduction. Numerous texts of the New Testament at least seem to suggest
that Jesus Christ is very God. In the Gospel of John alone, for instance, one reads:
"the Word was with God, and the Word was God" (1:1); "that all may honor the Son
just as they honor the Father" (5:23); "before Abraham was, I am" (8:58); "the Father
and I are one" (10:30); "whoever sees me sees him who sent me" (12:45); "you call
me Teacher and Lord—and you are right, for that is what I am (13:13); "whoever has
seen me has seen the Father (14:9); "all that the Father has is mine" (16:15); "my
Lord and my God" (20:28), etc.. In the same Gospel, however, one finds numerous
statements by and about Christ that seemingly call his deity into question. One reads,
for example, "he was greatly disturbed in spirit" (11:33); "Jesus began to weep"
(11:35); "my soul is troubled" (12:27); "he...began to wash the disciples' feet"
(13:5); "the Father is greater than I" (14:28); "they persecuted me" (15:20); "why do
you strike me?" (18:24); "Pilate took Jesus and had him flogged" (19:1); "the
soldiers wove a crown of thorns and put it on his head" (19:2); "they crucified him"
(19:18); "I am thirsty" (19:28); "he bowed his head and gave up his spirit" (19:30);
"I am ascending to...my God and your God" (20:17), etc..
Faced with such a seeming conflict, one could easily conclude that Scripture
contradicts itself in its account of the nature(s) of Christ. Augustine, nonetheless,
with the whole orthodox tradition, discerns in Scripture a criterion by which one can
distinguish the referents of the seemingly conflicting texts about Christ and thus
affirm them all in their literal sense without falling into self-contradiction. The "rule
for resolving these questions throughout all of the holy Scriptures," writes Augustine,
"is brought forth to us from a chapter of an Epistle of the Apostle Paul, where that
distinction is more manifestly commended: 'who, when he was in the form of God,
judged it no robbery to be equal to God, but emptied his very self [semetipsum]
taking the form of a servant, being made in the similitude of men and found in habit
as a man'" (Phil 2:6-7).614
614 De Trinitate 1.7.14; CCL 50, 45-6.
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2. The significance of Philippians 2:6-7. In this passage, Augustine finds, as it
were, a "canonical rule"615 for interpreting texts that ascribe seemingly incompatible
properties to Christ. One must refer any property inapplicable to Christ's deity to his
humanity, i.e. "the form of a servant," and any property inapplicable to Christ's
humanity to his deity, i.e. "the form of God." By thus discriminating between those
texts that describe the "form of God" from those texts that describe the "form of a
servant," Augustine harmonizes statements that otherwise might seem irreconcilably
opposed. "According to the form of God," the bishop of Hippo writes:
all things were made through him [John 1:3]. According to the form of a servant, he himself was
made of a woman, made under the law [Gal 4:4], According to the form of God, he himself and the
Father are one [John 10:30]; according to the form of a servant, he did not come to do his own will,
but the will of him who sent him [John 6:38]. According to the form of God, as the Father has life in
his very self, so has he also given to the Son to have life in his very self [John 5:26]; according to the
form of a servant, his soul is sorrowful all the way to death, and: Father, he says, if it can happen, let
this cup pass [Matt 26:38-9]. According to the form ofGod, he himself is true God and life eternal [1
John 5:20]; according to the form of a servant, he became obedient all the way to death, even the
death of the cross [Phil 2:8].616
If one adopts Augustine's interpretation of Phil 2:6-7, then, it seems that one can
accept the Bible's testimony to Christ's deity in its full and natural force without in
any way slighting Christ's humanity. To vindicate Augustine's construal of Phil 2:6-
7, consequently, is practically to prove that Scripture affirms the deity of Jesus Christ.
3. The centrality of pope))!]. In order to vindicate Augustine's exegesis, moreover,
it seems that one need merely establish that "form," or popcj)fj, means something like
"nature," or ouoia. For if: a) the Bible always speaks consistently and truthfully; b)
God is simple (we shall defend this premise in a later section); and c) Christ is ev
oucna 0sou, then d) controversial terms like apuaypoc, kevoco, and utrspuyoco
(Phil 2:9), at least in this context, can assume only a narrow range of meanings.
Specifically, interpretations of apTraypoc in the sense of a res rapienda,
understandings of kevoco that entail "kenoticism," and construals of 'ioa as indicative
of anything less than absolute equality all seem a priori unacceptable if Christ's ev
pop<|)ri 0eou uuapxcov implies his ev oucna 0eou gov. In this case, moreover,
615 Ibid., 2.1.2; p. 81.
616 Ibid., 1.11.22; p. 61.
The Deity of Jesus Christ 191
uTTspu^oco could bear only a superlative, as opposed to a comparative, sense, and
the aorist participles Aa(3cbv, ysvopEVoc, and EupsSsic could not conceivably refer
to action prior to the state designated by urrapxcov. For the purpose of this
investigation, in which we presuppose the doctrines of the verbal inspiration of
Scripture, already proved, and divine simplicity, to be proved below, therefore, proof
that piop4>T1 in the context of Phil 2:6-7 constitutes a rough equivalent of oucna
would suffice to eliminate the difficulties posed by other terms within these verses
for Augustine's understanding of Phil 2:6-7 as a "canonical rule" for the
interpretation of Scriptural language about Christ.
Two alternative construals of pop<f>ri, however, seem sufficiently plausible to
warrant consideration: the view that Paul uses pop^p interchangeably with EtKcbv
and the idea that pop4>q in this context refers to a being's external appearance, its
Erscheinungsfonn. Before defending our own views on this subject, therefore, we
intend to evaluate these alternatives.
4. Mop<|)r| = e'ikgov.
a. Nuance or alternative? The first view, viz. that Paul employs popcjyr) in the
sense of sikcov in Phil 2:6-7 might seem more of a complement than a challenge to
Augustine's exegesis. As Andre Feuillet observes:
Whereas in the Synoptics and the Apocalypse the s'ikcov is always an artificial reproduction: the
image of Caesar on a piece of money (Mark 12:6; Luke 20:24; Matt 22:20), the image of the beast
(Rev 13:13; 14:9, 11; 15:2; 16:2...), according to St. Paul, on the contrary, the image is something
inseparable from the person: for him, to become conformed to "the image" of the Son of God is the
same thing as to be configured "a son corps" glorieux (Rom 8:29; Phil 3:21). On the other hand,
consequent upon this, the Apostle does not name the artificial reproduction of human beings or of
animals "image" (s'ikcov), but the copy of an image: opoicopa e'ikovoc (Rom 1:23).617
One could plausibly argue, then, that even if Paul designates Christ "the image of
God" in Phil 2:6, as he does twice elsewhere (2 Cor 4:4, Col 1:15), he employs such
617 "L'hymne Christologique de l'Epitre aux Philippiens (II, 6-11)," RB 72 (1965) 352-80, 481-507 at
491. Cf. the similar remarks of Hermann Kleinknecht, "e'ikcov C. The Greek Use of s'ikgov," TDNT2,
388-90 at 389; and Gerhard Kittel, "sikcov F. The Metaphorical Use of Image in the NT," ibid., 395-7
at 395.
Chapter 4: Scriptural Foundations for the Doctrine of the Trinity 192
language precisely to locate Christ within the very being of God. To the position that
pop(j)fi in Phil 2:6-7 is equivalent to eikcov insofar as this term denotes "the thing
itself' or "the genuine article," therefore, we have few objections. Such a position
seems virtually identical to our own pop^q = ouch a interpretation, especially if one,
following Augustine, considers the divine oucna an oucna TTpcorq.
Many contemporary advocates of the view that pop4>q = eikcov in context of Phil
2:6-7, however, view the presumed correspondence of the terms as counterevidence
to the claim that Paul ascribes ontological divinity to Christ in Phil 2:6. Some of
those who equate popcj)f) and eikgov, in fact, believe that Paul, in describing Christ as
being ev poptjyq 0eou means to ascribe to him only the status possessed by the
prelapsarian Adam: viz. that of being ko(t' s'lKova 0eou (Gen 1:27 LXX).618 To the
extent that the pop(j)q = e'ikgov hypothesis lends support to this "thoroughgoingly
anthropological"619 approach to Phil 2:6-7, therefore, we think it appropriate to treat
it as an alternative to the Augustinian interpretation of pop^q in Phil 2:6-7.
b. Arguments in favor. Supporters of the pop({)q = sikgov hypothesis have
proposed three, principal arguments in its defense. First, these scholars observe, the
LXX employs pop<j)q in Dan 3:19 to translate the Aramaic equivalent of the
Hebrew □ by. Since the LXX translates in Gen 1:26-7 and elsewhere with
eIkcov, this argument implies, pop<j)q must convey much the same meaning as
e'ikcov.620 Second, proponents of this view note, the Peshitta employs pf^\a_2rn, a
Syriac word closely related to HID"7!, to translate popcj)q in Phil 2:6-7. Since
appears in parallelism to □^ (=e'ikg6v) in Gen 1:26, the Peshitta translation
618 Hans-Werner Bartsch, for example, writes, "The second Adam is man as God wishes him to be—
and this the first Adam was not—but he is, therefore, nonetheless as a creature of God equal to the
first Adam" (Die konkrete Wahrheit und die Luge der Spekulation [TW 1; Frankfurt-am-Main and
Bern: Peter Lang, 1974], 68, Anm. 63; cf. also 21, 25-7, 32-40, and 129-30). For similarly minimalist
perspectives on the meaning of poptjjq in Phil 2:6, cf. James D. G. Dunn, Christology in the Making:
A New Testament Inquiry into the Origins ofthe Doctrine ofthe Incarnation (London: SCM, 1980),
114-21; idem, The Theology ofPaul the Apostle (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 282-8; John
MacQuarrie, Jesus Christ in Modern Thought (London and Philadelphia: SCM and Trinity Press,
1990), 56-9; George Howard, "Phil 2:6-11 and the Human Christ," CBQ 40 (1978), 368-87, esp. 377;
and John A. T. Robinson, The Human Face ofGod (London: SCM, 1973), 163-4.
619 We borrow this phrase from Lincoln D. Hurst, who employs it to characterize the position of Dunn
("Christ, Adam, and Preexistence Revisited" in Ralph P. Martin and Brian J. Dodd, ed., Where
Christology Began: Essays on Philippians 2 [Louisville: WJK, 1998], 84-95 at 85).
620 cfy e g jean Hering, Le royaume de Dieu et sa venue: Etude sur I 'esperance de Jesus et de
I'apotre Paul (Bibliotheque Theologique; Paris: Delachaux & Niestle, 1959), 161, n. 2.
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suggests that pop<j)q bears a meaning equivalent to that of eikcdv in Phil 2:6-7.621
Third and finally, those who equate popcj)q and e'ikgov observe that two cognates of
popcj)q, viz. auppop(})OG and pETapop<j)6opai, appear in sufficiently close proximity
to s'ikgov in Rom 8:29 and 2 Cor 3:18 to suggest that Paul considers the terms
synonymous.622
i. The argument from the LXX translation of by pop^q. These arguments
have persuaded such distinguished students of the New Testament as Ernst
Lohmeyer,623 Oscar Cullmann,624 and Joseph Fitzmeyer625 to embrace the view that
pop(j)q = e'ikcov in the context of Phil 2:6-7. The arguments in question, however,
have by no means met with universal approval. Dave Steenburg, for example,
subjects the argument from the LXX translation of by pop^q to the
equivalency of popcjiq and EtKcbv to a searching critique in his "The Case against the
Synonymity ofMorphe and Eikon."626 In the LXX, Steenburg observes:
only once does morphe translate slm and it is not in the sense of either 'image' or 'likeness'. Sim in
all but one of its occurrences either signifies 'idol' or is used to speak ofman as being 'in the image of
God'. In almost all of these cases it is translated by eikon (26x), exceptions being the resort to
homoidma (twice) and typos (once), both words being used in the sense of 'idol'. The unique
occurrence of morphe as a translation of slm is found in Dan 3:19, where its Aramaic counterpart is
used in the sense of 'appearance'. Theodotion also avoids eikon here by using opsis ('face' or
'countenance'), a word which, like morphe, is nowhere else in the LXX used to translate slm. This
suggests rather strongly that morphe is used, not because it is synonymous with eikon, but because it
covers a rare portion of slm's semantic field that eikon does not. Therefore, there is no basis for
speaking of the interchangeability of the two words in the LXX on the basis of their relationship to
s/w.627
To this argument, we have nothing to add. The LXX translation of □ 7^ by
pop(j)q in Dan 3:19, at least when viewed in the light of Steenburg's discussion,
seems not to imply that pop4)fj denotes e'ikcov in the context of Phil 2:6-7.
621 Cf., e.g. Feuillet, Le Christ sagesse de Dieu d'apres les epitres Pauliniennes (Paris: Gabalda,
1966), 345.
622 Cf., e.g., Ralph P. Martin, Carmen Christi: Philippians ii. 5-11 in Recent Interpretation and in the
Setting ofEarly Christian Worship (SNTSM 4; Cambridge: CUP, 1967), 115-16.
623 Kyrios Jesus: Eine Untersuchung zu Phil. 2, 5-11 (SHAW.PH; Heidelberg: Carl Winter,
Universitatsverlag, 19614), 17-18, Anm. 1; 20, Anm. 1.
624 The Christology ofthe New Testament (London: SCM Press, 1959), 176-7.
625 "The Aramaic Background of Philippians 2:6-11," CBQ 50 (1988), 470-83 at 476.
626JSNT 34(1988), 77-86.
627 Ibid., 79.
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ii. The argument from the Peshitta's translation o/ H1D1 by nd^aLnn. The
second argument for the pop<j>p = e'ikcov hypothesis, viz. that from the Peshitta's use
of rC^\a2z>n to translate pop^fj in Phil 2:6-7, possesses two great advantages. First,
it seems difficult to dispute that, at least in the context of Gen 1:26, the terms □ 'pi? (=
s'lKcbv) and (= rC^crm ) are employed synonymously.628 Second, and even
more importantly, the translators of the Peshitta lend credit to the pop^f] = s'ikcov
hypothesis not only by translating pop4>p with rC^\crjon in Phil 2:6-7 and Mark
16:12, but also by also by translating sikcov with rx^sxcYpn in Rom 8:29; 1 Cor 11:7
and 15:49; 2 Cor 3:18; and Col 1:15 and 3:10.629
Two factors, however, tend to countervail this argument's strengths. First, the
argument's Septuagintal basis seems somewhat strained. Admittedly, the LXX does
translate □ 'PH with e'ikcov in Gen 1:26 and thus places e'ikcov in parallelism to niDl,
which in this context constitutes a synonym of □ "PH and which in this case is
rendered by opotcopa. The LXX, moreover, does translate HIQ"7! with e'ikcov in Gen
5:1. In no other instance, however, does it translate with e'ikcov, and in no case
whatsoever does it translate niQT with pop^p.630
Second, the semantic ranges of e'ikgov and rC^\o")aa do not overlap completely.
The Peshitta's translators, for instance, employ rC^cvp.t as a substitute for xurroc in
Rom 6:17: "But thanks be to God that you, having once been slaves of sin, have
become obedient from the heart to the form of teaching [ tuttov 5i5axpc ] to which
you were entrusted."631 Likewise, one finds rC^\cTp.t employed to render siSoc, in
the sense of "genus," in the Syriac translation of Eusebius' Acta martyrorum
Palestini 35.12 and 39.5.632 While the Peshitta translators' employment of rC^crm
as a translation of popt})p and eikgov buttresses the hypothesis that popcj)p = e'ikgov in
Phil 2:6-7, therefore, it does not positively exclude alternative interpretations.
628 Cf. H. D. Preus, "HQ"!; 171131," TDOT3, 250-60 at 259 and F. J. Stendebach, "D^," TDOT12,
386-96 at 394.
629 We owe these references to R. Payne Smith's Thesaurus Syriacum 1 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1879),
914. Strangely, the advocates of the pop4>p = s'ikcov hypothesis whose works we have reviewed make
no mention of the Peshitta translators' employment of rCh.CTp.1 as a substitute for s'ikcov in the New
Testament.
630 Cf. David H. Wallace, "A Note on pop^p," TZ 22 (1966), 19-25 at 21.
631 Again, we are indebted to Smith's Thesaurus Syriacum 1, 914 for this reference.
632 \ye owe these references to Carl Brockelmann, Lexicon Syriacum (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 19282),
157a.
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Hi. The argument from Paul's juxtaposition of cognates of pop({)q with s'ikcov.
The third argument for this theory, viz. that from Paul's juxtaposition of e'ikcov and
cognates of pop^f] in Rom 8:29 and 2 Cor 3:18, seems similarly inconclusive. In the
first passage, Paul writes, "For those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be
conformed to the image of his Son (Kaj TTpocopiaEV ouppopcjiouc Tqc sikovoc tou
utou auxou), in order that he might be the firstborn within a large family." In the
second passage, likewise, Paul writes, "And all of us, with unveiled faces, seeing the
glory of the Lord as though reflected in a mirror, are being transformed into the same
image (Tqv auxqv e'ikovcx pExapopcj)oup£0a) from one degree of glory to another."
On the basis of these passages a supporter of the pop^f) = e'ikcov hypothesis could
argue:
1. A person can be ouppop^OQ to or pETapop^ouTCu into only that which is itself a
popcj)q;
2. Paul states that he and other Christians are, to a certain extent at least, auppopcjiot
to and that they psxapop4)oup£0a into a particular e'ikcov; therefore
3. That particular s'ikcov is a popc^f].
This argument seems sound, but not quite to the point. The word e'ikcov in this
context manifestly refers to something substantial, a pop<j)f] to which one can be
ouppop4)oc, and in this sense, the sikcov is, indeed, a pop^q. By describing Christ's
pop(j)f) as an e'ikcov, however, Paul portrays it in the aspect of an exemplar to which
the pop(j)ou of Christians become similar, albeit not identical. Paul conveys a
meaning with the term e'ikcov, that is to say, that he does not and probably could not
convey with the word popcjxq. It seems, then, that although one can accurately
describe the referent of e'ikcov in Rom 8:29 and 2 Cor 3:18 as a pop^q, it is not at all
obvious that one could substitute popcj)q for eikcov without altering Paul's meaning.
This argument establishes, consequently, only that the terms popc()q and e'ikcov can
share a common referent: not that they can convey the same meaning.
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c. Difficulties. The three, principal arguments employed in defense of the
hypothesis that pop<j)f) ~ s'ikgov in the context of Phil 2:6-7 thus seem not to
demonstrate its probability. Three additional considerations should suffice to prove
the piopcjjri = e'ikcov hypothesis unlikely. First, as Peter T. O'Brien observes, "Adam
is nowhere in the LXX or the NT referred to as pop^q 0sou"633 as one would expect
him to be if popc})q 0sou conveyed the same meaning as eikcov 0eou. Second, as
Teresia Yai-Chow Wong notes, "in the LXX, pop(j)f| is never used in the context of
man's creation, nor of his relation to God"634 as one would expect it to be, again, if it
were closely associated with the Biblical idea of the image of God. Third and finally,
in the words of Joachim Gnilka, "oc ev pop^p 0sou UTrapxcov cannot...be so
understood, that the pre-existent existed according to the image of God. [For] popcjip
is employed again in the same sense in v. 7 and, therefore, can have no other sense
than it has in v. 6." 635 To clarify what Gnilka rightly describes as the
Haupteinwand 636 to the pop<j>f| = e'ikcov position: unless Paul equivocates
enormously, popcjjf] must bear at least roughly the same meaning in v. 7 as it bears in
v. 6. Yet Christ certainly takes to himself more than the image of a servant; he
becomes a servant, however one wishes to express that more precisely. It seems,
consequently, that when Paul describes Christ as sv popcJ>r| 0eou in Phil 2:6, he must
ascribe to Christ some more intimate relationship to God than that of being created ev
e'ikovi 0eou (Gen 9:6 LXX). The Son's real identification with a SouAoc thus
excludes the popc})q = e'ikcov hypothesis in its "thoroughgoingly anthropological"
sense.
5. Mop(])f] = Erscheinungsform. The second alternative to our understanding of
popcj)f| in Phil 2:6-7, viz. the position that pop^r) in this context signifies "visible
appearance," or Erscheinungsform, finds eloquent expression in Johannes Behm's
article, "pop<})q" in the TDNT.
633 The Epistle to the Philippians: A Commentary on the Greek Text (NIGTC; Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1991), 263-4.
634 "The Problem of Pre-Existence in Philippians 2, 6-11," ETL 62 (1986), 267-82 at 272.
635 Der Philipperhrief(HThKNT 10:3; Freiburg: Flerder, 19874), 139. Cf. the similar remarks of
Hans-Heinrich Schade, Apoealyptisehe Christologie bei Paulus: Studien zum Zussamenhang von
Christologie und Eschatologie in den Paulusbriefen (GTA 18; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,
1981), 66.
636 Der Philipperbrief 139.
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The phrase pop4>r] 0sou, which Paul coins in obvious antithesis to pop(j)r] SouAou, can be understood
only in the light of the context. The appearance assumed by the incarnate Lord, the image of
humiliation and obedient submission, stands in the sharpest conceivable contrast to His former
appearance, the image of sovereign divine majesty, whose restoration in a new and even more
glorious form is depicted for the exalted xupioc at the conclusion of the hymn, v. 10 f. The specific
outward sign of the humanity of Jesus is the pop<j>fi SouAou, and of his essential divine likeness (to
sivai i'aa 0eco...) the pop(j)(] 0eou. The lofty terminology of the hymn can venture to speak of the
form or visible appearance ofGod in this antithesis on the theological basis of the So^a concept of the
Greek Bible, which is also that of Paul, and according to which the majesty of God is visibly
expressed in the radiance of heavenly light.637
As before, one could argue for the functional identity of this interpretation of
Moptjjf) in Phil 2:6-7 with that of Augustine. For, if the pop(j>q 0eou is equivalent to
the 5o£a Kupiou, and the Lord will give his glory to no other (Isa 42:8; 48:11), then
it might appear that Christ's £v popcjyf] 0eou UTTapxcov would entail his essential
deity.638 It seems, however, that an interpreter of Phil 2:6-7 who identified pop^q in
this context as Erscheinungsform could reconcile Paul's ascription to Christ of
existence ev pop^f) 0£°u with a denial ofChrist's ontological divinity in at least two
ways. First, such an person could reasonably claim that Paul means to identify
Christ with the pop^q 0eou in Behm's sense of the term and thus relegate Christ to
the status of a manifestation of divine glory.639 Second, an exegete who accepted the
pop(J)f] = Erscheinungsform hypothesis could consistently argue that a being of lesser
dignity than the Father, could exist pop(j)Tj 0eou if by this phrase one means, "in
the realm of the effulgence of God's glory."640 It seems advisable, therefore, to treat
the popcjiq = Erscheinungsform hypothesis as an alternative to, rather than a variant
of, the Augustinian interpretation.
a. Arguments in favor. Supporters of this alternative hypothesis appeal to two,
principal arguments in defense of their position.641 First, these scholars note, the root
637 Johannes Behm, "pop^n," TDNT4, 742-52 at 751.
638 Calvin employs this argument in his In Epistolam ad Philippenses Commentarius at 2:6 (Opera
Exegetica 16: Commentarii in Pauli Epistolas ad Galatos et al. [Helmut Feld, ed.; Geneva: Librairie
Droz, 1992], 320-1).
639 Cf. the exegesis of Phil 2:6-9 on p. 283 of Gedaliahu G. Stroumsa's "Form(s) of God: Some Notes
on Metatron and Christ," HTR 76 (1983), 269-88.
640 Cf. C. A. Wanamaker, "Philippians 2.6-11: Son ofGod or Adamic Christology," NTS 33 (1987),
179-93 at 187-8.
641 ^ye reaijze these two arguments do not exhaust the arsenal of those who advocate the pop^q =
Erscheinungsform hypothesis. Having already shown that rCAtcqon can signify an invisible essence,
however, we think it unnecessary to address here the argument for the popjjf] = Erscheinungsform
hypothesis from the Peshitta's translation of both pop^r) and opoicopa in Phil 2:6-7 with fCA\cvpn.
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pope))- appears to bear this sense in a number ofNT texts. Specifically, pop<J>ri itself
(Mark 16:12) and popcjicoaic (2 Tim 3:5) appear in the NT in the sense of "external
appearance," while psxapopcjioco in Matt 17:2 and Mark 9:2 refers to the
transfiguration precisely of Christ's appearance.642 Second, proponents of this view
observe, the word pop^f] seems to bear the meaning, "external appearance," in each
of the seven instances in which the LXX employs it (Judg 8:18; Isa 44:13; Job 4:16;
Dan 3:19; Wis 18:1; Tob 1:13; 4 Mace 15:4).643 The Greek Bible as a whole, such
persons argue, thus appears to supply ample testimony to the view that popcjip, at
least in its Biblical usage, signifies something like an Erscheinungsform.
i. The argument from NT use of popejir] and its derivatives in the sense of "visible
appearance. " As to the first argument, that from the four instances in which the NT
employs popcjjf] or its cognates to convey the idea of an Erscheinungsform: J. B.
Lightfoot, in his classic commentary on Philippians, maintains that in at least six
cases within the Pauline corpus, the cognates of pop<j>r] bear an unmistakably
substantial sense. One can glean the meaning and force of Lightfoot's argument
from the following extract in which he contrasts the meanings of popcJ>fi and axppa
in the NT. "A review of the passages where oXhMot and its derivatives are used,"
writes Lightfoot:
will not, I think, leave any doubt on the mind that this word retains the notion of 'instability,
changeableness,' quite as strongly as in classical Greek. Thus 'the fashion of this world,' which
'passeth away,' is to oxflMC* t°h xoopou toutou (1 Cor. vii. 31)....The fictitious illusory
transformation whereby evil assumes the mask of good—the false apostles appearing as the true, the
A brief discussion of this subject appears in Paul Jouon's "Notes philologiques sur quelques versets de
l'epitre aux Philippiens," RSR 28 (1938), 89-93, 223-33, 299-31 1 at 223-4.
We shall refrain from discussing the Hellenistic texts adduced by Stephen E. Fowl (The Story of
Christ in the Ethics ofPaul: An Analysis ofthe Function ofthe Hymnic Material in the Pauline
Corpus [JSNTSup 36; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1990], 50-53) to authenticate the synonymity of popffq
and Erscheinungsform, moreover, because they appear to us only tangentially relevant to Phil 2:6-7.
As Markus Bockmuehl explains, "most of the pre-Christian Greek texts [in which popc()f| signifies a
visible divine form] relate explicitly or at least implicitly to the classic legends ofGreek mythology, a
context without which even transferred applications.. .would remain meaningless. Especially given
the clearly Jewish Christian tenor of our passage [then] a direct dependence on this material must be
deemed highly unlikely" ("'The Form ofGod' (Phil. 2:6) Variations on a Theme of Jewish
Mysticism," JThS 48 NS [1997], 1-23 at 7).
Our reasons for passing in silence the Jewish and early Christian texts adduced by Bockmuehl
himself in pp. 11-19 of the just-mentioned article, finally, will become apparent in 5.b below.
642 Behm, "poptjjq," 750, 755, 758. In these loci, it seems, Behm implicitly appeals to the meaning of
cognates of popc()f] in order to bolster his interpretation of pop<t>q itself.
643 Behm, "poptjjq," 746.
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prince of darkness as an angel of light, the ministers of Satan as ministers of righteousness—is
described by the thrice repeated word pETOtaxriMorn^EaQai (2 Cor. xi. 13, 14, 15)....On the other hand
the great and entire change of the inner life, otherwise described as being born again, being created
anew, is spoken of as a conversion of popcfiri always, of ayriM^ never. Thus 'he fore-ordained them
conformable (ouppopcjjouc) to the image of his Son' (Rom. viii. 29); 'Being made conformable
(ouppop^opEVoc) to his death' (Phil. iii. 10); 'We are transformed (p£Tapop(j)OupE0a) into the
same image (2 Cor. iii. 18); 'To be transformed by the renewal of your mind' (Rom. xii. 2); 'Until
Christ be formed (pop(f>co0?|) in you' (Gal. iv. 19).644
As Wong explains, peTapop4>oopai, as opposed to psTaoxqpcm^co, "must be
understood as implying the essential transformation of Christians into a new
life....What matters is not simply an external change which leaves the interior self
untouched. The latter is precisely the malfeasance of the false apostles that Paul
attacks in 2 Cor 11, 13-15. Christian life should not be like that. Thus, Paul pleads
for an authentic transformation of the self in which a completely new life comes
about."645 That Paul would choose peTapopc^oopai to convey this meaning would
seem quite odd, of course, if pop(j>f|, the word from which pETapopcjioopai derives,
signified nothing more than "external appearance" in mid-first century Greek. It
seems more reasonable to suppose, rather, that the term pop4>q can denote both an
Erscheinungsform and at least something like a substance in Paul's Greek and to
determine which of the two meanings the word conveys in any given verse on the
basis of its context.
ii. The argument from the LXX usage of popc})f|. The instances in which the
LXX employs pop4)f| in the sense of "external appearance," moreover, seem
insufficient to overturn this conclusion. For, although the term pop4>q does
manifestly convey this sense in each of the texts in question: a) the six instances in
which the LXX employs the term hardly exhaust the range of its possible meanings
in ITellenistic Greek; and b) the LXX never applies pop^q or its cognates to God.646
b. Difficulties. The two principal arguments usually employed in defense of the
view that popc})q = Erscheinungsform, therefore, seem insufficient to establish this
644 St. Paul's Epistle to the Philippians (London and New York: MacMillan, 1890), 130.
645 Wong, "The Problem of Pre-Existence," 271.
646 Cf. Pierre Grelot, "Deux expressions difficiles de Philippiens 2, 6-7," Bib 53 (1972), 495-507 at
503.
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conclusion. Two additional considerations should suffice to exclude it. First,
Gnilka's Haupteinwand to the view that pop4>q = s'ikcov in Phil 2:6647 applies equally
to the hypothesis that M°P4>0 = Erscheinungsform in the same context. Unless Paul
equivocates tremendously in his use of pop(j)q in this pericope, the term must bear
the same meaning in Phil 2:7 as it does in 2:6. If the by M°p4>q in v. 7, however,
Paul meant nothing more than Erscheinungsform, he would declare in this verse
merely that Christ took the appearance of a servant: in which case, it seems, he
would hardly have been able to become uTrqKOOG MEXP1 Qavaxou, Qavaxou
5s axaupou.
Second, the Apostle Paul, who includes Ssiorqc itself among the "invisible things
of God" (Rom 1:20) would surely never ascribe a visible form to "the invisible God"
(Col 1:15; cf. 1 Tim 1:17). As Walter Kasper explains, "the term morphe may mean
either the outward phenomenal form or visible figure, or else the being itself.. ..Since
it is not possible to speak of God having an outward form [then]..., it is hard to avoid
concluding that the present passage is speaking of 'essential form.'"648 One cannot
construe pop^r] in this context as Erscheinungsform, therefore, without implicitly
accusing Paul of contravening the doctrine of divine invisibility.
6. Mop^q = ouaia . A process of elimination, then, leads to the conclusion that
popcjjq, as Paul employs it in Phil 2:6, signifies something like ouala. This construal
of Paul's words possesses the advantages: a) of confirming the Augustinian
interpretation of Phil 2:6-8 and thus rendering intelligible the co-existence of
statements that imply more or less directly Christ's deity with subordinationist
language in the writings of Paul and other Biblical authors; and b) of possessing an
enormous fund of patristic support. The latter circumstance, of course, might give
rise to the suspicion that the pop4>q = ouoia interpretation constitutes a relic of pre-
647 Der Philipperbrief, 139.
648 The God ofJesus Christ (London: SCM, 1984), 176. We owe this citation to Nunzio Capizzi,
"Soteriologia in Fil 2:6-11?" Greg 81 (2000), 221-48 at 229. Others who reject the pop<j)r| =
Erscheinungsform hypothesis because of its incompatibility with the doctrine of divine invisibility
include David J. MacLeod, "Imitating the Incarnation ofChrist: An Exposition of Philippians 2:5-8,"
BSac 158 (2001), 308-30 at 313, n. 24; Hermann Binder, "Erwagungen zu Phil 2 6-7b," ZNW 78
(1987), 230-43 at 235; Gerald F. Hawthorne, Philippians (WBC 43; Waco, TX: Word, 1983), 84;
Ludger Oeing-Hanhoff, '"Der in Gottesgestalt war...' Erneute Kritik der Einheitsiibersetzung," TQ
161 (1981), 288-304 at 295; Ceslas Spicq, "Note sur pop])!) dans les papyrus et quelques
inscriptions," RB 80 (1973), 37-45 at 45; Lucien Cerfaux, Christ in the Theology ofSt. Paul (New
York, Edinburgh, and London: Herder and Thomas Nelson, 1959), 385; and Lightfoot, Philippians,
132.
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critical exegesis driven more by dogmatic than historical concerns. Lightfoot argues,
nonetheless, that in thus interpreting Phil 2:6-7, the Fathers seem to be animated by
something more than mere dogmatic prejudice. "It is not surprising that they should
have taken this view," he writes, "but they could hardly have insisted with such
confidence on the identity of pop(j)f] and ouaia, unless they had at least a reasonable
case on their side."649 The principal objections to the pop^O = ouata hypothesis, viz.
that such a usage of popcjir) by Paul would have required a more Hellenistic
background, a more philosophical orientation, and a more advanced Christology than
he, in fact, possessed, seem, in any event, ill conceived.
For, first, if one credits Luke's account of Paul's speech on the Areopagus in Acts
17:22-31 and accepts the authenticity of 1 Corinthians and Titus, then one must
admit that Paul possessed at least enough Greek culture to pepper his discourses with
quotations of Aratus,650 Menander,651 and Epimenides.652 It seems hardly reasonable,
therefore, to reject the poptjiq = oucna interpretation simply because it has a
Hellenistic ring to it. To the second charge, viz. that Paul lacked the philosophical
wherewithal to employ pop^q in the sense of oucna, one can hardly respond better
than Lightfoot. "In accepting this conclusion [viz. that pop4>f| in Phil 2:6-7 =
oucna]," he writes:
we need not assume that St. Paul consciously derived his use of the term from any philosophical
nomenclature. There was sufficient definiteness even in its popular usage to suggest this meaning
when it was transferred from the objects of sense to the conceptions of the mind. Yet if St. John
adopted Aoyoc, if St. Paul himself adopted eikcov, ttpcototokoc, and the like, from the language of
existing theological schools, it seems very far from improbable that the closely analogous expression
popcjir) 0eou should have been derived from a similar source. The speculations of Alexandrian and
Gnostic Judaism formed a ready channel, by which the philosophical terms of ancient Greece were
brought within reach of the Apostles of Christ.653
649 Lightfoot, Philippians, 133, n. 1.
650 Paul's speech in the Areopagus, as recorded by Luke, includes a quotation from Aratus'
Phenomena 5 at Acts 17:28 (Aratos: Phenomenes: Tome I [Jean Martin, ed. and trans.; CUFr; Paris:
Les belles lettres, 1998], 1).
651 In 1 Cor 15:33, Paul quotes a verse from Menander's now almost completely lost play Thais
{Menander quae supersunt: Pars altera (Alfred Koerte, ed.; Andreas Thierfelder, rev.; BSGRT;
Leipzig and Berlin: Teubner, 19592), fragment 187(218), p. 74.
652 Jerome identifies the Cretans' "very own prophet" whom Paul quotes in Titus 1:12 as Epimenides,
who, according to Jerome, composed a book either of or about oracles {Commentarius in Titum at
1:12; CCL 77C, 29).
653 Lightfoot, Philippians, 133.
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As to the third objection, viz. that Paul's Christology had not advanced to such an
extent that he could seriously describe Christ as sv ouaia Seep: a cursory survey of
Paul's Epistles shows that he continually speaks of Christ in ways at least suggestive
of his essential deity. In Col 1:19, for instance, Paul writes, "In him [i.e. Christ] all
the fullness of God was pleased to dwell." Again, in Col 2:9, Paul writes, "in him
the whole fullness of deity dwells bodily." Paul describes Christ as xupioc, i.e. the
Septuagintal equivalent ofHUT, 97 times in his Epistles. He testifies to his belief in
Christ's deity most strikingly, perhaps, in 1 Cor 8:6 where, in Gerald O'Collins'
words, "Paul splits the Shema." As O'Collins explains, in this text:
Paul splits the Shema or Jewish confession par excellence of monotheism (Deut 6:4-5), glossing
"God" with "Father" and "Lord" with "Jesus Christ" to put Jesus as Lord alongside God as Father:
"For us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things and for whom we exist, and one Lord,
Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and through whom we exist" (1 Cor 8:6). Here the title
"one Lord" expands the Shema to include Jesus Christ. Using the classic monotheistic text of Judaism,
[then,] Paul recasts his inherited perception of God by introducing Jesus as "Lord" and redefining
Jewish monotheism to produce a Christological monotheism.654
It scarcely seems reasonable, therefore, to dispute the pope})/] = ouata hypothesis
simply on the grounds that Paul's Christology was insufficiently "advanced."
7. Conclusion. It seems, then, that Paul does mean something like oucna by the
word pop(j)f] as he employs it in Phil 2:6-7. In this case: a) Phil 2:6-7 constitutes a
clear Biblical testimony to the deity and the humanity of Jesus Christ; and b) given
the presuppositions that God is simple and that the possibilities of change and
inequality within the deity are, therefore, excluded, Phil 2:6-7 does, indeed,
constitute a rationale for referring subordinationistic language to Christ's human
nature while allowing Biblical testimonies to Christ's deity to retain their full force.
654 "The Incarnation under Fire," 268.
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III. The Personality of the Holy Spirit
As we noted earlier, it seems unnecessary to prove that the expressions "Holy
Spirit" and "Spirit of God" do, on at least some occasions, refer to God himself. The
point is patently obvious in such texts as:
1. "For what human being knows what is truly human except the human spirit that is
within? So also no one comprehends what is truly God's except the Spirit of God [1
Cor 2:11]; and
2. "Do you not know that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit... [1 Cor 6:19]?
Unless Paul means to say that God is ignorant of "what is truly God's" or that the
Christian's body is an idolatrous temple to a creature known as "the Holy Spirit," he
manifestly employs the terms "Spirit of God" and "Holy Spirit" in these texts to refer
to God.
Although the Spirit's distinct personality is more controverted than his deity,
proving this point as well may, perhaps, prove similarly unproblematic. It would be
exceedingly odd, for instance, for Christ to describe the Holy Spirit as "another
Advocate" (John 14:16 than himself whom he will send from the Father (John 15:26)
if Christ and the Holy Spirit were, in fact, simply the same. The Holy Spirit,
moreover, could not conceivably testify on Christ's behalf (John 15:26) without
some distinction between the persons. Likewise, the Holy Spirit's inclusion in the
baptismal formula (Matt 28:19) seems inexplicable if the Holy Spirit does not, like
the Father and the Son, constitute a distinctly subsisting divine person. It requires
little ingenuity, therefore, to establish the Holy Spirit's distinctness from the Father
and the Son. This, of course, constitutes the final step in our argument that the
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit constitute three distinct divine persons; or, in
Augustine's words, "The Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and each individual
of these is God, and at the same time all are one God....The Father is neither the Son
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nor the Holy Spirit; the Son is neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit; [and] the Holy
Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son."655
It seems, therefore, that one can legitimately derive the deity and personal
distinctness of the Trinitarian persons from the data of Scripture without
presupposing the accuracy of Rahner's Grundaxiom. These truths in isolation,
however, do not constitute the fully developed, orthodox, Latin doctrine of the
Trinity. We shall not have shown this to be deducible exclusively from Scripture
premises alone before we have established, without appealing to extra-Scriptural
premises, what Bourassa describes as "the fundamental principle consecrated by the
[great, Trinitarian] dogmatic definitions: [viz. that] the three persons, really distinct
among themselves, are one and the same God, and are distinguished in the
possession of the same divine substance or nature only by the opposition of their
relations of origin, in such a way that all that in God is an absolute perfection, as
power, bounty, wisdom, knowledge, and love, is common to the three persons, as
essential attribution, and possessed by each in virtue of his essence."656 In other
words, we shall not have vindicated the possibility of deriving a strictly orthodox,
Western Trinitarianism from Scriptural premises alone until we have derived,
exclusively from the data of Scripture, the axiom: "In God all things are one where
no opposition of relation intervenes."657 In the following, accordingly, we intend to
show that the Biblical doctrines of divine simplicity, the transitivity of identity, the
eternal generation of the Son, and the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit, when
properly understood, entail precisely this axiom. Before establishing the connection
between these doctrines and the axiom in question, however, it seems appropriate to
demonstrate that these doctrines themselves possess an adequate, Biblical foundation.
655 Augustine, Doctr. Chr. 1.5.5; CCL 32, 9.
656 "Communion du Pere et du Fils," Questions de theologie Trinitaire, 125-89 at 146-7
657 DH 1330.
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IV. In God all things are one, where no opposition of relation intervenes
I. Premises ofOur Argument.
a. Divine simplicity. One can deduce the doctrine of divine simplicity most
readily, it seems, from two more immediately Biblical doctrines: first, that God
"created all things" (Rev 4:11; cf. Eph 3:9; John 1:3 and Col 1:16); and, second, that
he who creates some perfection must possess that perfection antecedently in himself.
This principle seems to constitute the suppressed major premise of the following
enthymeme (Ps 94:9; cf. Ex 4:11): "He who planted the ear, does he not hear? he
who formed the eye, does he not see?"
The second doctrine supplies an adequate basis for the following argument in
modus tollens:
1. If any perfection of God is a creature of God, then a creature of God is possessed
by God antecedently to its creation;
2. But no creature ofGod is possessed by God antecedently to its creation; therefore
3. No perfection of God is a creature.
Employing the first doctrine as major premise and the conclusion to the preceding
argument as minor premise, one can then construct the following syllogism in
Camestres.
1. Everything other than God is a creature of God;
2. No perfection ofGod is a creature ofGod; therefore
3. No perfection of God is other than God.
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Now, one can validly permute the conclusion of this syllogism into the
proposition: Every perfection of God is not other than God. Since the principle of
the excluded middle dictates that that which is not other must be the same, one can
justly conclude, then, that God is the same as each of his attributes: that, in other
words, he is simple.658
The Bible corroborates this claim, moreover, not only by supplying premises from
which it may be deduced, but also by testifying that God possesses the characteristics
one would expect of a metaphysically simple being. Such a being, for instance, is, as
we have seen, per definitionem identical with his attributes; and the Bible,
accordingly, identifies God with the divine attributes of existence (Ex 3:14), truth
(John 14:6), life (John 11:25; 14:26), light (1 John 1:5), and love (1 John 4:8, 16). A
simple being, likewise, possesses per definitionem the perfection of immutability;
and the Bible, accordingly, ascribes immutability to God in his being (Ps 102: 26-7;
Mai 3:6; Heb 1:10-12, 13:8; James 1:17) and in his will (Num 23:19; 1 Sam 15:29;
Ps 33:11; Rom 11:29; Fleb 6:17-18). It seems overwhelmingly likely, therefore, that
the Bible does, at least indirectly, teach the doctrine of divine simplicity.
b. The transitivity of identity. The evidence that the Bible also sanctions the
principle of the transitivity of identity, i.e. the principle that if a=b and b=c, then a=c,
seems similarly compelling. Christ himself seems to employ this principle, for
instance, in Matt 25:34-40. At the final judgment, he announces, the son of man
"will say to those at his right hand, 'Come, you that are blessed by my Father, inherit
the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world; for I was hungry and
you gave me food, I was thirsty and you gave me something to drink," etc.. "Then,"
Christ continues, "the righteous will answer him, 'Lord, when was it that we saw you
hungry and gave you food, or thirsty and gave you something to drink?" etc.. "And
the king will answer them, 'Truly I tell you, just as you did it to one of the least of
these who are members ofmy family, you did it to me."
Christ answers the question of the righteous, in other words, with the equivalent
of the following syllogism in Dimaris:
658 For the idea of deriving the doctrine of divine simplicity from the doctrine of creation ex nihilo,
we are indebted to Brian Leftow, "Is God an Abstract Object?" Nous 24 (1990), 581-98.
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1. You are all those who have cared for members ofmy family;
2. All those who have cared for members ofmy family are those who have cared for
me; therefore
3. You are those who have cared for me.
Now, if one signifies "you" with "a," "all those who have cared for members of
my family" with "b," and "those who have cared for me" with "c," one can restate
this argument as: if a=b and b=c, then a=c. The principle of the transitivity of
identity thus appears to possess Scriptural, and even dominical, warrant.
c. The eternal generation of the Son. That the Bible also witnesses to the eternal
generation of the Son by the Father seems equally evident from the text of Scripture
itself. The Bible testifies to this doctrine most notably by designating Christ the
Father's "only begotten Son," (John 1:14, 18; 3:16, 18; 1 John 4:9).659 By
representing the Son as the Father's Word (Ps 33:6; John 1:1, 14) and Wisdom (Ps
136:5; Pr 3:19; Jer 10:12; 51:15; 1 Cor 1:24), moreover, Scripture identifies this
begetting as an immanent generation per modum intellectionis and thus clarifies how
the absolutely immaterial Father can "beget" a consubstantial Son. Lest anyone
attempt to construe this intelligible generation as a merely temporal occurrence,
finally, Scripture testifies that Christ's "comings forth are from of old, from the days
of eternity" (Micah 5:2).660
659 The NRSV translators render povoyEvqe in each of these verses merely as "only." This, of course,
is not an unreasonable translation. The frequent employment of povoyEvqc by the Septuaginf s
translators as an equivalent ofTP!1 , in fact, weighs quite heavily in favor of the NRSV translation,
and even the AV renders povoyEvqc as "only" in Luke 7:12, 8:42, and 9:48.
In each of the five instances (John 1:14, 18; 3:16, 18; 1 John 4:9) in which John employs the word,
however, he places it in close proximity to passages concerning spiritual begetting and birth. Now,
the connection between the word povoyEvqc and words like yEwaco, yEVuqpa, and yEvvqoic, all of
which can refer to birth and begetting, is too obvious to escape the attention of John or that of his
readers. John's intense concern for establishing parallels between Christ and Christians, moreover,
renders implausible the hypothesis that John juxtaposed povoyEvqc with "begetting" language five
times purely by accident. It seems, therefore, that, the Septuagint translators' use of povoyEvqc
notwithstanding, one cannot reasonably deny that John intends for his readers to understand this term
as at least connotative of begetting: i.e. as "only begotten" and not merely "only."
We owe the argument of this footnote to Geerhardus Vos, The Self-Disclosure ofJesus (Johnannes
G. Vos, rev.; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 19532), 212-18. Cf. also John V. Dahms' excellent article,
"The Johannine Use ofMonogenes Reconsidered," NTS 29 (1983), 222-32.
660 -p^g nrsv translators render Micah 5:2b: "whose origin is from of old, from ancient days." It
would seem more apt, however, to render as "comings forth" and thus to alert the reader to
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d. The eternal procession of the Holy Spirit. That the Father also eternally
"spirates" the Holy Spirit, that is, that the Holy Spirit eternally proceeds from the
person of the Father, appears, likewise, from John 15:26. In this text, Christ tells his
disciples that "when the Advocate comes, whom I will send to you from the Father,
the Spirit of truth, who comes [i.e. EKTropsusTCu] from the Father, he will testify on
my behalf." Some exegetes,661 admittedly, have seen in the phrase, "who comes
from the Father" (o Trapa tou Traxpoc SKTTOpsuETai) a reference, not to the Spirit's
eternal procession from the Father, but to his temporal mission in salvation history.
The tense of the verb "comes" (ekttopeustcxi), however, positively excludes this
interpretation. For, at this point in salvation history, "there was no Spirit [sc. he had
not yet been given]; because Jesus was not yet glorified" (John 7:39). The verb,
"comes" (EKTTopEUExai), then, can refer only to an immanent divine act which, by
virtue of God's eternity and immutability, must continue unchanged forever.662 John
15:26, therefore, at least seems to teach that the Holy Spirit proceeds eternally from
the person of the Father.
the etymological connection between TINKIO and The NRSV rendering of 0*2112 as "ancient,"
moreover, seems incongruous when one considers the purpose for which Micah employs the term: viz.
to contrast the obscurity of Bethlehem, the future king's home town, with the antiquity (which
connotes eminence) of his ancestry. For Micah could hardly have regarded David, who died less than
150 years before the outset ofMicah's prophetic career, as an "ancient" ancestor of Christ, and
Christ's descent from genuinely ancient dignitaries such as Adam, Noah, and Abraham would not
have distinguished him from the ordinary Jew.
The translation of 0*2122 as "ancient," therefore, seems to deprive Micah's comparison of
rhetorical impact. IfMicah employed this term in the sense of "eternity," however, it seems that he
would convey a stark contrast. Since 0*2122 appears elsewhere in the Old Testament with the
meaning "eternity" (cf. Ps 90:2 and Isa 63:16); and since, by employing 0*2112 with the meaning,
"eternity," Micah would achieve the rhetorical end he obviously seeks; it seems not improbable that
Micah himself employs □ *211? in this sense. In the context ofMicah 5:2, therefore, "eternity" seems
a more reasonable translation for 0*2112 than "ancient."
T
The argument of this footnote derives principally from Theodore Laetsch, Bible Commentary:
Minor Prophets (St. Louis: Concordia, 1956), 270, 272; and E. W. Hengstenberg, Christology ofthe
Old Testament 1 (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 18542), 480-85, 489-91.
661 Cf., for instance, Hans-Christian Kammler, "Jesus Christus und der Paraklet: Eine Studie zur
johanneischen Verhaltnisbestimmung von Pneumatologie und Christologie," in Kammler and Otfried
Hofius, Johnannesstudien: Untersuchungen zur Theologie des vierten Evangeliums (Tubingen: Mohr-
Siebeck, 1996), 87-190 at 117; Rudolf Schnackenburg, Das Johannesevangelium: III. Teil:
Kommentarzu Kap. 13-21 (HThKNT; Freiburg, 1976), 136; and Edwyn C. Hoskyns, The Fourth
Gospel: Vol. 2 (Francis Noel Davey, ed.; London: Faber & Faber, 1976), 569.
662 We owe this argument to George Smeaton, The Doctrine ofthe Holy Spirit (Edinburgh: Banner of
Truth, 1974: orig., 1889), 111 and 114. Cf. also William Hendriksen, The Gospel ofJohn (Edinburgh:
Banner of Truth, 1954), 314; M.-J. Lagrange, Evangile selon St. Jean (EtB; Paris: Gabalda, 1927),
413; Frederic Godet, Commentary on the Gospel ofSt. John (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1887), 170-1.
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That the Holy Spirit also derives his personal being from the eternal Logos
appears from John 16:12-15 in which Christ says:
I still have many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now. When the Spirit of truth comes,
he will guide you into all the truth; for he will not speak on his own, but will speak whatever he
hears....He will glorify me, because he will take what is mine and declare it to you. All that the
Father has is mine. For this reason I said that he will take what is mine and declare it unto you.
As Bruce Marshall explains, this text implies, according to the consensus of
Lutheran scholastics, that the Spirit proceeds not merely from the Father alone, but
also from the Son: a patrefilioque. In his words:
The Spirit, after all, fully shares the one divine essence with the Father and the Son. He is therefore in
full possession of the knowledge (that is, the omniscience) which the persons who possess that nature
enjoy. What then could the Spirit possibly "take" from the Son, or "hear" from the Son, if he already
has the divine essence from the Father alone? He would already have everything the Son could
possibly give him, everything which he could receive from the Son, without taking or "hearing" it
from the Son at all....If the Spirit takes from the Son at all, as John here says he does, then he can take
from him nothing less than the divine essence.663
John 16:12-15, accordingly, seems very much to indicate that the Holy Spirit
eternally proceeds not only from the Father, but also from the Son.
2. The specifically Trinitarian realities ofScripture. The Bible testifies clearly,
then, to: a) God's absolute simplicity; b) the soundness of the principle of the
transitivity of identity; and c) the existence of generation and spiration, the eternal
processions by which the Son originates from the Father and the Holy Spirit
originates from the Father and the Son. In each of the two eternal processions,
moreover, one can discern a principle and a term as well as two opposed relations:
that of the principium to the principiatum and vice versa. These are the specifically
Trinitarian realities identified by the Bible, i.e. those aspects of God that indubitably
pertain to the Trinitarian persons insofar as one can distinguish them from the one,
divine essence.
Some subset of these, or perhaps the whole set, it seems, must constitute the basis
of real distinction within the eternal Trinity: i.e. that element in virtue of which the
663 "The Defense of the Filioque in Classical Lutheran Theology: An Ecumenical Appreciation,"
NZSTh 44 (2002), 154-73 at 170.
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Father is really diverse from the Son, and in virtue of which the Father and Son are
really diverse from the Holy Spirit. Since the Bible reveals God's absolute
simplicity and the transitivity of identity no less than it reveals the real diversity of
the Trinitarian persons, one may reasonably suppose that whatever diversifies the
divine persons from one another does so in such a way as not to compromise the
doctrines of divine simplicity and the transitivity of identity.
3. The method of the proof. This necessary compatibility of the doctrine of the
Trinity with divine simplicity and the transitivity of identity, moreover, suggests a
simple means of discovering, by process of elimination, precisely what renders the
Trinitarian persons really distinct from each other. If a real distinction between two
Trinitarian realities as such proves incompatible with divine simplicity or the
transitivity of identity, then one can say with absolute certainty that these realities do
not diversify the Trinitarian persons. Such a verdict, of course, would not imply that
the realities in question pertain simply to the common, divine essence. It would
mean, rather, that these realities pertain to the Trinitarian persons qua distinct only
insofar as divine simplicity renders them identical to whatever actually diversifies the
persons of the Trinity. One can determine at least which Trinitarian realities do not
constitute the Trinitarian persons as distinct, then, simply by determining whether the
various conceivable distinctions cohere with the doctrines of divine simplicity and
the transitivity of identity.
4. The proof itself Divine simplicity, as we have seen, dictates that nothing in
God can differ objectively from the divine essence. The law of the transitivity of
identity, likewise, dictates that if any two realities are identical to some third reality,
they must also be identical to each other secundum rem, though not necessarily
secundum rationem: i.e. in fact though perhaps not in concept. One can reasonably
infer from the identity of divine justice and divine love with the divine essence,
therefore, that these two realities must be ultimately identical. One would commit
the fallacy of equivocation, however, if one argued in Darapti:664
664 The validity of syllogisms in Darapti has been contested on the grounds that universal
propositions lack existential import: i.e. that they abstract from the question ofwhether the classes to
which they refer possess actual members. Hence, the argument goes, one cannot reasonably deduce a
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1. Every virtue that is divine justice is divine love;
2. Every virtue that is divine justice is that virtue on account of which God must
punish sin; therefore
3. Divine love is that virtue on account of which God must punish sin.
This argument is no sounder than the following, also in Darapti:
1. Every star named Hesperus is Phosphorus;
2. Every star named Hesperus is the evening star; therefore
3. Phosphorus is the evening star.665
By employing the middle term secundum rem et non rationem in the major
premise and then secundum rem et_ rationem in the minor premise, the person who
argues thus generates a radically false conclusion secundum rationem.
The gap between res and ratio, of course, leads to no real distinction between the
divine attributes, because they can exist and function in the absence of a human
observer who would perceive them according to differentiated rationes. The divine
attributes, therefore, can differ only according to rational distinctions, i.e. distinctions
particular, contingent conclusion from universal premises that may refer to "null classes" or "empty
sets."
The theses that universal propositions always lack existential import, and that singular propositions
always possess existential import, however, seem not to be verified in ordinary discourse. For, contra
the second thesis, human beings utter singular propositions about, say, Leopold Bloom in full
knowledge that, in so doing, they are not predicating extra-mental existence of anything. Contra the
first thesis, moreover, the Apostle Paul utters the universal proposition, "there is no one who is
righteous, not even one" (Rom 3:10), and thereby expresses a contingent fact without in any way
prescinding from the conditions of actual existence.
In any event, those who regard universal propositions as incapable of intimating the existence of
particular things may conform our arguments in Darapti to their standards by supplying the premise,
"the sets referred to in this argument are not empty," in each case. We are indebted for the argument
of this footnote to 1. M. Bochenski, A History ofFormal Logic (Ivo Thomas, trans.; New York:
Chelsea Press, 1970), 221-4, 365-7 and Jacques Maritain, An Introduction to Logic (London: Sheed &
Ward, 1937), 225-33.
665 We owe this example to A. P. Martinich "Identity and Trinity," JR 58 (1978), 169-81 at 180.
Martinich himself credits the example to Leonard Linsky, "Hesperus and Phosphorus," Philosophical
Review 68 (1959), 515-19.
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imposed by human beings' limited powers of reasoning. They cannot, however,
differ in themselves. The same holds, it seems, for the principles and terms of the
divine processions and even the processions themselves insofar as one considers
these realities qua absolute, sc. in abstraction from the opposed relations. In fact,
one could even say, "Phosphorus is the evening star," in a true sense if one intended
these terms purely secundum rem abstracting from considerations of ratio.
The opposed relations to which the intra-Trinitarian processions give rise,
however, differ in one all-important respect from the divine attributes and the divine
processions, etc. when they are considered in abstraction from the relations. Unlike
these other realities, the intra-Trinitarian relations possess rationes in themselves
regardless of whether human beings contemplate them or not; i.e. they possess
rationes that are, in a certain respect, res. For human reasoning is not required to
diversify the divine begetter from the divine begotten; nothing begets itself. The
relations of the Son to the Father as his begetter and of the Father to the Son as his
only begotten, therefore, exist regardless of whether human beings consider these
relations in accordance with imperfect, human concepts.
When one reasons, then, in Darapti:
1. Every entity that is God is the divine Father;
2. Every entity that is God is the divine Son; therefore
3. The divine Father is the divine Son;
one does not, as in the syllogism concerning divine justice and divine love, reach a
conclusion that is invalid secundum rationem, but valid secundum rem. For the
rationes of the divine relations are res. The oppositions of relation implied in the
names "Father" and "Son," accordingly, render this syllogism and others like it
invalid not only secundum rationem, but also secundum rem. Unlike the principles
and terms of the divine processions and those processions themselves, insofar as
these are distinct from the relations of opposition, the intra-Trinitarian relations of
opposition do not simply collapse into each other under the collective weight of
divine simplicity and the transitivity of identity. It seems to follow, then, that
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relations of opposition alone can subsist in real distinction from each other without
undermining divine simplicity or the transitivity of identity.
5. Two difficulties. This conclusion, however, seems liable to two difficulties. It
might seem, first, that one who treats the relations of opposition between the persons
as res, and not merely rationes, implicitly denies the doctrine of divine simplicity;
and second, that the foregoing argument discredits the law of the transitivity of
identity and thus undermines one of its own presuppositions.
a. Persons, perfections, and simplicity. The first difficulty arises from the
following considerations. The relations' rationes, as distinguishing properties of the
divine hypostases, cannot constitute perfections of the divine essence; if they did,
each divine person would be imperfect insofar as he lacked the personal property of
the other two. Yet neither may one correctly regard them as mere aspects under
which one considers the one, divine res if these rationes constitute really distinct res
of themselves. In order to distinguish these relations' rationes from perfections of
the divine essence, then, it might seem that one must posit a real distinction between
the res of the relations and that of the divine essence. If one posited such a
distinction, however, one would represent the absolutely simple God of the Bible as a
fourfold composite. One might be tempted to conclude, therefore, that one ought to
avoid characterizing the intra-Trinitarian relations' rationes as really distinct res in
order to avert this intolerable consequence.
It seems at least negatively demonstrable, nonetheless, that the idea that the divine
relations possess, or rather are, really distinct res, and not merely rationes, does not
conflict with the divine simplicity. For, in spite of the "reality" of the relations'
rationes, one can reasonably differentiate, albeit to a very slight extent, between res
and ratio even in the divine relations. Specifically, one can justly distinguish
between the very existence of a divine relation and its reference to another: between,
in other words, its esse in and its esse ad.
The esse ad of a divine relation of opposition, i.e. that ratio by virtue of which it
is a relation, exists, as we have seen, not only in the rational, but also in the real order.
It exists in the real order, however, only by virtue of its identity secundum rem with
the relation's esse in. "The esse in," as Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange phrases it, "is
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the title to reality of the esse ad,"666 For a relation, as a reference of one thing to
another, cannot exist in the real order if it inheres in no real subject that admits of
being thus referred.
Although each divine relation's esse ad really exists by virtue of its objective
identity with the esse in of the divine essence, this esse ad, considered in abstraction
from the divine essence, has no being of itself that could be composed with the esse
in of the divine substance. The threat that this esse ad poses to divine simplicity,
therefore, seems nugatory. One cannot undermine the argument above to the effect
that only relations of opposition can diversify the divine persons, then, by
representing the identity of ratio and res in these relations as inconsistent with divine
simplicity.
b. Presuppositions about identity. One might also object, however, that the
outcome of this investigation seems to discredit, at least in a particular case, the
principle of the transitivity of identity. If the identity of the Father with God and of
the Son with God does not entail the identity of the Father and the Son, one might
argue, then the principle of the transitivity of identity is not universally applicable. If
this were the case, of course, it would be senseless to claim that only those
distinctions can exist within the Godhead, which do not violate the law of the
transitivity of identity. The method by which we have sought to determine precisely
what diversifies the Trinitarian persons, correspondingly, would be highly
misleading.
Exegetical and logical considerations, however, seem to falsify the thesis that the
arguments against Trinitarian orthodoxy fail because of some exception to the law of
the transitivity of identity. For, first, the Bible employs the law of the transitivity of
identity in reasoning about God. In Rev 4:11, for instance, one reads, "You are
worthy, our Lord and God, to receive glory and honor and power, for you created all
things, and by your will they existed and were created." One need merely supply the
suppressed premise of this enthymeme to translate this argument into the following
syllogism in Darii.
666 fhe Trinity and God the Creator: A Commentary on St. Thomas' Theological Summa, la. q. 27-
119 (St. Louis and London: Herder, 1952), 118.
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1. Every entity that created all things for its own pleasure is worthy of glory, honor,
and power;
2. God is an entity that created all things for its own pleasure; therefore
3. God is worthy of glory, honor, and power.
The Bible, therefore, disallows the conclusion that the law of the transitivity of
identity simply does not apply in divinis.
It seems likely, then, second, that those who argue in Darapti:
1. Every entity that is God is the divine Father;
2. Every entity that is God is the divine Son; therefore
3. The Father is the Son;
reach a false conclusion, not because the law of the transitivity of identity fails to
hold, but because they equivocate in their use of the syllogism's middle term, "every
entity that is God." When one speaks of God the Father, that is to say, one refers not
simply to God, but to God begetting. When one speaks of God the Son, however,
one refers, properly speaking, to God begotten. The premises of false syllogism
above, consequently, could be written as:
1. Every entity that is God begetting is the divine Father;
2. Every entity that is God begotten is the divine Son.
A middle term, in the proper sense of those words, simply does not exist in a
syllogism that identifies the Father with the Son on the basis of their common
identity with the divine essence. If one abstracts from the proper rationes of the
persons so as to render the middle term univocal, however, one renders the argument
of such a syllogism innocuous from the points of view of logic and orthodoxy. No
orthodox theologian should object, except perhaps on terminological grounds, to the
argument in Darapti\
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1. Every entity that is God is the divine Father abstracting without precision from his
fatherhood;
2. Every entity that is God is the divine Son abstracting without precision from his
sonship; therefore
3. The divine Father abstracting without precision from his fatherhood is the divine
Son abstracting without precision from His sonship.
In other words, the divine essence is the divine essence.
6. Conclusion. It seems, then, that one can establish, without appealing to extra-
Scriptural premises, that relative opposition alone diversifies the divine persons each
of whom is identical with the one, absolutely simple Godhead. In other words, "In
God all things are one, where no opposition of relation intervenes."667
667 DH 1330.
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V. Implications
From this justly acclaimed axiom follow a number of consequences of
inestimable importance for the theology of the Trinity. As we explained in Chapter 3,
the dictum "In God all things are one, where no opposition of relation intervenes,"
implies a) that the divine persons possess, as peculiar to themselves, only their
reference to each other and the properties that follow immediately therefrom; b) that
they, accordingly, can act only through God's essential omnipotence which is equally
identical with each of the three; c) that all divine acts ad extra may, in consequence,
be ascribed with equal right to any of the divine persons; and d) finally, that one may
not, therefore, legitimately infer the tripersonality of God from divine effects that
may appear to manifest the activity of three divine agencies. This implies, of course,
that human beings, at least before they enjoy the beatific vision, can possess
warranted true belief in the doctrine of the Trinity only if God communicates this
doctrine to human beings through concepts and/or words.
In the preceding sections of this chapter, therefore, we have established: a) that
Phil 2:6-7 ascribes two distinct natures to Christ so that one can give due credit to the
Scriptural evidence for his deity without implicitly denying its affirmations of his full
humanity; b) that the Holy Spirit constitutes a divine person in his own right, distinct
from the Father and the Son; c) that "in God all things are one where no opposition
of relation intervenes;" d) that the divine persons cannot manifest their distinctness to
human beings who do not enjoy the beatific vision without resorting to verbal, or at
least conceptual, forms of communication; and e) that the doctrine of the Trinity, at
least in its orthodox, Latin form, consequently, presupposes the doctrine of the
verbal/conceptual inspiration of Scripture.
Epilogue
We began this work with a massive critique of Rahner's contention that human
beings come to learn of the doctrine of the Trinity on the basis of inferences from
their experience of divine self-communication as mediated by the events of salvation
history and objectified in Scripture. We sought to prove, in this first half,
specifically: a) that a simultaneously simple and mutable God cannot correspond
precisely to his former self in any respect after undergoing the alterations Rahner
considers requisite to divine self-communication; b) that, even if such a God could
exempt the intra-Trinitarian relations from this sort of metamorphosis, human beings
would possess no means of knowing that he has actually done so if he does not,
through some verbal/conceptual revelation, inform them of this; c) that Rahner's own
insistence on the exclusively relative character of the intra-Trinitarian distinctions
precludes the possibility of God's revealing the doctrine of the Trinity through means
other than the beatific vision or verbal/conceptual revelation; and d) that one can
reconcile the Biblical accounts of Christ's anointing with the Holy Spirit, when
interpreted in accordance with the Grundaxiom, with Rahner's Latin Trinitarianism
only by so modifying one's understanding of the Grundaxiom itself as to render it
powerless to warrant inferences from the economy of salvation to the doctrine of the
Trinity. In Part 1, then, we supplied what we regard as conclusive evidence for each
of these four charges: any one of which, if substantiated, would suffice to render
Rahner's understanding of the means whereby God reveals the doctrine of the Trinity
incredible.
In Part 2, we attempted to complement the criticisms of Part 1 with some
constructive alternative. Specifically, we sought to demonstrate that the sixty-six
books of the Protestant, Scriptural canon, whose inerrancy, perspicuity, and
sufficiency we presupposed, actually contain, at least implicitly, the doctrine of the
Trinity in its orthodox, Latin form. We sought, accordingly: first, to establish the
deity and humanity of Jesus Christ on the basis of Phil 2:6-7; second, to vindicate the
distinct personality of the Holy Spirit; third, to vindicate the doctrines of divine
simplicity and the transitivity of identity; fourth, to establish the existence of the
specifically Trinitarian realities of Scripture, sc. the divine processions, their
principle and terms, and the relations between them; and, fifth, to ascertain precisely
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what diversifies the Trinitarian persons by determining which of these Trinitarian
realities may subsist as distinct in the divine essence without undermining the
principles of divine simplicity and the transitivity of identity. In accomplishing this
fifth task, we established that one can derive from Scriptural premises alone that
capstone of Latin, Trinitarian doctrine, the axiom, "In God all things are one, where
no opposition of relation intervenes." We saw that this axiom, moreover, implies
that the divine persons, by virtue of their ontological constitution, can exert no
distinct influences on creation. By sharing every aspect of the divine life in common
with the exception of their opposed relations, that is to say, the divine persons forfeit
the prerogative to act independently and so consent to influence creation only
through the one, absolutely undifferentiated divine omnipotence.
On account of this ultimate consequence of our argument in Part 2, one could
justifiably deem this work's second half an elaborate apologia for a fifth criticism of
Rahner's understanding of the process whereby God reveals the doctrine of the
Trinity to human beings: viz. that if the Trinitarian persons can exert no personally
differentiated influences on the world, then one cannot possibly learn of the doctrine
of the Trinity merely by reflecting on the economy of salvation as objectified in
salvation history or in one's private religious experience. In this case, it seems, one
could reasonably argue in modus tollendo ponens:
1. The divine persons can reveal the doctrine of the Trinity to human beings who do
not yet enjoy the beatific vision, if they can reveal it to such human beings at all, in
one of only two ways: by communicating this doctrine in verbal/conceptual form or
by exerting personally differentiated influences on creation from which the persons'
diversity could be inferred;
2. The divine persons, however, cannot exercise personally differentiated influences
on creation; therefore
3. If the divine persons can reveal the doctrine of the Trinity to human beings who do
not yet enjoy the beatific vision at all, they can reveal it only through a
verbal/conceptual revelation.
One cannot, therefore, reasonably believe the doctrine of the Trinity unless one
also believes that God has revealed this doctrine through concepts and/or words.
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